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PREFACE 
 
 
 
This thesis assesses the manner in which India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has 
emerged as the political face of Hindutva, or Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism. The 
insights of scholars like Christophe Jaffrelot, Ashish Nandy, Thomas Blom Hansen, 
Ram Puniyani, Badri Narayan, and Chetan Bhatt have been instrumental in furthering 
my understanding of the manifold elements of Hindutva ideology. I am grateful to 
Anil Padmanabhan, co-editor of Mint newspaper in New Delhi, whose guidance 
during my summer internship in 2009 exposed me to the predominant debates on 
Hindu nationalism. I appreciate the inputs of Kimberly Franklin at the Honnold-Mudd 
library of the Claremont Colleges. Our numerous meetings pointed me to a range of 
authors and online sources. 
I thank Professor Gastón Espinosa, whose class, Religion, Politics, and Global 
Violence, introduced me to the inextricable connections between faith and political 
power. His enthusiasm is infectious. Working with him on this thesis helped me wade 
through the seemingly endless writing process. I am indebted to Professor Roderic 
Camp, whose feedback and encouragement during the past year was invaluable in 
defining the scope and direction of this analysis. He has been truly wonderful as a 
reader, and even more so as a mentor.  
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TIMELINE 
Landmarks in Indian History  
 
 
1526-1858 
 
Mughal rule in India 
 
1858-1947 
 
India under British rule 
 
1947-89 
 
August 15, 1947: Indian independence from British rule 
 
January 26, 1950: Indian Constitution enforced 
 
1967: Congress Party defeated in nine states  
 
1969: Congress splits into two: Indian National Congress (Congress I) and Congress  
          Organization (Congress O) 
 
• Radical turn in Congress-bank nationalization 
• Garibi hato (end poverty) policy  
 
1971: Bangladesh attains independence from Pakistan. India sends troops to assist 
          Bangladesh. 
 
1974: Total Revolution, a movement initiated in the state of Bihar by Gandhian     
           leader Jay Prakash Narayan, spreads across north India.  
 
• Allahabad High Court judgment on corrupt electoral practices of Indira 
Gandhi-led Congress government leads to National Emergency. 
 
1975-77: Government declares Emergency 
 
1977-79: Congress defeated. Janata Party government assumes power. 
 
• Democracy restored after Emergency 
 
• July 1979- Janata government collapses 
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1980-88: Decade of turbulence because of separatist movements in Punjab and the    
               northeast 
 
• 1980- Indira Gandhi inaugurates another decade of Congress rule. 
 
• June 1984- Operation Blue Star launched by Congress. Indian army moves into 
Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, to flush out terrorists. Involves gun battle 
and attack on the Sikh place of worship. Leaves 550 dead.  
 
• October 1984- Congress-sponsored massacre of Sikhs. Indira Gandhi 
assassinated by Sikh bodyguards.  
 
• December 1984- Congress wins parliamentary elections due to “sympathy 
vote” after Indira Gandhi’s death. Rajiv Gandhi becomes Prime Minister. 
 
• 1986- Government passes Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce 
Act. Overturns Supreme Court judgment on Shah Bano case.  
 
• 1987- India deploys the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka 
 
1989-2010 
 
1989: Congress defeated following widespread allegations of corruption.  
 
• National Front government under V.P. Singh wins elections with BJP support 
 
1990: Mandal Commission Report implemented. Indian troops withdrawn from Sri   
          Lanka. 
 
1991: National Front government falls as BJP withdraws support following the first  
    major attempt to demolish the Babri mosque. Congress returns to power.  
 
• Rajiv Gandhi assassinated by Tamil suicide bomber 
 
• Structural Adjustment Program initiated under International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
 
1992: Babri mosque demolished due to Hindu right-wing mobilization.  
 
1996: Congress defeated in national elections. BJP emerges as single largest party in  
          Parliament. Is unable to garner support of other parties to form a coalition. 
          Congress-led United Front government supported by leftists takes over.  
 
  7 
1998: BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) takes power at the Center (union    
          level). India detonates three nuclear bombs. South Asian arms race begins. 
 
2002: Godra train attack on February 27, 2002 causes riots in the north western state  
          of Gujarat. 2,000 Muslims perish. 100,000 women and children are displaced. 
 
2004: BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition loses to Congress-led     
          United Progressive Alliance (UPA)  
 
2008: Mumbai terrorist attacks leave 175 persons dead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  8 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On May 16, 1998, under the directives of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP)-led coalition, the Indian government detonated three nuclear bombs in the 
Rajasthan desert, near a site called Pokhran.1 If the name of India’s inter-ballistic 
missile, Agni, the god of fire in the Vedic tradition, is inscribed in antiquity, its 
symbolism in 1998 was entirely new, reflecting the rise of a political party that 
emblematizes a chauvinistic, majoritarian stance.2  
To celebrate India’s accomplishment, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), a 
sister organization of the BJP, ordered the construction of a temple dedicated to 
Shakti, the goddess of strength, some fifty kilometers away from the testing site.3 The 
decision is an apt example of Hindutva ideologues’ use of the feminine metaphor of 
“innate strength” to legitimize aggression against external forces. Shortly after the 
nuclear tests, Bal Thackerey, the chairman of the Shiv Sena, a Mumbai-based Hindu 
nationalist ally of the BJP, declared that Hindus were no longer eunuchs—a notion 
that traces its roots back to the Mughal period which spanned three centuries.4 
Thackerey’s statement ironically subverted the idea of female power and reiterated the 
masculinist theme that has animated Hindu nationalism since its inception in the 
                                                 
1
 Chetan Bhatt, “Introduction,” in Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths (Oxford: 
Berg Publishers, 2001), 1-2. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 The Mughal period in India lasted from 1526 AD to 1858 AD. See footnote 15 for citation.  
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1920s. Hindutva’s sacralization of aggression had an anticipated consequence: 
Pakistan retaliated by exploding five nuclear bombs on May 28, 1998.5 
 The names of both countries’ missiles, Agni, the Vedic god of fire, and Ghauri, 
the famous Muslim conqueror,6 make real the monumental conflict between 
primordial Hinduism and medieval Islam that votaries of Hindu nationalism consider 
central to their political agenda.7 
The Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 reinstated the animosity between 
Islam and Hinduism, giving a new lease of life to the Hindutva cause.8 In 
contemporary India, where Hindus constitute about 80.5 percent of the total 
population, followed by Muslims (13.4 percent), Christians (2.3 percent), Sikhs (1.9 
percent), Buddhists (0.8 percent), Jains (0.4 percent), and others (0.7 percent),9 this 
legacy is encapsulated in the struggle between the dominant Hindu majority and a 
comparatively belittled Islamic community. In its capacity as the second most 
powerful national party with a voter base of about twenty-five percent of India’s 
population, the BJP has emerged as the most powerful organization for promoting the 
Hindu nationalist voice.10 
This study aims at assessing the dynamics of Hindutva, or Hindu ethno-
cultural nationalism, in the politics of the BJP from 1990 to 2010. It analyzes the inter-
                                                 
5
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 1-2. 
6
 The name Ghauri comes from the famous Afghan ruler Muhammad Ghauri, known to have invaded 
India seventeen times between the 11th and 12th centuries. The missile is also referred to as Hatf V, 
which was the sword used by Prophet Muhammad. See footnote 1 for citation.  
7
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 3.  
8
 Ibid. 
9
 For citation and further information, see table 1, pie chart 1, and map 3 in appendix. 
10
 As of 2010, the BJP possesses 116 of 552 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Indian Parliament), 
and 55 of 250 seats in the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Indian Parliament). For more information, see 
table 2 and map 1 in appendix. See footnote 1 for citation.  
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linkages between Hindu nationalism and extremism by evaluating the role of Hindutva 
rhetoric in inciting communal violence against India’s 138 million Muslims.11 
Through its investigation of the interplay between rhetoric and patterns of violence, 
the analysis will address three essential questions. How has the BJP used Hindutva 
ideology as an instrument of political mobilization? How has BJP-led communal 
violence impacted Indian society and politics? What role will Hindutva play in the 
future political agenda of the BJP?  
The first chapter of this thesis outlines the theoretical and intellectual 
developments that led to the rise of Hindutva as a form of Hindu ethno-cultural 
nationalism. The second chapter identifies the precursors to the BJP. It explores their 
organizational structures and missions to gauge the historical and political contexts 
from which the BJP borrowed. Chapter three details the evolution of the BJP and its 
core mobilization strategies. Subsequent sections of the thesis focus on specific cases, 
in order to illustrate how the BJP’s rhetoric and mobilization tactics have garnered 
Hindu support for communal violence against Muslims.  
Chapter four describes the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in 
1992, and assesses the role of the BJP in the demolition. It argues that Ayodhya was a 
catalyst for future communal violence; one such instance being the 1993 riots in the 
city of Mumbai. By demonstrating how southern, regional organizations like the Shiv 
Sena advanced Hindutva goals in the Mumbai riots, the chapter highlights the 
hierarchical tendencies in the BJP’s organizational and operational structures. The 
fifth chapter is a study of the Gujarat riots in 2002. It deals with the complicity of the 
                                                 
11
 For citation and further information, see table 1 in appendix. 
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BJP-led state government in the communal carnage, and exposes the absence of 
boundaries between religion and secularism in the Indian context. Chapter six explores 
the communal bias in the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA) 2002, which 
was legislated during the BJP’s reign at the Center.12 By demonstrating how the Act 
was used to indict Muslims in the Gujarat carnage (2002) and Mumbai blasts (2003 
and 2006), the chapter indicates POTA’s legacy in Indian politics.  
In light of the BJP’s consecutive electoral defeats in the 2004 and 2009 
national elections, the study proposes that the lack of a concrete socio-economic 
agenda is an impending loophole in the party’s political strategy. It also suggests that 
for the BJP to maintain its current national standing, a more pluralistic stance is of the 
essence. This being said, the thesis acknowledges that the BJP’s leadership has refused 
to forfeit Hindutva, despite the party’s defeat at the 2004 and 2009 union polls. It 
establishes that while the party’s share of the national vote has declined from 37.06 
percent in 1999 to 24.6 percent in 2009, the BJP remains the second largest political 
party in India.13 This not only indicates the continued presence of Hindutva in BJP 
politics, it also suggests that the BJP will rely on anti-minority violence to secure 
electoral victories.  
This evaluation does not seek to project Hindutva as an ideology that has 
gripped the entire nation. Much of this analysis focuses on political dynamics in north-
central India. Case studies in this thesis focus primarily on the states of Gujarat 
(Godhra) and Uttar Pradesh (Ayodhya). Yet, it is clear that Hindutva forces have 
                                                 
12
 “Center” is a term used interchangeably with “union government” or “national government.” See 
footnote 4 for citation.  
13
 For more information, see tables 1 and 2 in appendix.  
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established their presence in south Indian states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and 
Maharashtra14—though on a limited scale.15 This analysis therefore attempts to 
demonstrate the potency of Hindutva despite its essentially northern appeal.  
It is important to acknowledge that communalism in the modern Indian context 
is not a solely Hindu phenomenon. Islamic radicalism is an equally pressing concern 
for Indian statesmen.16 Muslim-led communal riots in the pre-Partition era caused the 
death of close to 250,000 Hindus.17 The 1967 riots in Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh) and 
Ahmedabad (Gujarat) were instigated by the Muslims in these cities. The 1987 riots in 
Pune (Maharashtra) commenced after Muslims burnt an idol of Lord Ganesha in a 
Hindu neighborhood.18 Shiv Sena volunteers involved in the 1993 Mumbai riots 
claimed that their actions were a response to Muslim resentment against the 
destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992.19 More recently, the alleged involvement of 
Muslim terrorists in the 2003, 2006, and 2008 Mumbai bombings have raised the ire 
of many in the Hindu community.20 
There are several reasons for the recent surge in Islamic violence in India. 
Internal indoctrination by conservative priests or mullahs; radical Islamic rhetoric that 
presents Muslims as both marginalized actors and subjects of Western exploitation; 
                                                 
14
 The 1993 Mumbai riots illustrate the BJP’s presence in southern India. The Shiv Sena, a regional ally 
of the BJP, led communal violence against Mumbai’s Muslims. The city of Mumbai is located in the 
south western state of Maharashtra. See footnote 14 for citation. 
15
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 1-2.  
16
 Ram Puniyani, “The Partition: Who was Responsible?,” in Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Lmt., 2003), 111. Note: “Pvt. Lmt.” is an abbreviation for 
“Private Limited.” The notation will be used in subsequent citations in this thesis. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid 
19
 Badri Narayan, “Introduction: Pastness and Politics,” in Fascinating Hindutva: Saffron Politics and 
Dalit Mobilization (New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Lmt., 2009), 17. 
20
 Ibid. 
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and economic disadvantages associated with demographic factors like high birth rates 
are some reasons for the emergence of Muslim-sponsored communalism in the 
country.21 Of equal significance is the fact that Hindutva rhetoric has proved damaging 
in this scenario. This assessment therefore underscores the manner in which the 
discourse and political activism of Hindutva ideologues, notably the BJP, have 
heightened the preexisting minority psychosis among Indian Muslims.22 
                                                 
21
 Puniyani, Communal Politics, 111. 
22
 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ORIGINS OF HINDUTVA 
 
Making Connections 
The birth of a distinctive view of Hindu supremacy is traced in historical scholarship 
to the violent but puzzlingly short period from 1919 to the mid-1920s.23 It was in 1923 
that V.D. Sarvarkar’s founding statement on Hindu identity (Hindutva—Who is a 
Hindu?) was published.24 The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was formed in 
1925, and Sarvarkar’s Hindu Mahasabha of 1916, the central organ for promoting 
Hindu demands during the Indian independence struggle, was strengthened.25 The idea 
of the Sangh Parivar, a family of Hindu nationalist organizations, took root during 
this period.  
These crystallizing events were direct consequences of Hindu resentment 
towards nationalist leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s support for the khilafat 
movement; a global Muslim campaign in support of the Caliphate after the Ottoman 
Empire’s demise in 1920.26 The rise of the All India Muslim League in the 1920s, 
Muslim demands for separate electoral representation, and agitation in the aftermath 
of the khilafat struggle led to the consolidation of a Hindu supremacist, anti-Muslim 
constituency in India. In this register, Hindu consciousness was viewed as an external 
                                                 
23
 Chetan Bhatt, “The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s Ordered Society,” in Hindu Nationalism: 
Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001), 79. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid, 80. 
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factor, subsidiary to the movement for self-determination, and of relatively minor 
importance until well after independence.27 
The link between Hindu consciousness and a nationalist view of political and 
social history became apparent in post-colonial India with the stabilization of the RSS 
in the 1960s, and the subsequent rise of its political arm, the BJP, in the 1980s.28 This 
notwithstanding, the works of three scholars (V.D. Sarvarkar, K.B. Hedgewar, and 
M.S. Golwalkar) during the pre-independence period were instrumental in the 
fructification of Hindutva: an ethno-cultural and nationalistic view of the Hindu 
religious tradition.29 
 
Sarvarkar’s Discourse on Radical Ethno-Nationalism 
 Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar was born in May 1883 in Bhagpur, a town in the 
Nashik district of Maharashtra in western India. He is celebrated in contemporary 
times as a revolutionary hero, a daring and courageous figure who fought the British in 
India.30 While British colonialism was the catalyst for much of Sarvarkar’s writing, his 
assessment of India’s past drew from both the ancient Vedic era and the medieval 
period of Mughal domination.31 Much of his work—he began writing in 1920 and 
continued until his death in 1966—is embedded in a dense hagiographical tone. His 
references to gods, saints, and medieval Hindu heroes stress themes of 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 The Vedic age lasted from the 1st millennia BC to the 6th century BC. The Mughal period lasted from 
1526 AD to 1858 AD. See footnote 1 for citation.  
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uncompromising militancy and masculine strength, both against British colonial rule 
and against Indian Muslims.32 
 
Definition of Hindu Identity 
Sarvarkar’s overarching aim was to provide a comprehensive definition of 
what constituted Hindu identity. To do so, he instituted Hindutva as the essence of 
Hinduness. Though he dismissed twentieth century views of Hinduism as rooted in 
Western ideas, Sarvarkar’s goal was not to reject Orientalist conceptions of India’s 
religious heritage.33 Rather, he wished to underscore that Hindu identity is not defined 
merely through personal or collective religious beliefs: “A Hindu means a person who 
regards this land of Bharatavarsha34 from the Indus to the seas as his Fatherland as 
well as his Holyland, that is, the cradle of his religion.”35  
In addition, Sarvarkar sought to introduce historically attenuated versions of 
what he believed were the foundations of Hindu dharma (religion). The strategic 
primordialization of Hindu identity proved essential in this regard.36 Despite his 
outward rejection of Western conceptions, “the intellectual conditions for the essence 
of Sarvarkar’s Hindu identity were the eighteenth and nineteenth century paradigms of 
[German and British] Orientalism.”37 He found in such views an unchanging quality to 
                                                 
32
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 1-2. 
33
 V.D. Sarvarkar, “Excerpts from Hindutva,” in Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and 
Articulation in the Twentieth Century, ed. Bidyut Chakrabarty (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 69. 
34
 “Bharatavarsha” is one of the several terms used by Sarvarkar to describe the Hindu nation. See 
footnote 9 for citation. 
35
 Sarvarkar, Communal Identity in India, 69. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
  
16 
the historicity of India. Time was purely serial, bereft of any consequence, and history 
was an outcome of external events: wars and invasions. Hinduism settled back to its 
steady state, in consonance with its primordial content once the external threat 
ceded.38 By linking Hindutva with history, Sarvarkar was able to temporalize and 
secularize Hindu religious identity.  
For Sarvarkar, the Hindu had come into being long before the Egyptian and the 
Babylonian; when the Aryans had crossed the Indus River to occupy India. This racial 
occupation of India’s geographical space during the Vedic age became a key 
component of Sarvarkar’s imagined Hindu nation.39 Accounts of the Aryans’ 
migration from the north to the south, an important facet of nineteenth century 
European Aryanism,40 figure extensively in the ideologue’s works.41 This elucidates 
the link between Hindutva and European nationalist writings. Further, it stresses the 
origins of the Aryan Race Theory and the Out of India Theory.42 The two are 
extensively employed by BJP cadres to root their antecedents in the “pure” Vedic 
civilization.43 
While Sarvarkar believed that the comingling of indigenous and Aryan blood 
gave rise to the Hindu-Vedic civilization, he clearly stated that Aryan blood, culture, 
                                                 
38
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 86. 
39
 Scholars believe that the Vedic period extended from the 1st millennia BC to the 6th century BC. See 
footnote 10 for citation. 
40
 Sarvarkar borrowed from the European nationalist writings of Gramsci, as well as the fascist writings 
of Hitler and Mussolini. Many of his ideas were rooted in German notions about the “pureness” of the 
Aryan race. See footnote 18 for citation. 
41
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 86.  
42
 Both the Aryan Race Theory and the Out of India Theory track Aryan migration (from Europe to 
India), thereby establishing Aryans (Hindus) as the true inhabitants of the Indian nation. See footnote 18 
for citation.  
43
 Ronald Neufeldt, “Hindutva and the Rhetoric of Violence: Interpreting the Past, Designing the  
Future,” in The Twentieth Century Confronts Its Gods: Globalization, Technology, and War, ed. David 
J. Hawkin (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 159. 
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and ideas were the ultimate basis of Hindu nationhood.44 For example, in his 
discussions of the Ramayana myth, Hanuman, the representative of non-Aryan groups 
in southern India, is depicted as a supporter of Rama’s Hindu mission to conquer the 
non-Aryan rakshasas (demons).45  
Interestingly, in assigning a primordial attribute to the word “Hindu,” 
Sarvarkar stressed that its roots were not indigenous. Of the above he said: “But when 
the self comes into contact with the non-self, then alone it stands in need of a name if 
it wants to communicate with others or if others persist in communicating with it.”46 
This dual structure to the patronymic is insightful. The word “Hindu” originated 
among the British, who are projected as invaders in Hindu nationalist writings. The 
primal patronymic, according to Sarvarkar, is therefore “a product of Vedic-Aryan 
conquest that is antagonized in history through conflict with others.”47 The term 
“Hindu” is conferred upon India, and outlives other labels like Bharata and Aryavarta, 
at the juncture where conflict and war intersect with the primal patronymic.48 
 
Fundamentalism in Sarvarkar’s Hindutva 
Sarvarkar’s writings during the 1930s featured a definitively stronger version 
of Hindutva.49 As noted earlier, European nationalism cast a profound impression on 
the ideologue. In the work of Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, Sarvarkar found an 
                                                 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 88. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid, 89. 
49
 Thomas Blom Hansen, “Imagining the Hindu Nation,” in The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu 
Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 77. 
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ideological framework that combined cultural pride and national self-assertion with a 
“vision of a homogenous nation embodied in a unitary state.”50 By 1938, Sarvarkar 
began drawing comparisons between Hindus and ethnic Germans and between Indian 
Muslims and German Jews. He repeatedly stated that an ethnically sound Hindu nation 
“should be inhabited only by pure-blooded Aryans.”51 Whereas Sarvarkar’s previous 
notions focused on race and territory, his subsequent ideas stressed the role of 
militarism and war.52  
The link between Hindu cohesion and German unification became the basis for 
Sarvarkar’s comparison between Hitlerism and the “cowardly democratic-socialist 
attitude” of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.53 The use of aggressive 
discourse to mobilize the economically downtrodden proved particularly effective 
during Sarvarkar’s lifetime. This provides another close parallel between right-wing 
European ideas and the ethno-cultural nationalism that was emerging in India. By 
focusing on economic apathy and disadvantage, Hindutva forces developed a 
totalitarian view of manushya (man) and his role in Hindu civilization.54 
Saffron is believed to be the color of purity and strength in Hindu mythology. 
It became a means of internal colonization55 for Hindu nationalists, who readily 
                                                 
50
 M.J. Akbar, “The Hitler Note: Or, Notes on Apocalypse Now,” in Riot After Riot: reports on caste 
and communal violence in India (New Delhi: Roli Books Pvt. Lmt., 2003), 167.  
51
 Sarvarkar, Communal Identity in India, 70. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 107. 
54
 Akbar, Riot After Riot, 179. 
55
 “Internal colonization” refers to the manner in which Aryanism was used to consolidate national 
power in the hands of the elitist brahaminical or priestly class. The Hindu nation envisioned by 
Sarvarkar was unified only in so far as it ascribed Hindu identity to the lower castes. In all other 
respects, the project catered to the whims of the upper castes.  See footnote 33 for citation.  
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employed fascist appeals to insignia56 while constructing the “otherness” of non-
Hindus.57 Armed with Hitler’s ideas on the purity of the German race, and Mazzini’s 
delineation of present humiliation and past glory, Hindutva ideologues reinforced the 
superiority of Hindu brahamins (priests).58 Thus began the internal colonization of 
India, and the subjugation of all other castes and religions under the pretext of 
securing a unified Hindu nation.  
 
Muslim Identity and Reinterpretation of Indian History 
Hindutva’s emphasis on aggression ensured that the Buddhist period between 
the Mauryan era (321-185 BC) and the Mughal sultanate (1526-1858 AD) barely 
received space in Sarvarkar’s historical scheme.59 Sarvarkar found Buddhism’s 
universal, non-violent approach profoundly emasculating; demeaning to India’s 
martial heritage.60 Sarvarkar’s repudiation of Buddhism also underscored his 
opposition to the pacifist Gandhian ideas that typified India’s freedom struggle during 
the 1930s and 40s.  
With Sarvarkar, and the simultaneous advent of Gandhi, there emerged two 
distinct interpretations of a modern Indian nation based on Hindu values. Sarvarkar’s 
cultural nationalism was masculine, aggressive, and anti-Muslim, but also rational and 
                                                 
56
 The bhagwa dhwaj (saffron flag) is for Hindu nationalists what the swastika (equilateral cross with 
arms bent at right angles) was for proponents of Nazism. See footnote 33 for citation.  
57
 Robert E. Frykenberg, “Hindutva as a Political Religion,” in The Sacred In Twenty-First Century  
Poitics, ed. Roger Griffin, Robert Mallett, and John Tortorice (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 
205.  
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ajit Karnik, “Sarvarkar’s Hindutva,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 15 (April 12-18, 
2003), 1426. 
60
 Ibid. 
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progressive.61 Gandhi’s views, in contrast, were rooted in tradition. He stressed the 
notion of swadeshi (economic self-reliance) and—unlike Sarvarkar who remained 
ambivalent about Western culture—projected peaceful nationalism against the 
backdrop of all that the West lacked.62 Sarvarkar perceptibly refuted these ideas. His 
anti-Gandhian stance was strengthened on another account: M.K. Gandhi’s support for 
Indian Muslims. These two features of Sarvarkar’s Hindutva, its militant activism and 
anti-minority appeal, figure prominently in the contemporary discourse of the BJP and 
its allies.63 
The elevation of India’s ancient past and the repudiation of non-violent action 
in India’s modern history were accompanied in Sarvarkar’s discourse by a staunch 
dismissal of the medieval period. Sarvarkar readily employed the racial homogeneity 
of the Vedic era to demonstrate how the Mughals had destroyed and dismembered 
ancient archetypes of Aryanism.64 In fact, the myth of Vedic origin allowed Sarvarkar 
to undermine all external forces. The essentials of the Hindutva landscape, blood ties 
to India’s territory and a caste system founded on the purity of upper caste (Aryan) 
blood, contextualized much of Sarvarkar’s critique of the British and Muslim eras.65  
In an effort to undermine Muslim identity, Sarvarkar focused on Hindu martial 
clans like the Marathas and Rajputs. He presented medieval Hindu princes like Shivaji 
and Rana Pratap as epitomes of the Hindu essence. In addition, Sarvarkar cited 
medieval directives such as the imposition of jaziya, or pilgrimage tax, as evidence of 
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the atrocities Hindus bore under Muslim colonialists.66 His disdain for Muslim 
domination stemmed from the belief that Muslims had denied Hindus the opportunity 
to profess their faith.67 He held that religious stringencies68 were responsible for both 
the economic marginalization of Hindus and the communalization69 of India’s social 
space: “When Muslims penetrated India, the question of life and death 
began…Muslim rulers systematically plundered the wealth of Hindus…the 
illegitimacy of jaziya drove a wedge between the two communities.”70 Sarvarkar’s 
repudiation of Mughal rule has made inroads into the BJP’s rhetoric. Featured in an 
essay on the BJP’s official website is the following quote:  
During the era of Islamic invasions, what Will Durant called the bloodiest 
period in the history of mankind, many Hindus gallantly resisted, knowing fully 
well that defeat would mean forced conversion, economic discrimination via the 
jaziya tax, or death. It is no wonder that the residents of Chittor, and countless 
other people over the length and breadth of Bharat [India], from present-day 
Afghanistan to present-day Bangladesh, thought it better to die gloriously rather 
than face cold-blooded slaughter. Hindus will never forget the repeated 
destruction of the Somnath Temple, the massacre of Buddhists at Nalanda, or 
the pogroms of the Mughals.71 
 
The rationale of Muslims’ extra-terrestrial loyalties was used by votaries of 
Hindutva to create an anti-minority psychosis among Hindus. In institutionalizing this 
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reversal of affective states, a major problem for Hindu communalists was how the 
majority could be made to fear the minority. Their solution: repeated references to the 
Muslim brutes who specialized in sexual aggression against Hindu women.72 In 
Sarvarkar’s view, Muslim conquerors raped Hindu women to sully the honor of Hindu 
men: “Hindu women…were distributed in fives or tens amongst the most faithful 
followers of Islam. Their future progenies were Muslim.”73  
Sarvarkar’s preoccupation with medieval struggles between Hindus and 
Muslims led to a narrow reading of Indian history, rendering Muslim identity a 
contested category. His substitution of Hinduism by Hindutva ironically augmented 
race at the cost of religion.74 In claiming that Muslims and Christians had to be 
excluded from India because they were religiously dissimilar to Hindus, Sarvarkar 
overlooked the fact that the communities’ racial identities were coextensive with their 
religious leanings.75 Instead of rejecting the race-caste connection, Sarvarkar 
generalized the category of race by arguing that Hindu religious constitution76 
accounted for the primary difference between colonizers and the true inhabitants of 
India. Sarvarkar’s view of Hindutva as comprising racial and geographic elements—
Vedic-Aryan blood and territorially ordained descent—contained another loophole.77 
It failed to account for those Muslims who could lay claims to Indian territory owing 
                                                 
72
 Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, “The Long Shadow of Gandhiji’s  
Assassination,” in RSS, School Texts and the Murder of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications Pvt. Lmt., 2008), 83. 
73
 Sikata Banerjee, “The Feminization of Violence in Bombay: Women in the Politics of the Shiv 
Sena,” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 12 (December 1996), 1215. 
74
 Ibid/ 
75
 Sarvarkar, Communal Identity in India, 69. 
76
 Sarvarkar seems to have concluded that the Aryans (as a race) were the forefathers of Hinduism 
(religion).  See footnote 42 for citation.  
77
 Misra, Identity and Religion, 172. 
  
23 
to the practice of inter-marriage. In lieu of the above, Sarvarkar introduced a third 
criterion for membership to the Hindu nation. The idea of a common culture 
constituted by both Hindu religion and Sanskrit language came to occupy the center 
stage in his theory.78 
Although Sarvarkar sought a collective Hindu-Muslim front to curb British 
colonialism and synthesize the political aspirations of the two communities, Muslim 
demands for a separate nation turned him against inter-communal collaboration.79 The 
solidification of the Pakistani state during the 1960s played an instrumental role in 
advancing Hindutva. Many deemed it necessary to establish counterweights to an 
intensely Islamic neighbor.80 Sarvarkar’s construction of the Muslim male as lustful 
and threatening corresponded to his view of Indian Muslims as supporters of Pakistan 
and agents of pan-Islamism.81  
It is important to note that Sarvarkar’s scheme overlooked Hindu-Muslim 
syncretism during the medieval era. It repudiated the links between the Hindu bhakti 
movement and the Muslim sufi tradition—both anti-establishment campaigns that 
sought to evade social hierarchies and move beyond deterministic orientations of 
identity.82 Rather than incorporating notions of religious cohesion, Sarvarkar’s 
Hindutva sought to bind Hindu men and women in an intensely nationalistic 
framework by juxtaposing India’s martial heritage with the fertile, feminine nature of 
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India’s geography. Hindustan became the pitrubhoomi, or the Fatherland, and the 
matrabhoomi, or the Motherland.83 
Sarvarkar’s vision of Hindu nationalism consisted of five salient elements. 
First, it was anti-Muslim and presented the medieval era as a period of Hindu 
exploitation. Second, it denounced Gandhian precepts of non-violence and favored 
India’s martial tradition.84 Third, it extolled the Aryan race and the virtues of blood 
ordained caste hierarchies. Fourth, it established blood ties to India’s territory as the 
basis for membership to the Hindu state.85 Lastly, it promoted the idea of a common 
Hindu culture based on Hindu religion and Sanskrit language. These components 
became the foundations of Hindu nationalism in India and are visible in the goals and 
charters of Sangh Parivar organizations.86 
 
Hindu Nationalism under K.B. Hedgewar and M.S. Golwalkar 
 The ideas of Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1940)87 and Madhav Sadashiv 
Golwalkar (1906-1973)88 built upon many of Sarvarkar’s notions. Brahamins from 
western Maharashtra and co-founders of the Rashtriya Sawayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 
the parent organization of the Sangh Parivar, both Hedgewar and Golwalkar proposed 
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that India’s colonization was a result of the weak and disaggregated approach of 
Hindus in the nation.89 
 
An Overview of Indian History  
Golwalkar and Hedgewar presented medieval accounts of Muslim domination 
to demonstrate the organization and strength of Indian Muslims, thereby exhorting 
Hindus to rise to the occasion.90 In his treatise on Hindu nationalism, We, or Our 
Nationhood Defined (1939), Golwalkar sought to link Sarvarkar’s conception of the 
Hindu nation with the notion of a Hindu state. Although he endorsed Sarvarkar’s 
views on the antiquity and truism of India’s Vedic civilization, Golwalkar argued that 
the Aryans were not exogenous to India.91 Yet, both Golwalkar and Hedgewar claimed 
that the Hindu nation should not be viewed as the exclusive property of India’s 
original inhabitants. Distinguishing between nation and state, they maintained that the 
latter was distinguishable from and subservient to the national concept.92 The two 
ideologues repudiated Buddhist pacifism and Gandhian non-violence. Like Sarvarkar, 
they focused on the eight hundred-year period following the arrival of the Mughals in 
India.93 
 
Hindu Identity and the Social Organization of the Hindu State 
The BJP’s political jargon of “one nation, one culture, one language, and one 
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race” draws in multiple ways from the writings of early Hindutva ideologues.94 Both 
Hedgewar and Golwalkar endorsed the parallels between Nazism and Hindutva, and 
stressed the common racial spirit of the imagined Hindu nation.95 
 The complete abandonment of civic nationalism, which began under 
Sarvarkar, found a continuous chain of supporters through India’s pre and post 
colonial periods. As with Sarvarkar, culture was indistinguishable from religion for 
Golwalkar and Hedgewar. This link formed the basis of a race consciousness.96 
Golwalkar’s use of somatic metaphors—the healthy body of the Hindu nation being 
plagued by the minority cancer—supplemented his ideological double binds in which 
minorities could not be anything other than foreign, and therefore, could not claim 
citizenship to the Hindu nation.97 According to Golwalkar, “The non-Hindu people in 
Hindustan must adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold 
in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of glorification of the 
Hindu culture and race…We are an old nation; and let us deal, as old nations ought to 
deal, with foreign races who have chosen to live in our country.”98   
Interestingly, while Golwalkar and Hedgewar rejected Sarvarkar’s emphasis on 
the caste system (varnashramadharma) and sub-caste hierarchies (jatis), they 
promoted the idea of a uniform racial heritage. Like Sarvarkar, they advocated rigid 
hierarchical organization in the RSS.99 The need to efface hierarchical power in order 
                                                 
94
 Ibid. 
95
 Ibid, 132. 
96
 Ibid, 129.  
97
 Ibid. 
98
 Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, RSS, School Texts and the Murder of  
Mahatma Gandhi, 83. 
99
 Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 83. 
  
27 
to sustain the RSS brotherhood highlights that the Hindutva movement was founded 
on the premise of political clout.  
In addition to providing structure to Hindutva organizations, the notion of a 
uniform racial heritage was pivotal to Golwalkar and Hedgewar’s conception of a 
democratic state. The two argued that in the absence of race-based organization, local 
decision-making bodies like the village panchayats would cease to function 
effectively as arbiters of dispute.100 The curtailment of state power to preserve 
democracy clearly indicates Hindutva ideologues’ desire for control over India’s 
religious affairs.  
Although operating within the same organicist paradigm, the aforementioned 
figures disagreed with respect to the strategies needed to achieve the Hindu rashtra 
(nation). Sarvarkar focused on politics, agitation, and mass mobilization, whereas 
Golwalkar and Hegdewar focused on character building.101 The crystallization of these 
two positions marked a restaging of the double-stringed strategy of gradual cultural 
change and public political articulation, which had emerged during India’s freedom 
struggle.102 
 
Upadhyaya’s Integral Humanism  
Equally pivotal to the Hindutva scheme are the ideas of Deendayal Upadhyaya, 
an RSS volunteer who wrote in post-colonial India during the 1960s. Borrowing from 
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theologian Shankaracharya’s advaita103 (non-dualism or spiritual monism)104 
philosophy, Upadhyaya developed the precepts of integral humanism; a premise that 
figures repeatedly in the charters and expressed goals of the BJP.105 Upadhyaya’s 
project was promethean. It sought to erase caste antagonisms and create a harmonious 
society based on ideals from India’s Vedic past. Yet in offering equity among castes in 
Indian society, Upadhyaya’s scheme appealed to the inequalities in the religious 
domain: A unified Hindu community could be achieved only after Muslim influences 
had been eliminated from the nation.106 
 
Advaita and Hindutva  
Upadhyaya used advaita philosophy to stress the principle of ekamata; a form 
of unity that pervades the universe, and of which humankind is a part. He frequently 
equated the human body, mind, intellect, and soul with the four universal objectives of 
kama (pleasure), artha (wealth), dharma (duty or natural law), and moksha (salvation). 
In so doing, he denounced economic systems like capitalism which accord autonomy 
to the individual.107 By employing concepts like political morality, saryodaya (welfare 
for all), and swadeshi (economic self-sustenance), Upadhyaya’s integral humanism 
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“ideologically hijacked” the authority of the Gandhian idiom.108 These notions figure 
widely in contemporary Hindutva. Contrary to the virtues of equality, Sangh Parivar 
politics focuses on the upper echelons of society, arousing mass consciousness only in 
name.109 
 
Conception of the Hindu State and Projection of the Enemy 
A staunch anti-modernist, Upadhyaya was deliberate in his choice of 
vocabulary. He stressed the power of Hindu dharma (duty) in relation to both society 
and the state, arguing that democracy is based on a hierarchical division of power that 
corresponds to the four ultimate objectives of life.110 Despite his denials, Upadhyaya’s 
conception of dharma oscillated between natural law, national soul, and the Hindu 
nation. This demonstrates that he envisioned democracy as subservient to a religious 
imperative. Upadhyaya’s discussions on secularism weigh against the ideology’s core 
principles, given that they necessitate social hierarchy, while simultaneously stressing 
the idea of an undifferentiated Hindu race.111 
In assessing the interrelationships between secularism and democracy, it is 
important to note that unlike the Western world, India lacks a formal segregation 
between the religious and civic spheres.112 Religious practices among Hindus, 
Muslims, Sikhs, and Jains are co-extensive with the communities’ cultural activities. 
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Festivals and celebrations among these groups frequently possess religious 
underpinnings. Given the above, the conventional understanding of secularism, “as an 
ideology conveying social and political equality,” appears a denial of the veracity of 
the Indian way of life.113         
 The Indian notion of secularism is influenced by the Hindu belief that various 
faiths offer different paths that lead to the same truth. Hindutva adopts this view, but 
with one crucial difference. It asks where the limits of the traditional acceptance of 
plurality lie, and takes it upon itself to defend the freshly demarcated boundaries.114 
The problem with Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism is not that it regards religion as an 
encompassing phenomenon but that it insists on the compatibility and transferability 
of secular and Hindu rationalities. The resultant dichotomies between the civil and 
religious realms engender strife among communities. Furthermore, faith based politics 
reinforces religious norms that perpetuate social hierarchies.115  
Upadhyaya evidently appealed to the long-standing intersections between the 
religious, political, and social spheres. In the end, his failure to separate religion and 
nationalism significantly reduced the political currency of his secular rhetoric.116 
Taking cue from Upadhyaya’s ideas, pro-Hindutva scholars like Ashish Nandy and 
Tarun Vijay have employed the religious imperative to stress that secularism is a 
colonial remnant. They maintain that secularity was imposed to create rifts between 
                                                 
113
 Ibid. 
114
 Deepa S. Reddy, “Ethnicism as Critique,” in Religious Identity and Political Destiny: Hindutva in 
the Culture of Ethnicism (New York: AltaMira Press, 2006), 176.  
115
 Embree, Prospects for Peace in South Asia, 168. 
116
 Ibid. 
  
31 
Hindus and Muslims.117 Unlike Upadhyaya, who embraced religious tolerance in 
theory, Nandy and Vijay posit secularism as antithetical to the aim of a unified India: 
 It is important to recognize that one of the major reasons for the rise of 
religious fundamentalism is the excess of ideological secularism and its 
emergence as a dogma…by subverting religion as generally understood, 
secularism sets off a reaction in the form of fundamentalism, which usually is a 
perversion of religion and has less to do with the purity of faith and more to do 
with the acquisition of power.118  
 
To advance the idea of an undivided India, an Akhand Bharat, Upadhyaya 
continuously counterposed his imagined Hindu nation with countries like Pakistan and 
China. The first case, presents an enemy that was primordially part of the self, but that 
has betrayed and denied the fulfillment of the self.119  In the second case, the enemy is 
projected as so radically removed from the self that annihilation proves the only 
logical counterweight. By delving into the notion of selfhood and constructing the 
category of the “other,” Hindu nationalist forces concede to an important fracture in 
their conception of Hindu superiority.120 That Hindus readily converted to other faiths 
in the Mughal and British eras, and in post-colonial India,121 suggests that it is 
Hinduism that is left wanting. Hindutva’s problem with “otherness” is, therefore, just a 
means of masking the inherent failings in Hindu society. This is precisely the point at 
which Hindu nationalism relinquishes the Hinduism project and establishes itself as an 
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ideological substitute of the latter.122 For this reason, Hindu nationalism has been 
unimportant for epistemological and metaphysical advancements, but incredibly 
significant for the substitution of Hinduism by the materialist concerns of territory, 
culture, xenology, and state power.123 
 
Ideological Formulations and Hindutva Rhetoric  
 To ascertain Hindutva’s impact on Indian societal formations, it is essential to 
explore the ways in which ideology operates. Ideological constructions perform two 
crucial roles. First, they act as lenses with which humans can view the world. Ideology 
“converts…contingency into an ostensibly stable symbolic order that promises to 
close gaps in social existence through the construction of a more harmonious social 
world.”124 Ideology becomes a means of either repudiating facts or embracing new 
knowledge. It then emerges as an affect of power; an attempt to conceal the raw 
contingency of the world. This allows ideology to perform the powerful function of 
articulating “subjects” and “objects.” The disunity between imagery and symbolic 
orders at the subject level eventually paves the way for the creation of communities as 
objects of intense hatred.125  
According to this framework, anti-Islamism in India is a consequence of 
rhetoric that holds Muslims responsible for fissures in Indian society. Hindutva 
rhetoric has indeed influenced the manner in which Hindus view Muslims. The 
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ferocity of violence during Hindu-led riots in Ayodhya (1992) and Gujarat (2002) 
bears testimony to this trend.126 The potency of hatred among common people is 
expressed openly and candidly. With reference to a communal incident in Dattawadi, 
Pune, in 1987, a Hindutva follower from a low caste grassroots organization called the 
Patit Pawan stated, “Our Ganesh idols had been defiled by them…we actually 
terrorized [the Muslims] and they could not fight us [they were in a minority]. We 
burnt their houses and broke them down. We did not get enough time because the 
police came immediately.”127 
The aforementioned example illustrates the need for concrete frameworks to 
gauge the multiple levels on which Hindutva operates. Two ideological paradigms are 
particularly instructive in assessing the impacts of Hindu nationalism holistically: the 
modernity versus anti-modernity debate (culturalism) and the Marxist theory on 
economic relations (instrumentalism). 
 
West vs. Rest: The Modernity vs. Anti-Modernity Debate 
In The Renewal of the Radical Right, Michael Minkenberg says of right-wing 
radicalism: 
It is defined as a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a 
homogenous nation…the contemporary religious right wants government by the 
people, but in terms of ethnocracy rather than democracy…The nationalistic 
myth is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of national belonging by 
radicalizing ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion, to 
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condense the idea of a nation into an image of extreme collective 
homogeneity.128  
 
 Western scholars attempting to study the birth of radicalism in the Third 
World have frequently used the European model, where extremism has been explained 
in terms of the psychological conditions of anxiety faced by people under the stress of 
modern-technological societies.129 However, the religious extremism defined by V.D. 
Sarvarkar and practiced by BJP leaders like L.K. Advani cannot be explained in terms 
of the psychological dilemma (owing to modernization) of the Hindu majority, as 
Muslims in India arguably face similar societal and psychological constraints.130 
According to Sumit Sarkar, pro-Hindutva scholars like Ashish Nandy project 
modernity as the core cause of Hindu extremism, shying away from the inbuilt biases 
in Hindu nationalist ideology. By refusing to accept that the comingling of faith and 
politics taints the Hindutva perspective, Nandy offers a superfluous reading of Hindu 
religion. His view of modernity does little in the way of offering insights into Hindu 
nationalism.131 
While the modernity versus anti-modernity approach appears less useful in 
explicating the extremist tendencies in Hindutva politics, the essence of 
fundamentalism is nonetheless found in the ideology and praxis of Sangh Parivar 
organizations.132 In the first volume of Major Religious Fundamentalisms Observed, 
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby state: “Fundamentalists begin as traditionalists 
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who perceive some challenge or threat to their core identity, both social and personal. 
They are not frivolous, nor do they deal with peripheral assaults. If they lose on the 
central issues, they believe [they’ve lost] everything. They react; they fight back with 
great innovative power.”133 The above mentioned description of fundamentalism 
provides a comprehensive picture of Hindutva in India. Indeed, Hindu violence against 
Muslims, and more recently against Christians,134 stems from projecting the image of 
“the Hindu” being threatened by believers of another land.135  
 
Marxists on Economic Relations  
 Traditional Marxists view the political processes as a means of intervention 
directed at creating a new social order.136 Politics for them is essentially the site of 
conflict among contending social classes. A few distinctive features of Indian politics 
may be stated for the purpose of finding an appropriate relationship between Hindutva 
forces and the socio-economic soil on which they thrive.137 The most significant 
feature of the current phase in Indian politics is that a majority of the competing actors 
belong to different fractions of the upper class. This competition among ruling elites is 
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unfolding at a time when the exploited are not in a position to effectively challenge the 
dominant class.138 
Political rivalry among the empowered sections of society is fierce, as each 
section requires control of state apparatuses to lay claims over economic surpluses. 
This struggle has nullified the left-of-center politics of the Congress Party.139 In a 
country where modes of production are in an uneasy stage of equilibrium, the 
processes of capitalism and globalization have only accentuated domestic social 
disparities.140  
Hindutva found new footing in the 1990s because it used social discontent over 
the crisis of capital accumulation in India to its advantage.141 On one hand, the BJP 
seeks to appease its traditional, upper caste voter base by opening India’s economy to 
trade and foreign investment. On the other hand, the party has consciously appealed to 
the ideal of a unified India to expand its base and endear the Hindu masses. In sum, 
Hindutva has become the instrument that allows the BJP and its allies to employ 
religious symbolism in political contests.142  
 
Hindutva Rhetoric and Communal Violence 
 The key to understanding the complex links between communal violence and 
militant nationalist discourses lies in three stages. First, are the everyday patterns of 
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exchange, often marked by discrete separations or back-to-back interactions.143 Sunil 
Kakar points out that in the case of the Muslim community in India, patterns of 
separation have been reinforced by the segregation of living spaces and occupational 
endeavors. The social void between Hindus and Muslims has in turn promoted 
stereotypes pertaining to the impure living conditions and dietary habits among 
Muslims.144 Muslims, on the other hand, regard the medieval militant tradition of the 
Rajputs and Sikhs as indicative of a mob psychology among Hindus. Communal 
tension, often a consequence of economic and spatial distinctions, is the precursor to 
institutionalized forms of communal violence.145  
Second, the narratives and actual experiences stemming from riots and other 
forms of communal violence establish the “other” as the source of absolute evil.146 In 
his study, Kakar focuses on how wrestlers, or pehelwans, in both Hindu and Muslim 
communities are projected as heroes possessing immense martial prowess. While 
assaults on women and children are viewed as acts of transgression, pehelwans seek to 
commit such acts, seemingly to justify similar acts during subsequent retaliations.147 
Rumor and myth construction are integral to this process. They act as instruments of 
mobilization, encouraging individuals to engage in communal conflict.148 
This leads to the third and final dimension of the reproduction of communal 
violence: the formation, organization, and dissemination of political identities around 
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discourses on the “other.”149 Provocation, usually through celebrative of funerary 
processions that encourage direct confrontation among communities, is an important 
mode of sustaining violence.150  
According to Thomas Blom Hansen, the fundamental reason behind the 
capacity of ethnic hatred is the lack of self-esteem within a particular community. 
Fissures along caste and occupational lines demand a scapegoat: the Muslims appear 
ready targets.151 The economic agenda of the Hindu elites, and upper castes’ desire to 
retain their positional authority by preventing low castes’ empowerment, has 
instigated violence since the inception of the BJP. A similar hypocrisy has been the 
idealization of women as inherently peaceful, despite their prominence in the 
communal activities152 of the Sangh Parivar.153   
There are obvious discrepancies between localized expressions of communal 
enmities and the more generalized majoritarian discourses on the Hindu nation. It is 
clear, however, that the nationalistic, anti-minority rhetoric of the BJP has left its mark 
on local communities.154 Moreover, communal violence (both at the local and national 
levels) is cyclical and persists across centuries. The replication of violence illustrates 
its nature and utility:  
Violent acts are dramatic productions, creations of specific groups, persons and 
political parties, operating through institutionalized networks within a discursive 
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framework of Hindu-Muslim communal antagonism, which in turn produces 
specific forms of political practice that make violence integral to the political 
process.155 
 
Hindus and Hindutva 
Is there a community of Hindus that will vote for Hindutva ideologues 
unfailingly? Will the BJP win all elections if all voters were Hindu by birth? As far as 
practicing Hindus are concerned, the two scenarios seem unlikely.156 Even the most 
ardent Hindu believes that it is unethical to denounce either Buddhist pacifism or the 
medieval legacy of syncretism,157 as encapsulated in the Hindu bhakti movement and 
the Islamic sufi tradition.158 Religious harmony remains a crucial part of a Hindu ethos 
that stands on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and love for all beings. It is 
this equality of status that Hindutva most vehemently opposes. Though it seeks to 
endear all sections of society by espousing the rubric of a unified nation, Hindutva’s 
ultimate allegiance lies with the high castes and elites.159 
Communal violence in Gujarat, Ayodhya, and Mumbai has made people aware 
of the cleavages in Hindutva rhetoric. They have begun questioning the idea of a 
Hindu rashtra (nation) founded on the premise of denigrating Muslims.160 One of the 
staunchest opponents of the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, in 1992, was 
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the head priest of a Rama temple adjacent to the site. Mahant Lal Das was vocal in his 
disapproval and paid with his life. He was brutally murdered on November 16, 
1993.161 Another instance of the non-malleability of Hindu society in relation to 
Hindutva designs was seen a couple years ago. Following its defeat in the 2004 
parliamentary elections, the BJP tried to mobilize Hindus to oppose the arrest of the 
Shankaracharya of Kanchi, a Hindu spiritual leader from southern India, in a case 
involving internal rivalries within his muth (religious organization). The effort failed 
to win adherents, as the Shankaracharya’s significance was limited to one sect of 
brahamins (priests) in the south. The BJP clearly miscalculated the relevance of the 
issue to the Hindu masses.162  
 Though many Hindus genuinely buy into the “Hindutva ideal,” there is 
significant resistance from within Hindu ranks to being mobilized in this way. 
Backward classes and lower caste dalits fear being used as political implements for 
electoral feats. Feminists and homosexuals seek greater social freedoms. Corporate 
executives and entrepreneurs understand that political stability will augment their 
fortunes.163 
 Evidently, the masses have not blindly endorsed the secularism of pro-
Hindutva scholars, who view communalism as a product of modern democratic 
governance. Hindus are gradually realizing that while secularism is always in the 
process of becoming, ethno-religious majoritarian rule is not a viable substitute.164  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SETTING THE STAGE: PRECURSORS TO THE BHARATIYA JANATA 
PARTY 
 
 
 
Hindutva, as envisioned by Sarvarkar and Golwalkar, sought to instate an idealized 
Hindu nation by hearkening back to the Vedic age. In post-independent India, the 
ideology is represented by a group of political organizations collectively known as the 
Sangh Parivar.165 Not every institution in this formation considers the bolstering of 
Hindu identity its primary aim.166 This pragmatic self-designation is precisely the 
electoral strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which appeals to the vote of 
both the Hindu masses and those sections of the elite who view the BJP as a modern, 
secular party that will not pander to minority demands.167  
This chapter analyzes the ideological orientations of the BJP’s precursors. It 
explores the discourse and activities of the organizations to determine how they have 
influenced the ideology and praxis of the BJP. 
Of the several Hindu nationalist organizations that gained prominence in post-
independent India, four hold specific relevance within the politics of the BJP. The 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), the 
Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), and the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) played 
                                                 
165
 “Sangh Parivar” literally means “a family of organizations.” These organizations derive their core 
values and goals from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which was founded in 1925. See 
footnote 2 for citation.  
166
 Nivedita Menon, Aditya Nigam, “Politics of Hindutva and the Minorities,” in Power and  
Contestation: India since 1989 (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Lmt., 2007), 41. 
167
 Ibid, 42. 
  
42 
instrumental roles during the 1960s and 70s.168 Their missions and activities 
perpetuated the Hindutva cause, and consolidated an environment within which the 
BJP could thrive. While the first two organizations profess cultural and social 
objectives, their activities—both in conjunction with and independent of the BJP—
have caused considerable political polarization in India.169 The Swadeshi Jagran 
Manch, on the other hand, focuses solely on economic concerns. It is the institution 
from which the BJP borrows principles of statecraft. The Jan Sangh was created as the 
political arm of the RSS. However, the party’s inability to find following in the Indian 
electoral system grossly undermined Hindu nationalist efforts. Its collapse was the 
catalyst for the rise of the BJP.170 
 
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
 Founded in 1925 by ex-Hindu Mahasabha171 member Keshavram Baliram 
Hedgewar, the RSS is the ideological fountainhead of contemporary Hindutva politics. 
With a membership base of nearly six million people, the Sangh is a formidable force 
in Indian society.172 Given its outwardly cultural agenda, the organization does not 
contest in elections. Regardless, its indirect control casts profound effects on the 
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electoral face of Hindutva politics: the BJP. This is evidenced by the fact that many 
BJP leaders are also members of the RSS.173  
 The visible work of the RSS pertains to the management of educational and 
social institutions. However, these institutions are frequently used as centers to 
propagate anti-minority views among impressionable children.174 The RSS’s claims of 
being a cultural organization should not blind us to its identity as a body that can 
disengage itself from the interests of Hindu minorities, should they refuse to comply 
with the Hindutva ideal of assimilation.175 The organization’s emphasis on martial 
competence is equally worrisome. Dressed in khaki shorts, RSS cadres routinely 
engage in acts of communal aggression.176 The next section of this chapter 
demonstrates the militaristic, hierarchical tendencies in the RSS. 
 
Remapping Practices: Ideological Imperatives in the RSS 
 Dr. Hedgewar envisioned the RSS as a synthesis of Hindu elitism and the 
sangathan (brotherhood) methodology.177 He argued in favor of the creation of a small 
but efficient organization of devoted men who could provide leadership to the entire 
Hindu community. Hedgewar therefore refashioned certain Hindu institutions, notably 
akharas (wrestling pits) and Hindu spiritual sects.178 Though wrestling matches were 
popular forms of entertainment among both upper and lower caste Hindus, spiritual 
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sects were frequented mainly by the elites.179 In an effort to endear the Hindu masses, 
Hedgewar merged these two traditions; endowing akharas with spiritual content and 
religious sects with martial appeal.180  
Shakhas—institutions where young boys would meet for physical exercise and 
ideological training—became tools for promoting virtuous behavior (samskaras),181 
strong fraternal bonds, and a compelling patriotic sentiment among volunteers. Even 
today, shakhas function as ideological akharas.182 
Masculine power lies at the center of the RSS’s nationalist fraternalism. This 
notion of masculinity is based entirely on the consecration of warriorship. In one of his 
speeches to RSS volunteers, Golwalkar stated, “Let mothers bless and send their sons 
at this moment of trial. When the five Pandavas sought their mother Kunti’s blessings 
before war in the [epic] Mahabharata, she told them, ‘Go ye all to the battle.’”183 
Golwalkar’s stance is buttressed by a martial tradition wherein the RSS swayamsevak 
(volunteer) is the kshatriyaized184 antithesis to Gandhi’s non-violent, effeminate 
Hindu. While sevaks are encouraged to act as youthful soldiers, pracharaks, or 
celibate cadres, are taught that asceticism is a way of reclaiming control and 
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masculinity to counter the defiant and lustful Muslim foreigner.185 Interestingly, while 
the RSS opposes the Gandhian notion of satyagraha, or passive resistance, its focus 
on chastity and solidarity parallels Gandhi’s vision of an independent India premised 
on moral supremacy vis-à-vis the modern world.186  
 
Out in the Field: RSS Activities 
A staunch proponent of activism, Hedgewar avoided the RSS’s involvement in 
political agitations during its early years, so as to bolster its image among the 
moderate members of the Indian National Congress (INC).187 On assuming his 
predecessor’s position, Golwalkar sought to ascribe a nuanced cultural character to the 
Sangh. This pitted him against those in favor of Hegdewar’s militaristic stance.188  
The birth of Pakistan gave RSS members a renewed sense of purpose and 
unity. For RSS cadres, the Partition was the outcome of a mistaken soft-handedness 
towards Indian Muslims.189 They therefore sought to present communal atrocities 
during the Partition as instances of patriotic baptism; initiations through blood and 
sacrifice into the nationalist cause.190 Despite Golwalkar’s efforts, the strategic 
pendulum of the RSS swung from character-building to activism. For their role in 
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M.K. Gandhi’s191 assassination in 1948, close to 20,000 RSS workers were 
imprisoned along with the chief suspect, Nathuram Ghodse. The RSS was banned.192 
 After the ban was lifted in 1949, those in the RSS worked to overcome their 
tarnished image. Shedding militarism temporarily, the organization focused on four 
specific projects during the 1950s. First, it established the Akhil Bharati Vidhya 
Parishad (All India Student’s Organization), which encouraged India’s youth to 
combat “leftist” influences on education. Today, the organization supports the BJP in 
its electoral rallies.193 Second, the RSS focused on strengthening its women’s wing, 
the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (RSS*), which was founded in 1936. Hindu nationalists’ 
simultaneous emphasis on masculinity and women’s connection with Bharatamata, or 
“Mother India,” is perhaps the most striking contradiction in Hindutva ideology. 
Regardless, the BJP consistently appeals to this dichotomy in its electoral 
endeavors.194 Third, the RSS made a conscious attempt to connect with India’s urban 
working class by creating the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Worker’s 
Association) in 1955.195 The Mazdoor Sangh is a visible voice among the several labor 
organizations in contemporary India. The RSS later established a rural affiliate: the 
Bharatiya Kisan Sabha was created in 1979.196 Fourth, the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashrama 
was formed in 1952 with RSS support. By 1980, it had become the leading re-
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conversion body, and sought to counter Christian and Islamic missionaries197 by 
working closely with India’s tribal communities.198 
 
Organizing the Brotherhood:  Home to Hierarchies 
In addition to widening its outreach through subsidiary institutions, the RSS 
also strengthened its internal organizational structure during the 1950s. To 
institutionalize authority and order, RSS leaders created a rigid hierarchy system.199 
The entire structure of the RSS rests on permanent gradations. It is comprised 
of elite swayamsevaks or volunteers, who are ranked by education and age; 
gatanayaks or squad leaders; mukhya shikshaks or superior instructors; karyavahas or 
secretaries; pracharaks or celibate staff commanders; and sanghchalaks or directors at 
regional, local, and national levels. Each of these individuals is subordinate to the sar 
sanghchalak, the RSS’s supreme leader and guide.200   
While hierarchical relationships govern a vast majority of RSS activities, 
Hedgewar and Golwalkar understood that the organization’s standing depended, to a 
large extent, on free information exchanges. They ensured that tacit, informal channels 
were established in their regional and local constituencies.201 The existence of 
informal communication in an intensely hierarchical setup has lent charisma not only 
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to the RSS as an organization but also to individual leaders like L.K. Advani and A.B. 
Vajpayee, who now play conspicuous roles in the BJP.202  
 
Second Wave of Activism: Reconfiguring India’s Educational System 
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, the RSS engaged in a massive outreach 
effort, creating once again, a host of organizations that served as subsidiaries to the 
RSS cause.203 The Bharat Vikas Parishad was formed in 1963 to work with poor 
communities. The Bharat Shikshan Mandal was created in 1969 to promote Hindu 
values in the education system. The Vidhya Bharati was created in 1976 as the RSS’s 
formal educational wing. It caters to primary and elementary school children, 
imparting them with the Hindutva view on history and social organization.204 The RSS 
also has an international wing called Sewa International, which organizes funds for the 
Sangh Parivar by identifying Hindutva supporters outside India. Through the 
Deendayal Research Institute, and its journal Manthan, the RSS ensures the 
dissemination of Hindu nationalist ideas.205 
 
Revisiting Hindutva Ideology  
The RSS has worked for nearly seven decades to strengthen its position in 
Indian society. Through its organized and informal networks, the RSS structure grew  
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from a single shakha in 1926 to over 25,000 shakhas in 1989.206 
While hierarchical organization remains a crucial aspect of the RSS’s success, 
ideology is by no means unimportant. The primary objectives of the RSS are 
succinctly illustrated in its constitution. The document states that the RSS seeks to 
“eradicate differences among Hindus; make them realize the greatness of their past; 
inculcate in them a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to Hindu society as a whole; 
build an organized and well disciplined social life; and bring about the regeneration of 
Hindu society.”207  Rejecting secular ideas, the RSS constitution posits: “We make 
war or peace, engage in arts and crafts, amass wealth and give it away—indeed we are 
born and we die—all in accord with religious injunction.”208  
 The RSS works through multiple layers of symbolic integration. Ironically, 
symbols of purity are frequently used by its members to perpetuate irreligious acts.209 
Saffron flags, for example, are used to demarcate Hindu territories during communal 
riots. Other symbols and events, such as the celebration of specific festivals210 during 
the year, serve to enhance unity and reinforce ties of brotherhood within the RSS.211 
The ritualization of Hinduism through insignia rests on a form of masculinity 
that draws from militancy and monastic existence.212 Though it opposes Semitic 
traditions (Christianity and Islam), the RSS tries to overcome the supposedly 
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effeminate state of subjugation by emulating the aggressive foreigner (both Muslims 
and the British).213 Yet it simultaneously presents the Hindu capacity for endurance 
against subjugation. It follows that the RSS envisions the sevak (volunteer) as a 
liminal figure capable of transcending between celibacy and warriorship.214  
Like Sarvarkar, RSS leaders maintain that masculinity provides the link to 
India’s grandiose and paradoxically victimized past. Accounts of ancient Aryan heroes 
and medieval Hindu warriors figure extensively in the rhetoric of present-day RSS 
members.215 The sanctification of manhood in these accounts provides an avenue for 
uniting factions in Hindu society. In eulogizing the idea of a nation to be defended, 
RSS leaders convince lower caste communities that external domination and not caste 
segregation is solely responsible for their fate.216 
Images of power and strength within the RSS reflect a complex interaction 
between three forces: the structural logistics of a hierarchical environment; the 
perpetuation of heroic mythology in an ordered institution; and the indoctrinated 
psychological need among rank-and-file workers to revere their leaders.217 RSS 
leadership expresses these ideas in a single statement:  
The ultimate vision of our work, which has been the living inspiration for all 
our organizational efforts, is a perfectly organized state of society where each 
individual has been molded into a model of ideal Hindu manhood and made 
into a limb of the corporate Hindu society.218  
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The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) 
 The Vishva Hindu Parishad came into being under the auspices of the RSS in 
1964, following a movement to ban cow slaughter.219 A recent incident in the Indian 
state of Haryana effectively represents the explosive potential of the cow slaughter 
issue.220 On the morning of July 20, 2002, five men suspected of cow slaughter were 
encircled and lynched by VHP volunteers. The men turned out to be dalits, low caste 
Hindus, whose traditional work entailed laboring in tanneries.221 People of this 
community obtain raw material for their work from the carcasses of cows that have 
died of natural causes. In a revealing clarification, VHP members brushed aside the 
incident as one of “mistaken identity,” in which dalits were taken to be Muslims.222 
The revelation clearly indicates the anti-Muslim orientation of the Parishad. 
  
On Hinduism and Hierarchies  
The VHP’s charter outlines the following as it core objectives: to consolidate 
Hindu society, to spread Hindu values, to establish a network comprising all Hindus 
living outside India, and to welcome back to the Hindu fold all those who had left 
Hinduism.223 In accordance with its agenda, the VHP enunciated five requirements for 
being a good Hindu in a conference on religion in 1967. These included regular 
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worship, visits to temples, basic knowledge of the sacred geography of India, 
knowledge of mythical epics, and loyalty to Hindu culture.224 
Estimates hold that the VHP’s membership base ranges from two and a half to 
four million persons.225 The Parishad is organized on a state by state basis. It is 
divided into zonal branches or vibhaags, district branches or prakhands, and sub-
district units or upkhands. The supervisors at each of these levels ultimately report to 
two shankaracharyas or spiritual leaders. While the VHP draws extensively from the 
hierarchical structure of the RSS, interactions between volunteers at the civic level and 
leaders at the spiritual level are much stronger in the framework of the former 
organization.226 
 
Defining an Agenda  
The Vishva Hindu Parishad was founded as a religio-cultural institution. Its 
cadres serve as intermediaries between Hindu religious institutions and the RSS 
establishment. The VHP’s activities are, therefore, dedicated to producing a Hindu 
ethos that is divorced from the prescriptions of caste and sect.227 To achieve this end, 
the organization has constructed a series of rashtra mandirs (national temples). 
Drawing upon the Indian tradition of sadhus (holy men) heading religious institutions, 
the VHP relies on gurus (guides) to oversee its discourse on spirituality.228  
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Global in reach, the VHP’s international profile, not surprisingly, is one of 
promoting Hindu culture. The Vishva Hindu Parishad of America and other related 
organizations, such as the Hindu Student Council, focus specifically on garnering 
financial support from the overseas diaspora community.229 Proceeds from these 
organizations have supplemented VHP activities in India.  
 
From Words to Action 
VHP efforts to promote a Hindu nation commenced as early as 1966, with the 
first International Hindu Conference in Allahabad.230 During the next decade, the VHP 
pursued the strategy of uniting Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains by promoting a common 
understanding of each religious tradition’s beliefs and practices. The organization’s 
professed syncretism was limited in reach (focused only on Hindu sects) but strategic 
in form (endeared more supporters).231 The far reaching significance of this strategy 
was demonstrated in the late 1980s, when the VHP and RSS used their version of 
Hinduism for rallying the masses during the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation.232 
VHP endeavors during the early 1970s reflected a broader activist agenda. The 
organization embraced social causes, instituting schools, medical centers, and hostels 
all over the country.233 Like the RSS, the VHP set up reconversion units, or Vanavasi 
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Kalyan Ashramas, to encourage adivasi (tribals) Christians to embrace Hinduism 
during this period. It conducted thousands of shuddhi (purification) ceremonies under 
the auspices of these ashramas.234 To enhance Hinduism’s appeal among those who 
had converted to other faiths, the VHP engaged in a rationalization of ritual practices. 
By stipulating that only three rites, birth (namkaran), marriage (vivah), and death 
(antesi), were integral to Hinduism, the VHP sought to convince low castes that 
Hindutva would rid Hindu religion of excessive ritualism.235 A VHP pamphlet from 
1972 indicates the urgency with which this project was pursued: “The VHP is 
dedicated to preventing the apprehensions amongst the have-nots [from leading] to a 
storm of hatred which will destroy the whole structure of society.236  
 The rhetoric on the need to educate India’s youth was another compelling 
aspect of the VHP’s agenda. After initial difficulties in convincing parents to send 
their young sons to ahramas (places of worship and learning), the VHP succeeded in 
promoting Hindutva’s cultural and spiritual values.237 Language (Sanskrit), tradition 
(Vedic culture), and Hindu religion became instruments for promoting ordered 
relationships in society.238 
 The organization’s experiments in the social sphere, though momentous, were 
short lived. Like the RSS, the VHP assisted the BJP during its communal campaigns 
in Ayodhya (1992), Mumbai (1993), and Gujarat (2002). In consonance with the 
Hindutva ideal of a unified India, VHP members organized several Ekamata 
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(unifying) processions between 1980 and 1999.239 Mythological accounts of Hindu 
warriors like the Pandavas in the Mahabharata and Lord Rama in the Ramayana 
continue to characterize the VHP’s discourse. It is important to note that the VHP’s 
emphasis on cultural goals veils its identity as an elitist organization.240 The mere 
presence of women and low caste Hindus in the VHP does not prove its sincerity 
towards the masses. In reality, the VHP seeks to acquire mass support by unearthing 
local myths and casting them in the masculine, martial framework of the 
aforementioned epics.241   
 
Saints and Swords 
 While the RSS regards both warriors and monks as symbols of masculinity, 
the VHP bases its masculine agenda solely on the premise of martial expertise. The 
Bajrang Dal, which was founded in 1984 as the VHP’s youth wing, is a fitting 
example of this tradition.242 Men in the Dal are always armed with trishuls (tridents), 
and openly resort to violence during times of communal tension. Members of the 
organization played visible roles in both the 1992 Ayodhya riots and the 2002 Gujarat 
riots. Since the RSS and VHP plan communal violence under cover, their links to 
militant bodies like the Bajrang Dal are hard to establish.243  
It is important to note that the similarities between the RSS and VHP are not 
accidental. Like other Sangh Parivar members, the latter enjoys little autonomy. 
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Constant RSS oversight ensures that VHP members conform to its hierarchical and 
majoritarian nationalist framework.  
 
Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) 
 The SJM was founded in 1991 with the exclusive agenda of opposing 
economic imperialism.244 Since its inception, the organization has actively promoted 
the slogan of swadeshi, “Of one’s own land,” which originated during India’s 
nationalist movement against the British. Perceptibly, the SJM stands against 
contemporary corporatism and foreign economic assistance. It opposes International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) sponsored Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in India, arguing that their inbuilt conditionality 
imposes significant costs on the Indian poor.245 
The SJM repudiates Western aid and promotes instead indigenous economic 
models of statecraft246 contained in works like the Arthashastra, a treatise compiled by 
Kautilya in 300 BC.247 The organization frequently assists the Bharatiya Mazdoor 
Sangh, an RSS-oriented trade union, in its campaigns against multinational institutions 
in India.248 
 As noted previously, the BJP employs the SJM’s principles to articulate its 
economic position. Despite its professed allegiance to economic self-sustenance, the 
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BJP has emerged as a visible agent of liberalization. The party’s reign at the union 
level between 1998 and 2004 resulted in market reforms, and paved the way for 
international developmental initiatives.249 The most contested of all BJP endeavors 
was its decision to commission a dam on the Narmada River. In this case, the drive for 
development led to large-scale displacement of tribal communities in central India. 
The party’s stance raised concerns over its implicit urban bias.250 
Though the BJP’s orientation during the 1990s caused RSS leaders and leftists 
to accuse the party of hypocrisy, the former’s move towards economic 
interdependence did not undermine its “Hindutva” plank. On the contrary, the BJP’s 
version of liberalization has augmented the fortunes of its upper class supporters. And 
globalization has won the BJP new adherents.251 The middle class in urban and rural 
India have benefited from the influx of entertainment, economic opportunity, and a 
higher quality of life.252 
 
The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) 
 While the VHP was instituted to the RSS’s cultural agenda, the vision of 
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee led to the birth of the political affiliate of the RSS. The BJS 
was formed during an RSS consultation in October 1951.253 The party’s stated 
objective was to rebuild India on the basis of four ideals: one nation, one culture, one 
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country, and rule of law. The Jan Sangh embodied an eclectic mix of tradition and 
modernity, and while it proclaimed open membership and sought a populist stance, it 
possessed a covertly communal character.  
The BJS began its political career by securing three Parliament seats in the 
1952 general elections.254 Its strongest electoral performance came in the 1967 
elections, when the Congress majority was the thinnest. Between 1967 and 1971, the 
BJS participated in coalition governments in five states.255 It played a vital role during 
the National Emergency between 1975 and 1979, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
imposed the second ban on the RSS. The party was left to monitor the Sangh 
Parivar’s agenda in the absence of key RSS leaders.256   
The BJS’s performance during the 1960s and 1970s impressed conservative 
members of the Congress Party, as well as elites (merchant and landed communities) 
in urban and rural India.257 Despite its populist activism during the period, the BJS 
was unable to establish a national presence.258 Through the 1970s, the party oscillated 
between Hindutva’s ethno-religious orientation and the need to integrate itself with 
mainstream politics.259 The problem was that the BJS could never establish its 
legitimacy as a progressive political entity. The party depended on RSS support for all 
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its electoral endeavors.260 To make matters worse, RSS volunteers sensationalized 
their role during the Emergency by equating themselves with mythical heroes in epics 
like the Ramayana and Mahabharata.261 This proved to be a major setback for the Jan 
Sangh’s progressive economic campaign. 
 Taking cue from ex-RSS member Jay Prakash Narayan’s Total Revolution, 
the BJS eventually joint forces with the Bharatiya Lok Dal, the Socialist Party of 
India, and Congress (O)262 to form the Janata Party.263 Strong at the outset, the Janata 
government failed to harmonize the goals and aspirations of its disparate political 
actors. The party remained active on the Indian political scene for scarcely three years, 
during which time internal controversies weakened its electoral capabilities.264 The 
Sangh Parivar’s diminishing political presence demanded the creation of a cohesive 
and stable organization that would fill political lacunae in Hindutva politics. The BJP 
was instituted to achieve this goal.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BHARAT: THE INDIA OF THE BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY 
 
 
 
Having secured victory in India’s twelfth parliamentary elections in 1998, the Hindu 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed power as the head of an inchoate 
alliance of political entities.265 A year later, the government in shambles, India went to 
the polls again. The BJP secured a more decisive victory this time, establishing a front 
of twenty-four regional parties that lasted till the 2004 elections; when the Congress-
led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) assumed the political reins.266 Though out of 
power at the time of this writing, the BJP remains a formidable force in Indian politics 
in 2010, and Hindutva, more generally, continues to cast profound implications for 
India’s future. 
This chapter delves into the electoral history and mobilization strategies of the 
BJP. It provides a comprehensive sense of the structural and functional aspects of BJP 
politics. In so doing, it establishes a backdrop for the forthcoming case studies, which 
explore Hindutva-inspired communal violence in twentieth and twenty-first century 
India.  
 
The Bharatiya Janata Party 
By 1977, the Janata Party coalition under Prime Minister Morarji Desai was  
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onto the last chapter of its life.267 Enfeebled by the persistent ideological 
disagreements among its member parties, Desai’s government faced another ordeal: 
the dual member controversy. Given the Janata Party’s alliance with the Sangh 
Parivar, most of its members were also members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS), and did not want to give up either of the two positions. The RSS, on the 
other hand, seemed less impressed with the fact that the Janata Party shared forces 
with leftist and socialist actors. This spurred a huge debate within the Parivar.268 
Opinions became increasingly polarized, and the RSS was unable to contain the 
debate. The disunity among Hindutva ranks adversely impacted the electoral fortunes 
of the Janata Party, which was replaced by a Congress-led front in 1980. In the 
aftermath of the 1980 elections, the Janata Party disintegrated, only to be replaced on 
April 5, 1980 by the new and invigorated Bharatiya Janata Party.269  
 
Establishing a Name 
The BJP spent most of the 1980s out in the cold. In an effort to build a modern, 
progressive image during this period, the party distanced itself from its communal 
lineage, and embraced instead the model of Gandhian socialism.270 BJP leaders 
consciously reflected on issues like price rise and corruption to attract a broader voter 
base. Unfortunately, the party’s experiments with these alternatives did not yield 
immediate outcomes.  
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Change came in the mid-1980s, when specific developments—namely the 
dispute over the Babri mosque in Ayodhya and the debate over a Uniform Civil Code 
(UCC) for Hindus and Muslims271—led to the realization that there was greater 
potential in reviving the Hindutva platform.272 Another related event was the Congress 
government’s Operation Blue Star of 1984, which targeted the premises of the Golden 
Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, in order to end Sikh secessionist demands for an 
independent state of Khalistan. Indira Gandhi’s decision to target the Sikh community 
provided the BJP with an opportune moment. By claiming that Sikhs were members of 
Hindu society, the party accused the Congress of insensitivity towards Hindu 
sentiments.273 With the termination of Operation Blue Star began the most 
orchestrated Hindu revivalist movement in India. The slogan of jagaran (revival) 
pervaded Indian politics for the next two decades.274 
 
The Plunge into Hindutva  
 Armed with the ideology of Hindutva, the BJP emerged as a formidable force 
during the 1989 elections. It won an impressive total of eighty-nine seats in the Lok 
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Sabha,275 where it previously possessed only two places.276 The 1989 elections were 
important on another account: they demonstrated how the BJP utilized anti-minority 
violence to secure electoral victories. The party won forty-seven of the eighty-eight 
state assembly seats in Gujarat and Bihar.277 In addition, it obtained a majority in the 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh state elections.278 BJP leaders were 
quick to note the relationship between electoral gains and the use of force. The 
communal tactics that characterized the BJP’s early efforts have unfortunately won the 
party political office on most occasions.279 
 The 1991 election campaign is regarded as the most expensive and violent 
campaign in the history of independent India. Contesting parties used the electronic 
and print media, video raths (trucks with large video screens), as well as religious and 
cultural rallies to perpetuate an unprecedentedly sharp communal tone.280 The BJP 
seemed to be making all the right overtures during the campaign, until an unexpected 
event changed its fortunes. The assassination of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by 
a Tamil suicide bomber swung the campaign in favor of the Congress. Having won the 
“sympathy vote,” the Congress was back to man the helm. Despite this, the BJP 
secured feats at the state level, winning intensely communal electoral struggles in 
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.281 The reemergence of the Congress prompted the 
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BJP to assert its Hindutva agenda with greater vigor. The demolition of the Babri 
mosque in 1992 was a clear indication of the BJP’s ideological stance. The party also 
endorsed the Shiv Sena’s282 communal atrocities in Mumbai in 1993. This reiterated 
the BJP’s disapproval of the Congress’s soft-handed approach toward Muslims in 
India.283 
 After its debacle at the Center in 1996 and 1998, the BJP perfected its coalition 
building skills. With 270 parliamentary seats and 37.06 percent of the national vote in 
the 1999 general elections,284 the party emerged as the linchpin of the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA), a twenty-four party coalition285 with regional and leftist 
parties.286 These parties did not join the BJP for ideological reasons. They were 
motivated by the logic of political configuration in their states. For instance, the 
Trinamool Congress opposed the Congress and CPI (M) in West Bengal, the Telugu 
Desam Party opposed the Congress in Andhra Pradesh, and the DMK and MDMK in 
Tamil Nadu were opposed to a third party (the AIADMK)287 in the state.288 Due to the 
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BJP’s attempts to forge stable coalitions during the 1990s, regional political 
considerations began impacting a multitude of union-level alliances. In fact, the 
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) tapped on the BJP’s strategy to 
regain central control in 2004.289 
 
Politicians and Militants: Caretakers and Communalists 
In the aftermath of the Babri mosque dispute in 1992, the BJP consciously 
sought to project a right-of-center image. The BJP’s 1998 election manifesto 
contained explicit references to the Hindu nationalist vision of early ideologues like 
Sarvarkar.290 It presented Bharatavarsha291 as the cradle of the superior and ancient 
Vedic culture. In addition, the manifesto presented the BJP and not the Congress as 
the true inheritor of the freedom legacy. It is worth noting that while a majority of 
NDA members were not adherents of Hindutva politics, their participation in the 
coalition continued unabated. Though these actors supported the BJP in the hopes of 
strengthening their own position in regional constituencies, they were unable to 
challenge the party—even as communal stakes were gradually and alarmingly 
raised.292 
Soon after assuming power, the NDA repudiated hegemonic anti-proliferation 
regimes, and crossed the nuclear threshold by testing the inter-ballistic missile, Agni, 
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in May 1998. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan declared its nuclear capabilities as well. 
Within a year of the BJP’s ascension, India was entangled in its first military conflict 
in thirty years.293 The 1999 Kargil War, a product of the two nations’ long-standing 
dispute over Kashmir, ended only when the United States actively intervened. 
Following conflict at the Indo-Pakistan border, the BJP engaged in a cultural 
venture.294 In overhauling history textbooks across India, the party consciously 
articulated a narrow version of India’s past. The supremacy of India’s Vedic-Aryan 
roots and the ignominy of Hindu subjugation under medieval Mughal rule became 
common themes in India’s educational system. The project essentially aimed at 
unifying the diverse sections of Hindu India into a homogenous community.295 
 
A Tryst with Moderation 
Its experiments in the educational sphere notwithstanding, the BJP sought to 
project itself in a more liberal light. Although its Hindu nationalist partners 
(particularly the RSS and VHP)296 accused the party of digressing from a conservative 
platform, the BJP’s economic progressivism actually strengthened Hindutva’s support 
base. The party’s liberalization program appealed to Hindu elites. The strategy also 
won a new section of India’s society. Trade and investment created a wealth of 
economic opportunities, and expanded the already burgeoning middle class. Despite 
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its numerous efforts to garner political support, the BJP failed to survive another term 
in office.297 
Though the elections of 2004 and 2009 routed the NDA alliance, it would be a 
mistake to read the events as a clear vote against communalism.298 First, 
disagreements among party members have not undermined the importance of 
Hindutva within the BJP. On the contrary, the RSS’s involvement in the party 
suggests that Hindutva will remain a key component of future BJP operations.299 It is 
worrisome that some sections of the Hindu right have concluded that their defeat 
proves that people have rejected not Hindutva but its dilution of the BJP. Communal 
violence is, in their view, an essential means of countering this dilution.300 A recent 
instance is a series of violent acts in coastal Karnataka in 2006. Economic factors, 
such as the competition between Hindu and Muslims traders, are being used by BJP 
and RSS forces to whip up anti-communal sentiments. The aim is to reclaim the lost 
grassroots support.301 
This being said, the final tally in an election never represents the country-wide 
trend. National and local elections are fought under completely different conditions. It 
is noteworthy that merely three months after the Congress won the 2004 Lok Sabha 
election seat from Junagadh (Gujarat), the BJP swept the municipal corporation 
election in the district; capturing thirty-five of fifty-one seats. Evidently, forecasting 
                                                 
297
 Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 171. 
298
 Menon, Nigam, Power and Contestation, 53. 
299
 Ibid. / Increased RSS involvement in the BJP may undermine the party’s political autonomy. The 
RSS may promote its cultural-nationalist agenda too vigorously.  
300
 Menon, Nigam, Power and Contestation, 53.  
301
 Ibid. 
  
68 
patterns in party victories based on insights from a single round of elections amounts 
to an oversimplification of the trends in question.302 
 
Means and Ends: Mobilization Strategies of the BJP 
The BJP has relied on four pillars to advance Hindutva ideology during its time 
in and out of office. First, it has created alternative discourses on nationalism in order 
to bring lower caste Hindus into its ideological fold.303 Second, by paralleling its 
masculinist rhetoric with discourses on the latent power of the Hindu woman, the 
party has achieved the illusionary notion of women’s emancipation.304 Third, as noted 
earlier, it has embarked on a massive overhaul of the existing educational system. By 
revamping history textbooks, the party seeks to impart Indian students with a Hindu 
supremacist view of Indian nationhood.305 Fourth, it has effectively employed the print 
and electronic media to reach out to Hindus in India.306  
 
Broadening its Base: Lower Castes and the BJP 
The 1996 election manifesto of the BJP promised to work for a strong and 
prosperous India. Though self-rule (swarajya) and good governance (surajaya) were 
                                                 
302
 Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 171. 
303
 C.P. Bhambhri, “Governance,” in Bharatiya Janata Party: Periphery to Center (New Delhi: Shipra 
Publications, 2001), 179. 
304
 Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 171. 
305
 Ibid. 
306
 Prakash Louis, “Hindutva and Weaker Sections: Conflict between Dominance and Resistance,” in 
Religion, Power and Violence: Expression of Politics in Contemporary Times, ed. Ram Puniyani (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Lmt., 2005), 164. 
  
69 
central to the party’s campaign, the notions veiled the monolithic tendencies in 
Hindutva politics.307 
 
 Voices that don’t Count  
Dalits, Scheduled Castes (SC), and Scheduled Tribes (ST) constitute the lower 
castes in India. Estimates from the 1991 census reveal that SCs, including dalits, 
constitute about 16.48 percent of India’s population, while STs account for close to 
8.08 percent of the population.308 The Constitution of India clearly establishes that the 
development of these communities must be the imperative of every government. 
Article 46 of the Constitution maintains that, “The State shall promote with special 
care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and 
in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Schedules Tribes, and shall protect them 
from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.”309    
 Despite constitutional dictates, and the existence of legislation such as the 
Prevention of Atrocities Act (1989), SCs continue to suffer social and economic 
subjugation. After six decades of independence, only 37.8 percent of SCs are 
literate.310 As of 1991, 72 percent of SCs and STs worked as landless laborers. Since 
the mid-1990s, close to 74,00,000 adivasis (tribals) have been displaced in the state of 
Jharkhand.311 Several others live without access to their traditional forest spaces, 
owing to BJP-led development initiatives. The construction of a dam on the Narmada 
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River is a case in point. It led to the displacement of a sizable section of Jharkhand’s 
tribal community.312 
Since caste norms were traditionally tied to occupational modes, economic 
status in medieval India was an outcome of the caste into which an individual was 
born.313 Given the centrality of the ancient Vedic age in Hindutva discourse, it is 
ironic that Hindu elites seem bent on incorporating the caste gradations that emerged 
in medieval India. This being said, it seems clear that elites in Hindu society seek to 
safeguard themselves from low castes and Muslims alike.314 The genesis of Hindu 
violence against Muslims lies in this tri-polar relationship between class, caste, and the 
alienation of the “other.” According to Ornit Shani, “Communalism [grows] in the 
intersections between caste and class. The threat Hindu nationalists [claim is] posed by 
Muslims actually expresses a fear about the peril of violating the Hindu social and 
moral order from within.”315 
The upper class appeal of the BJP is in no way accidental. The rise of dalit 
consciousness in independent India threatened the Hindu brahamanical316 community. 
In Hindutva, the elites found a “majoritarian” substitute for true democracy:  
The formation of a Hindu nationalist government in May 1998 at the crest of 
Hindutva’s recent electoral surge clearly testifies to the increasingly 
authoritarian urges of India’s ruling class. Hindutva’s chances of holding state 
power more securely lies in a more complete hegemonization of this now 
overwhelmingly capitalist class…The implication is clearly 
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majoritarianism…And majoritarianism, as always, comes clothed in the rhetoric 
of democracy.317  
 
By subverting democracy, Hindutva forces sought to subjugate dalit identity. But 
Hindutva forces were unsuccessful in clamping down on the community’s rising 
consciousness for long.318 
 
Narrowness of the Broad Base: The BJP’s Rationales for Mobilization 
The Nehruvian consensus319 on secularism broke during the 1970s. The 
National Emergency320 resulted in black marketing on the economic front and 
corruption on the political front.321 In light of the above, the 1980s witnessed a 
resurgence of dalit activism. The newly formed BJP322 took charge of affairs at this 
juncture.           
  In a tactical move to unite all Hindus under the national umbrella, the party 
embarked on an era of strategic political incentives. Unfortunately, in their attempt to 
endear dalits, BJP leaders reverted to the brahaminical Hinduism and caste supremacy 
of V.D. Sarvarkar. The strategy was clever. It allowed the BJP to reap the benefits of a 
broader support base.323 The party could mobilize low caste communities as foot 
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soldiers without making any tangible attempts to ensure their assimilation in 
mainstream politics and society:324  
The Sangh Parivar, for all its rhetoric on the upliftment of the dalits, hardly 
ever raises a voice against caste-based discrimination or atrocities against 
dalits. This ambivalent attitude has led to considerable disenchantment and 
confusion among the dalits, which is exacerbated during times of tension.325 
 
Whether it was the Chakravara incident in the 1980s, where dalits were denied the 
right to enter the village pond, or the Jhajjar incident in the 1990s, where five dalits 
were lynched to death owing to their “impure profession” as leather tanners, dalits 
have consistently been disposed off by the dominant classes.326  
 
Blocking Progress 
The recommendations of India’s first Backward Classes Commission, known 
as the Kelkar Commission, went largely unnoticed in the political community. 
Following the commission’s disintegration, the Janata Party327 instituted the Mandal 
Commission in 1976; supposedly to keep its electoral promises to low caste 
communities.328 However, the Janata government did little in the way of reform during 
its time in office. During the 1980 anti-reservation riots, “the party tried to project the 
anti-dalit war [waged by upper class Hindus against lower classes] as a Hindu-Muslim 
conflict.”329           
 A decade later, the Mandal Commission submitted its report to V.P. Singh’s 
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National Front government.330 The twenty-seven percent quota proposed by the 
Mandal members caused uproar in urban India. Like its predecessor, the BJP emerged 
as an advocate of a socially conservative platform. The party consistently blocked 
lower caste emancipation.331  
 
Stories, Symbols, and Sour Promises  
Hindutva’s appeals to low caste communities are invariably undergirded by the 
desire to perpetuate the goals of India’s traditional elites. Sangh Parivar organizations 
have adopted a range of strategies to incorporate weaker sections into their fold. In 
particular, BJP leaders have reverted to figures like B.R. Ambedkar, who fought 
vehemently for the cause of dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBC) following the 
collapse of colonialism in India.332 Instead of promoting these individuals’ ideas on 
equality, the party has co-opted the likes of Ambedkar into the Hindutva scheme by 
presenting them as guardians of the brahaminical tradition.333 
Additionally, Hindutva forces have relied on a series of processions and prayer 
ceremonies to mobilize low caste communities. The BJP’s Ekamata Yatra (unifying 
procession) of 1983 is a case in point.334 The Yatra was the first of a series of month-
long campaigns undertaken to broaden the BJP’s social base, brush off the urban, 
upper class label attached to it, and popularize the idea of a unified Hindu society in 
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the wake of regional secessionist movements and dalit assertions.335 Three symbols—
Bharatmata, Gaumata, and Gangamata336—have found resonance in each of the 
subsequent BJP-led processions. Collectively, they remind the lower castes of their 
responsibility towards a unified Hindu society.337  
Repeated victories in the political realm strengthened the BJP’s resolve. In 
1984, the party launched the Ramjanmabhoomi liberation campaign. The movement 
endowed the BJP with another central symbol: the myth of a unified India under Lord 
Rama became a pivotal feature of subsequent BJP mobilization efforts.338 In his ratha 
yatra (chariot procession) in 1984, BJP leader L.K. Advani declared: “Manu and Shri 
Krishna are our Lawgivers and Shri Rama, the commander of our forces. Let us 
relearn the manly lessons they taught us.”339      
 The selection of Rama as the fountainhead of Hindu identity was a calculated 
decision. The dispute over Rama’s birthplace became a national issue, which 
eventually culminated in the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992. More 
importantly, however, every household in India is familiar with the Ramayana.340 
Since narratives in the epic ranged from local myths involving the downtrodden to 
upper class ideas on warriorhood and kinship, the BJP could achieve what it most 
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desired: the support of all Hindu castes and classes.341 In choosing Rama as its 
overarching symbol, the party repudiated the VHP’s discourse on Rama as a 
benevolent figure in poet Tulsidas’s Ramcharita Manas. It employed instead the 
symbolism of the aggressive, masculine warrior.342 Ironically, the BJP’s emphasis on 
“martial Rama” was deemed essentialist by many in India. In the aftermath of its 
defeat in 2009, the BJP has consciously embraced local discourses to endear the lower 
castes.343 
 
Myth, History, and Past Glory  
 History became an essential means of creating and promoting a lower caste 
consciousness. Hindutva ideologues sought to evoke a sense of historicity in 
communities by referencing mythical and historical heroes belonging to specific 
castes. These mythical figures were identified, and portrayed as subsidiaries or aides 
to overarching figures in Hindutva meta-narratives.344 For example, the story of 
Eklavya, the loyal dalit archer who gave up his right thumb for his teacher, Drona, is 
presented as an instance of dalits’ support for the kshatriya (warrior) class, to which 
Drona belonged.345 The local popularity of Eklavya is transposed onto the overarching 
narrative of the Mahabharata;346 where traces of upper and lower caste exchanges are 
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found. Similarly, the BJP has employed the myth of Guhya, the king of low caste 
Nishads347 in Uttar Pradesh, to highlight Guhya’s role in the Ramayana.348  
Hindutva ideologues’ use of the myth of Suhaldev, another hero among the 
Nishads, finds close parallels with fascist narratives based on the mysticism of blood 
and sacrifice.349 Fascist narratives attempted to construct racial unity by demonizing 
other communities. According to right-wing nationalists, violence was a means for the 
superior and cohesive racial group to project heroism and supremacy. 
 The tactic of employing myth to create foot soldiers is all too evident in the 
BJP’s political strategy.350 Through legend and mythology, the RSS, VHP, and BJP 
convince marginalized communities that Muslims and not upper caste Hindus are 
responsible for their plight. By tailoring mythical narratives to reflect contemporary 
struggles, proponents of Hindutva ensure the perpetuation of medieval antagonisms in 
contemporary socio-political interactions.351  
 
Hindutva at the Grassroots  
It was with the intent of mobilizing the poor, downtrodden castes that 
Sarvarkar organized a band of young boys into a society called the Patit Pawan.352 The 
group has been active since the 1950s, and allies with BJP members in the state of 
Maharashtra. If Rama is the BJP’s unifying symbol for northern India, the legend of 
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Maratha leader Shivaji is the party’s avenue into southern territory. In recent years, the 
Patit Pawan has grown tremendously due to the BJP’s strategic discourse on Maratha 
leaders’ endeavors to counter Mughal rule.353 Many view the Patit Pawan boys as the 
progenies of these valiant Hindu princes.  
Equally important is the manner in which the BJP has linked local communal 
skirmishes—such as the Dattawati riots in Pune, Maharashtra, in 1992—with the 
overarching struggle against domination by other nations and religions.354 The 
adoption of religion as the idiom for popular mobilization is illustrated by the Patit 
Pawan. In arguing that external influences have violated Hindu religious sentiments, 
volunteers of the organization mobilize their dalit constituents to partake in communal 
violence.355  
Another example of the use of local spaces to inject communal ideas is the 
Suhaldev festival. Since 2001, BJP forces in Uttar Pradesh have invited wrestlers to 
participate in the Virat Dangal competition during the Suhaldev festival in 
Bahraich.356 It is noteworthy that by secluding the Muslim community from these 
events, the BJP reinforces the age-old distinction between “self” and “other.” 
Wrestling matches become occasions where Hindu myth, religion, and social conduct 
are discussed in the absence of external influences.357 
 
Political Alliances: Hindutva and the Hindu Masses  
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 As proponents of Hindutva cater their rhetoric towards the subordinate section 
 of Hindu India, lower caste communities find themselves entrenched in an ambiguous 
set of socio-economic realities. On one hand, dalits and backward castes invest 
tremendous faith in modernity. They hope that new institutions and ideas will redeem 
their place in society. On the other hand, they are averse to the dominant secular-
nationalist discourse on modernity.        
 This ambivalence is visible in Indian culture and politics.358 On the face of it, it 
seems logical that the lower castes seek to join the right-wing to undercut the latter’s 
internal upper caste hegemony. The problem, however, is that instead of the lower 
castes deriving political and economic voice, they are co-opted into the Hindu 
nationalist scheme.359 The rise of dalit political formations like the Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP), and their subsequent ties with the Hindu right, is a fitting example of the 
above. Based in Uttar Pradesh, a predominantly dalit region, the BSP has repeatedly 
embarked on alliances with the BJP.360 It formed state level coalitions with the party in 
1993, 1997, and 2002. BSP leaders also supported the BJP’s endeavors in Gujarat 
during the 2007 elections.361 More importantly, however, the BSP-BJP alliance 
indicates how individual dalit leaders often collude with the Hindu nationalist agenda 
of economic and political supremacy. BSP leader Mayawati’s use of both the 
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Hindutva discourse on sarvajan (all inclusiveness) and the myth of Rama during the 
2007 state elections in Uttar Pradesh affirm the above.362  
Contrary to Mayawati’s approach, leaders like Laloo Prasad Yadav have 
consistently opposed Hindu right-wing operations. Laloo Yadav played an 
instrumental role during the arrest of L.K. Advani, a BJP member involved in the 
destruction of the Babri mosque, and lost his Chief Ministership in Bihar as a result.363 
Traces of dissidence are also evident among low caste communities in southern India. 
For these individuals, the struggle is two-pronged: an opposition to brahamanism and 
a repudiation of the north Indian variant of the religious system.364 
Undeterred by the efforts of enterprising dalit leaders, the BJP has largely 
succeeded in mobilizing the masses. Even after the collapse of the BJP-BSP alliance 
for the third time in August 2003, reports from Uttar Pradesh indicated that the dalit 
masses believed the BJP would assist them in securing dignity in society.365 Evidently, 
the BJP’s discourse contains a strong trace of hope—an evocation of the desires of 
marginalized communities. Mythical narratives chosen by the party undermine Hindu 
casteism and denounce external control. By providing an alternative vision of socio-
cultural relationships, these myths become instruments for achieving political 
support.366           
 To appreciate the import of the BJP’s mobilization efforts, it is worth assessing 
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the conception of caste in contemporary India. Modernization has rendered the official 
discourse on caste as a construct of the past.367 Most of India is given to believe that 
caste is no longer a prominent issue in Indian society. Yet, discourses on caste 
frequently break through everyday narratives, as generalized remarks on the 
characteristics of other caste groups—on customs, cleanliness, and atmosphere. The 
parameters of caste have thus become an “idiom of civic order: the brahamin caste 
spirit has gradually been injected into the modern mentality.”368 
Given the above, Hindutva’s denial of caste as an issue is a way of convincing 
lower castes that they are a part of the Hindu civilization, as well as a means of 
perpetuating the hierarchical model of social organization deemed “orderly” in the 
discourse of Sarvarkar.369 In co-opting dalits into the Hindu rashtra (nation), the BJP 
has undermined the communities’ mythical figures and cultural practices. These have 
been replaced by the obligations inherent to brahamanism.370 In essence, those seeking 
to advocate Hinduism have countered its egalitarian appeal at every level. Hinduism is 
being impoverished of its erstwhile tolerance as a result. Long prized for its diversity, 
the religion risks loosing a multitude of symbolisms and practices.371 
 
Subdued yet Assertive: Women and the Feminization of Violence 
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According to the 1991 Census, women constitute about 40 million of India’s 
1.2 billion people. Yet, they are the most marginalized section of the country’s 
population. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a marked increase in feminist movements 
across India.372 The Chipko movement in the Uttaranchal hills,373and the Naxalite 
movements in the northeast and Bengal,374 empowered women to protest against the 
patriarchal system upon which gender inequality in India is based. Unfortunately, the 
emergence of Hindutva has given a new lease of life to patriarchal social structures by 
ensuring that women collude with its overtly masculine agenda.375 
 
Bringing Hindutva to Women: The Rashtriya Sevika Samiti 
Since its inception, Hindu nationalist ideology has appealed to the notion of 
masculinity to justify violence against foreign forces. This being said, the Hindutva 
framework has not excluded women’s organizations altogether.376 Founded in 1936 by 
Laxmi Kelkar, the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (RSS*) is the largest women’s affiliate of 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).377 The symbolism inscribed in the names of 
the organizations is in itself instructive: the former presents women as sevikas or 
servants of the Hindu nation, while the latter refers to men as swayamsevaks or 
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volunteers of the national cause.378 Furthermore, while the founding myth of the RSS* 
underscored India’s martial heritage by focusing on stories of heroic men (like the 
Rajput king Rana Pratap and the Maratha leader Shivaji)379 during the medieval 
period, the Sevika Samiti was founded on the myth of the Muslim goonda or brute.380  
In addition to uniting Hindu women against Muslims, the Samiti underscores 
the importance of reaffirming traditional Indian values. With regards to the latter, a 
sevika stated: “Forgetting their own self, they are fascinated by the idea of equal rights 
and economic freedom. This unnatural change in the attitude of women might have led 
to the disintegration of the family, the primary…unit for imparting good samskaras 
[values].”381          
 These differences aside, the RSS and the Sevika Samiti follow a decidedly 
militant line. Although women of the Samiti are encouraged to revert back to the 
hearth, they are simultaneously told to partake in militant ventures against the nation’s 
enemies.382 In this scheme, the man has complete control over nation and home. The 
woman’s job is to nurture her sons, abide by the word of her husband and father, and 
preserve her homeland when called upon to do so: “A Hindu woman has performed 
excellently…by her forbearance, affection, and dedication. It is quite natural to get 
injured during a battle but it requires boldness, steadfastness, bravery, and tenacity to 
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sustain injuries. These qualities are to be acquired by a Hindu woman to deal with 
problems of all sorts.”383  
 
Symbols of the Samiti  
The Samiti’s ideology of a passive and sacrificing home-maker and mother is 
supplemented by its conceptualization of “the Goddess;” the latter being symbolically 
linked with the sacred topography of India.384 This religio-territorial identification 
highlights the Samiti’s underlying partriarchal nature, as it indicates an active and 
militant notion of womanhood. While this symbolism is a “stark mobilization of 
political affect, in order to cultivate a religious-territorial nationalism, it key intention 
is to function as a pedagogy for an idealized Hindu womanhood.”385 
In this conception, the Motherland endures for the sake of her Hindu children. 
Her forgiveness arises from her suffering. An important component of the Samiti’s 
character-building is, therefore, to promote a dual role of womanhood. Female 
militarism focuses on the force of sacrifice. The tenderhearted woman becomes bold 
and aggressive if time demands.386 The goddesses Durga and Kali are presented as the 
shakti, the innate power, that Hindu women require to face problems in life. They are 
not simply “the powers” which redeem the Hindu nation in times of trouble, but also 
“the resilience” the Hindu woman must cultivate to be dedicated and chaste.387 
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Mythological female figures perform similar roles. As part of its discourse on the 
sanctity of the epic Ramayana, the BJP has highlighted the character of Sita, the 
devoted wife of Rama, who remained chaste even though she was captured by the 
daemonic Ravana (the foreign force in the epic).388 Kunti, the mother of the five 
Pandava brothers in the Mahabharata is portrayed as the epitome of motherhood. By 
raising dutiful warriors, she contributes to the sustenance of the kingdom of 
Hastinapur. Like the valiant goddess, Kunti’s shakti is directed at nurturing and 
protecting her people.389 
The discourse on female shakti reinforces the systemic forms of patriarchy and 
hierarchy that typify the Hindutva framework.390 The use of the feminine metaphor—
the equation of female dignity with the sanctity of Hindu India—enables Hindutva 
ideologues to emphasize that India must be constantly protected by the strong Indian 
male.391 
 
Politics and Hindutva women 
The political fortification of cultural nationalism—through the BJP’s use of 
historical and mythical narratives—has played out rather interestingly in India. On one 
hand, it has strengthened feminist voices among more liberal middle class women. On 
the other hand, it has subverted these women’s efforts by mobilizing lower class 
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women.392 In fact, the party’s hegemonic approach has subverted the rights of women 
in communities that hitherto granted females considerable autonomy. The tribal 
populations in states like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh are a fitting example of 
this trend.393 Despite the fact that these communities have been subjugated by Hindu 
elites over many centuries, their animistic traditions and informal social networks 
grant women significant leverage. As dalit and tribal women embrace Hindutva, they 
risk losing this aspect of their traditional cultures.394 
 An interesting development within BJP politics is the appointment and 
promotion of women leaders. Women like Sushma Swaraj and Uma Bharati have 
emerged as outspoken proponents of gender-based legislation such as the Women’s 
Reservation Bill of 1996.395 While both favor reservation policy, Bharati seems 
predisposed to the idea of double quotas. In her view, low caste women require twice 
the assistance because they are twice as disempowered as ordinary women.396 It is 
worth noting that Bharati’s popularity in the BJP indicates that Hindu elites view 
women as “acceptable counter-measures” to the rising backward class consciousness 
in Parliament.397 
 The aforementioned discussion illustrates that the BJP’s supposed 
empowerment of women is a means of both assuaging low caste anxieties and 
upholding Hindu masculinity.398 This development only reiterates the relative 
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powerlessness of women. That they are placed at the forefront of Hindu nationalist 
organizations because of the belief that they will not prove effective agents of change 
highlights the masculinist tendencies within BJP politics. A similar trend is reflected 
in the operations of Jan Kalyan, a grassroots organization set up by a shankaracharya 
(spiritual guide), in Kanchipuram, Chennai.399 The organization was established in the 
1980s, by Jayanendra Saraswati, supposedly to represent the lower castes in the city. 
However, Jan Kalyan has been using feminine idioms—women’s involvement in 
prayer and ritual—to project itself as a mediator between the low castes and the upper 
caste smarta community in the region. This is ironic, because the smartas repeatedly 
establish their superiority over other castes.400 
  
Feminization of Violence: Women Under the BJP 
Hindutva’s infatuation with the Vedic past provides its supporters with a 
means of denigrating Muslims: The convenient chronology is that women lost all their 
glory and liberty in the dark period of history when India was ruled by the Mughals.401 
This notion of female victimization has found profound expression in the ideas and 
activities of right-wing Hindu women. Militant, and committed to the ideal of a Hindu 
nation, many female activists promote a millenarian vision of Rama being the new 
messiah.402 By promoting the unity of Sitaram, these women ensure that Sita becomes 
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an integral dimension of the martial Rama. A popular tape of the speeches of Uma 
Bharati, one of the most prominent women acolytes of the BJP declares: “If needed we 
will make bricks out of our bones, and our blood will be the mortar to build 
[temples].”403 Women’s collusion with the Hindutva cause is evident in the 2002 
Gujarat riots, “when women led mobs and dragged Muslim women and children into 
the streets, applauded their gang rapes, and joined men in stoning Muslim women and 
setting them on fire.”404 This brutality against other women is explained as a 
manifestation of female anger towards the entire Muslim community. Referring to the 
power of goddesses, women unknowingly assume masculine traits to instigate acts of 
communal violence against Muslim men and women.405 
In reality, the RSS strategy of managing Hindu male sexuality excludes 
women. Hindutva ideology places men in a purified space typified by celibacy. The 
continual sublimation of sexual energy becomes a means of serving Mother India and 
warding off foreign influences.406 Notions of sex segregation, communalized 
narratives on myth and history, as well as the differentiation of male and female roles 
may reflect the empowerment of women, but women’s autonomy extends only insofar 
as they profess faith in the notion of an “endangered nation that requires immediate 
unification.”407 
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Knowledge Distorted: Education under the BJP 
 A National Steering Committee on Textbook Evaluation consisting of widely 
respected scholars was instituted before the BJP regime assumed power. In its 
meetings in January 1993 and October 1994, the Committee evaluated the content of 
school textbooks in India through the reports prepared by the National Council for 
Educational Research and Training (NCERT).408 The reports also focused on the 
educational curricula of RSS-led institutions like the Saraswati Shishu Mandir 
Prakashan. The Committee’s recommendations to the Ministry of Human Resource 
Development (MHRD) underscored the partisan and communal nature of Sangh 
Parivar-led educational endeavors.409 Voicing its concerns about the Saraswati Shshu 
Mandir Prakashan, the Committee revealed:  “Some of the textbooks which are 
currently in use at the primary level…present an extremely virulent communal view of 
Indian history…historical facts have been fabricated …[to achieve] blind bigotry and 
fanaticism. These textbooks should not be allowed in schools.”410 The NCERT and the 
Steering Committee strongly recommended that legal stipulations be imposed upon 
those seeking to dismantle India’s education system.411 
 
Remapping History: A National Endeavor  
The de-secularization of national space has been highly apparent in the policies  
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of the BJP since the mid-1990s; particularly since the coming to power of BJP-led 
governments at the Center in 1998 and 1999. While the RSS has endeavored to 
communalize India’s society since its inception, the BJP’s rise to power resulted in a 
dangerous trend: the use of political office and state power to attack secular historians 
and promote communal historiography.412 After the BJP’s victory in 1999, Murli 
Manohar Joshi, long time RSS member and BJP Minister for Human Resource 
Development, initiated several proposals to amend school textbooks.413 The changes 
were intended to make the Indian education system “Indianized, nationalized and 
spiritualized.”414 
Anticipating resistance from autonomous institutions like the NCERT, 
University Grants Commission (UGC), and the Indian Council of Social Science and 
Research (ICSSR), the government appointed to educational commissions those who 
were willing to serve as its instruments.415 After unceremoniously sacking Professor 
D.N. Jha, the reigning chairman of the country’s national educational organ, the 
Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), the BJP secured control over the 
nation’s examination system.416 The party thereafter used the CBSE to pressure the 
NCERT and other organizations. In 2001, for example, the NCERT was forced to 
delete passages in history textbooks without informing scholars like Romila Thapar, 
Satish Chandra, and R.S. Sharma, who had authored these texts.417 
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In BJP-controlled states, these measures paved the way for the imposition of 
RSS primary and secondary school curricula onto state textbooks. In Gujarat, for 
example, the Narendra Modi government engaged in a massive overhaul of the 
existing educational framework, replacing history and political science textbooks with 
RSS material on the Hindu tragedy during the medieval era.418 Studies conducted post 
the Gujarat riots of 2002 have shown that two decades worth of communal 
indoctrination made the carnage in Gujarat inevitable: young minds in the state 
gradually became willful subjects of the political regime. 419 
 
Indoctrination: The Basis of Violence 
Consistent with Sarvarkar’s discourse, BJP and RSS funded texts have said of 
Islam: “Wherever they went, they had a sword in their hand…Houses of prayer and 
universities were destroyed. Religious books were burnt. Mothers and sisters were 
humiliated; mercy and justice were unknown to them.”420 BJP endorsed historical 
texts in school systems extol the “Greater India,” of the ancient times; they describe 
the Aryan civilization as the birthplace of humanity, from which the Persians, Greeks, 
and Egyptians borrowed.421 The pre-Aryan Indus Valley civilization is described as 
the Vedic core of Indian culture. Islam is said to have brought with it the rule of the 
sword.422 For this reason, school texts focused on the Rajput and Maratha clans, 
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featuring their vigorous efforts to thwart the dominion of the Mughals; the idea being 
that Hindus cannot confine themselves to words. This message pervades BJP attempts 
to re-cast history.423  
In political science textbooks, Upadhyaya’s ideology of integral humanism and 
Dharmarajya (rule by righteousness) has been inserted. A Gujarati history textbook 
from 2002 states that the “Aryans were the most illustrious race in human history, 
[and] Hitler instilled the spirit of adventure in the common people.”424 A state-level 
examination for tenth grade students featured a question which asked, “If it takes four 
sevaks [RSS volunteers] to destroy one mosque, how many does it take to destroy 
twenty?”425 In a literature textbook in Rajasthan, a guide to essay writing includes the 
following conversation between a teacher and pupil: 
Student: Master, what has India achieved by doing the nuclear tests? Was it a 
correct step?  
Teacher: Undoubtedly, it was correct…Economic sanctions do not matter. The 
country first has to become powerful. Only the powerful are listened to. Now 
we can talk about world peace aggressively.426 
 
In today’s context, it is of particular interest to see how the Hindu effort to 
appear nationalist has led to the distortion of the Hindutva. The Indian independence 
movement, which was a secular struggle against communalism, is projected as cultural 
nationalism.427 Leaders are presented in an intensely partisan light, and the entire 
struggle is projected against a communal backdrop. Gandhi is consistently criticized 
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for supporting Muslims, while Muslim leaders like Jinnah are viewed as aggrandizing 
individuals who hinged their political victories on Gandhi’s support.428 
Despite nationwide protests, this process of Talibanization of education was 
continued.429 It culminated in the existing NCERT history textbooks being withdrawn 
altogether. These were replaced by the works of key Sangh Parivar ideologues. 430 
By using education as the primary vehicle of ideological dissemination, the 
BJP fortified the fictions of the Hindutva curricula. The attempts to distort Indian 
history veiled the momentous developments in Hinduism, and undermined the 
substantive elements of traditions like Buddhism, and Jainism. More importantly, they 
have snatched from posterity the opportunity to bask in the truly diverse nature of 
India. 
 
Pervasive Press, Manifest Media 
 Since its inception, the BJP has employed visual and print media in a targeted 
and focused manner, since its inception. Following the proliferation of news channels 
during the last two decades, political reporting has found new following in India.431 
This has bestowed an indirect advantage upon the BJP: its activities and programs are 
often accorded excessive publicity. A formal association between Sangh Parivar 
leaders and the media emerged around the mid-1980s, around the same time that the 
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VHP and BJP were trying to link Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism with the notion of 
ramrajya, or rule by Rama.432 
 
The Targets: Women, Children, and the Marginalized 
The popularization of the Ramayana through television prepared the public for 
the Hindu nationalist venture of the BJP and RSS, by presenting Rama as both a 
historic hero and a supreme deity of the Hindus.433 The BJP clearly understood the 
potential of Lord Rama as a god, ideal, and hero or mobilizing people of both rural 
and urban areas. The slogan “man man mein hain Rama,” or “in everyone’s hearts 
resides Lord Rama,” was successful in targeting rural communities, for whom the 
stress on culture and tradition signified a break from the BJP’s urban-developmental 
agenda.434 
A characteristic feature of the BJP’s media campaign between 1999 and 2004 
was the broadcasting of national festivals centered on the deification of the Ganges 
River. This sacralization of India’s geography was accompanied by news reports on 
yajnas (sacrifices) and yatras (processions).435 The VHP’s Ekamata Tatra (unifying 
procession) of 1983 and BJP leader L.K. Advani’s ratha yatra (chariot procession) of 
1992 are fitting examples of the above. Both the movements were extensively covered 
by news channels like Aaj Tak and leading national newspapers like the Pioneer.436 
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The media also enabled the BJP to enlist the support of the marginalized in 
Hindu society. For example, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, the BJP relied on the print 
media to carve the image of Suhaldev, a Pasi437 hero who spent his life countering 
Muslim rule.438 Booklets like Hindu Samaj ke Gaurav: Pasi Veer Maharaja Suhaldev 
Ki Shaurya Gatha, written by Trilokinath Kol, a local RSS activist and BJP leader in 
Bahraich, used the figure of Suhaldev to demonstrate how the Pasis had been 
dethroned and ostracized by the Mughals. For the BJP, Muslim rule became the sole 
means of deflecting blame from its traditional elitist voter base. That lower caste 
troubles, and divisions in Indian society, were a consequence of medieval colonial 
domination was a strand of thought that underlay the entire rhetorical approach of the 
BJP.439 
 Co-opted Media: Recasting Violence 
The most appalling aspect of the BJP-media accord is the latter’s extensive 
coverage of BJP-inspired riots. Prior to the Ayodhya riots in 1992, news channels like 
Aaj Tak covered entire speeches of BJP members like L.K. Advani, whose views 
extolled violence against the Muslims. Coverage of the riots themselves presented the 
image of Hindus going to “avenge the wrong leashed upon them.”440 
Gujarati newspapers played a provocative role in highlighting the communal 
riots in 1998 in Bardoli, a town about thirty kilometers from Surat. Shortly after the 
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incident, a twenty-member assessment team reported: “The story about the attack by a 
Muslim crowd on the midnight of June 26 in Bardoli which appeared in Gujarat 
Samachar and Dhabkar on June 27 was found by us to be completely fabricated. 
Photographs published in one newspaper were manipulated.”441 Gujarat Samachar 
had a four-column headline: “Muslims Retaliate in Bardoli: Disgusting Attempt to Set 
Fire to Three Innocent Children. Attempt to Rape Women, Idol of Ganpati [Lord 
Ganesh] Broken.”442 Dhabkar stated: “A strict economic boycott will throttle the 
Muslims. It will break their backbone. Then it will be difficult for them to live in any 
part of the country. Friends begin this economic boycott from today...”443 
 Addressing an electoral rally in the city of Lucknow in 2009, BJP leader 
Advani stated: “It is a dream of [millions] of people across India and a magnificent 
temple will definitely come up in Ayodhya.”444 His speech was welcomed by youths 
in organizations like the Bajrang Dal and the Akhil Bharati Vidhya Parishad; 
newspapers like the Gujarat Samachar celebrated this decision. 445 
Educational institutions and the media have proved indispensible electoral 
planks of the BJP. They have provided Hindutva ideologues with the means necessary 
to disseminate its rhetoric and ideology. Women and lower caste communities are the 
primary targets, but also the means—they are the noble volunteers who spread the 
BJP’s message far and wide. Through their endeavors, the supposed “dream” of 
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homogenous India is partially actualized, consecrated in the violence that Hinduism so 
overtly opposes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MOSQUE OR TEMPLE? THE BABRI MASJID-RAMJANMABHOOMI 
DISPUTE 
 
 
With regards to the decision of whether to give in to the Hindu demand 
concerning [Lord] Rama’s traditional birth site, it is sufficient that there is a 
consensus among those people who worship Rama…When on October 8, 
1990, fighting broke out in Jerusalem over the “Dome of the Rock” and the 
Al Aqsa mosque, absolutely no one stood up and questioned the Muslim 
claim that the Al Aqsa mosque was built over the Prophet’s footprint in the 
rock. So why should Hindus start proving the sacredness of their sacred 
places?  
                           -Koenraad Elst, Ayodhya and After: Issues Before Hindu Society, 8. 
 
The demolition of the Babri mosque was justified by Hindu zealots as an 
attempt to rid India of a relic of Muslim domination.446 While proponents of Hindutva 
continue to advocate for the construction of a temple where the mosque hitherto stood, 
several Indians view the events of 1992 as an onslaught on Indian secularism and 
democracy.447 
 
Precursors to the Demolition: Shah Bano and the Uniform Civil Code Debate 
Sensing the heightened insecurity among Muslims following the Partition448 in 
1947, the Congress government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to 
assure members of the community that they were an integral part of India. It did so, 
ironically, by excluding them from what was to have been a uniform civil code 
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(UCC).449 Accommodation of religion became a matter of intense controversy with the 
enactment of the Hindu Code Bills in 1950.450 While the Bills replaced Hindu personal 
law governing marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance with a uniform civil code, 
they left Muslim customary law unchanged. This infuriated Hindu nationalists, who 
claimed that the proposed directives undermined traditional Hindu practices.451 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, proponents of Hindutva decried the 
government’s pampering of minorities, and denounced pseudo-secularism—state 
policies that accorded special rights to Muslims in matters pertaining to personal 
law.452 The issue reemerged in a 1985 Supreme Court Case453 involving a seventy-
three-year-old Muslim woman, Shah Bano, who was divorced by her husband after 
forty-three years of marriage.454 By requiring that Shah Bano receive monthly 
maintenance from her husband, the Court’s decision broke with the legal precedent of 
adjudicating Muslim family disputes455 under the Islamic Personal Law Application 
Act.456 Hindu nationalists opposed the Supreme Court’s decision, maintaining that it 
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was unnecessarily sympathetic towards Indian Muslims. They were equally critical of 
the Congress Party, which was in power at the time.  
Indian Muslims found their own set of religious rationales for opposing the 
Bills. Islamic clerics condemned the decision as an interference with Sharia law,457 
and a step towards a uniform civil code that would deny Muslims the right to profess 
their faith.458 In an attempt to stem the withdrawal of Muslim support from the 
Congress Party, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announced his support for the 
Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Bill. The Bill became law in 1986, 
despite widespread agitation by conservative Islamic clerics, progressive Indian 
Muslims (who genuinely desired Hindu-Muslim cohesion), and Hindu nationalists 
(whose communal agenda was severely compromised due to the law).459 
The Shah Bano controversy provided proponents of Hindutva with a tailor-
made opportunity, for it dramatized the dilemma of instituting democracy in a 
multicultural, multi-religious society.460 The courts461 bolstered Hindu nationalist aims 
by situating the issue of women’s rights in the conflict between a monogamous Hindu 
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society and a polygamous Islamic tradition.462 Appeals to gender problematized the 
debate on personal law within an intensely religious setting.463  
Recognizing the benefits that would accrue from cashing in on these events, 
Hindu nationalists used the consensus in favor of a national civil code to their 
advantage. They repeatedly emphasized that the Congress response to the Shah Bano 
case proved that the party was courting the Muslim vote. This affirmed, in their view, 
that Indian secularism was a sham, that it was, in fact, anti-Hindu.464 The Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), by contrast, stood for a “positive secularism” that embodied a 
uniform civil code—albeit a Hinduised version.465 By framing the Shah Bano case as 
one involving the sentiments of a Muslim woman, the BJP expressed a clear move 
against womanhood and Islam.466 In reality, the UCC debate reflects the communal 
tendencies of the Hindu right-wing. Proponents of Hindutva deliberately overlooked 
the persistence of personal law in other communities, among the Indian Parsi 
community, for instance.467 That they consciously appealed to the structural patriarchy 
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in Islamic society indicates how Hindu nationalists used the Shah Bano case, and the 
related debate on personal law, to promote their anti-Muslim agenda.468 
As indicated in chapter two, the BJP was forced to return to its militant roots in 
the wake of its electoral defeat in 1984.469 L.K. Advani, who possessed closer ties with 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), replaced the more moderate A.B. Vajpayee 
as party president.470 This change in the BJP’s leadership, the aforementioned Hindu 
Code Bills controversy, and the Shah Bano episode were events that crystallized the 
Hindu revival movement of the 1980s. In search of an outlet to express their 
grievances against Congress pseudo-secularism and the Muslim minority, the BJP-
RSS-VHP471 triad launched the Ramjanmabhoomi movement: The drive to erase the 
Babri mosque at Ayodhya encompassed the gambit of fears that plagued votaries of 
Hindutva.472 
 
Hindu Revivalism: The Struggle over Ramjanmabhoomi  
 Hindu revivalism during the 1980s was characterized by massive reconversion 
drives. The aim was to reclaim those low caste communities who had embraced 
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Islam473 during the medieval period.474 To this end, the BJP organized national yagnas 
or integration rituals, and the VHP made attempts to reestablish control over holy sites 
like the Kashi Vishwanath Temple in Varanasi and the Krishna temple in Mathura.475 
Public processions such as the Ekamata Yatra or unifying pilgrimage of 1983, and the 
solidification of subsidiary militia units—the VHP’s youth wing, the Bajrang Dal,476 
came into being in 1984—paved the way for a nationwide campaign directed at 
affording legitimacy to the “idealized Hindu nation.”477 
Though incremental, these measures positioned Hindutva forces for strategic 
action in the future.478 In 1985, the VHP launched a movement to liberate 
Ramjanmabhoomi, the birthplace of Lord Rama in the city of Ayodhya.479 The 
operation was spearheaded by the Sri Ramjanmabhoomi Mukti Yagna Samiti 
(Committee for Sacrifice to Liberate Rama’s Birthplace).480 At issue was the Babri 
mosque, which was constructed in 1528 AD by the first Mughal emperor Babur.481 
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Hindu nationalists alleged that the site hitherto housed a mandir (temple) marking the 
birthplace of Rama. The belief led to the eventual destruction of the mosque in 
1992.482 
 
Ayodhya: Contested through History  
The Babri masjid-Ramjanmabhoomi controversy is not of recent origin. It is 
believed that Hindus attacked the Babri mosque four times during Babur’s reign and 
close to twenty times a century later, during the reign of Emperor Akbar.483 Conflict 
over the territory resurfaced in the modern period, when a group of Hindu ascetics 
attacked the mosque in 1850.484 A compromise was later reached under the British 
government, and Hindus were allowed to offer prayers on a platform outside the 
mosque. The move failed to placate Hindus: In 1883, a coalition of devotees 
demanded that a temple be built adjacent to the mosque. The British refused to 
comply.485 Then in 1949, Hindu priests broke into the Babri mosque and placed an 
idol of Lord Rama in the premises. Against the backdrop of nearly a century of 
conflict over the shrine, the Congress government of 1949 declared the premises a 
disputed area and locked the gates.486 These efforts failed to avert contention, and a 
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1951 district court ruling in the state of Uttar Pradesh affirmed Hindus’ rights of 
worship on the land.487 
For nearly four and a half decades, Hindu nationalists sought an agenda which 
would warrant the call of revival. The opportunity arrived in 1986 when a district 
judge from Faizabad, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, ordered that the gates of the 
mosque be opened to Hindu worshippers.488 The decisions of 1951 and 1986 brought 
to the fore the inherent politicization of the Indian judiciary. The BJP would use this 
dynamic to its advantage in time to come. While the VHP launched its revival 
movement, Muslims formed the Babri Masjid Action Committee and observed 
nationwide mourning.489 More than 300,000 Muslims gathered in New Delhi in March 
1987 to demand the return of the mosque. This was the largest organized Muslim rally 
since independence; only to be followed a month later by a massive Hindu rally 
organized by the pro-Hindu BJP.490 
As Hindu-Muslim tensions escalated, the VHP intensified its stand. 
Undergirding its efforts was the desire to consolidate a support base that could be 
mobilized to perpetuate Hindutva goals.491 The BJP pursued a mixed strategy. It 
entered into open alliances with opposition parties and also focused on Hindu 
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mobilization campaigns. The VHP had revived the Ramjanmabhoomi dispute and the 
BJP promptly boarded its chariot.492 
 
 
Revivalism, Rama, and Rationales for Aggression 
Through its discussion of the BJP’s mobilization strategies, the previous 
chapter established that the god-hero Rama holds a pivotal position in Hindutva 
iconography. The notion of ramrajya (rule by Rama) has enabled the party to 
perpetuate Sarvarkar’s views by employing symbols and narratives with which 
modern-day Hindus can relate.  
In appropriating Rama as a party symbol, the BJP has substantially altered the 
conventional iconography associated with the historical figure. First, the effort to 
equate Rama with a uniform Hindu consciousness received a tremendous boost 
following the popularization of visual media. In particular, the broadcasting of a 
televised version of the Ramayana in 1987-88 allowed millions to view excerpts from 
the epic on a daily basis.493 The move ensured that local traditions and myths were 
contextualized by a dominant, national narrative. It also enabled Hindu nationalists to 
use the myth of Rama during their political campaigns.494 The BJP’s projection of 
Rama as the linchpin of Hindu religion was and remains a monolithic attempt that 
subverts the diversity in Hinduism:  
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One could argue that the Sangh Parivar’s strategy of generating a 
nationalized Hinduism through the production of a religious community 
imagined around the national geography of sites like Ayodhya…is an attempt 
to “massify” the nation in a concrete spatial sense…The majoritarian notion 
of the “rights” of Hindus as the dominant interpretation of secularism…has 
settled among broad groups as the fundamental principle of intelligibility of 
the social world.495 
 
Second, by representing Rama as an aggressive warrior, the BJP has converted 
the hitherto moral representation of Rama into an overtly physical one.496 Anuradha 
Kaur says of this development: “Rama [has become] a warrior, not easily 
distinguished from other warriors: Ben Hir, El Cid, or to take Indian examples, Arjuna 
and Bhima. Like them, he fights for possession, control, [and] status.”497  
Finally, the new iconography of the Hindu right focuses explicitly, on Rama’s 
opposition to the Mughal Empire. By portraying the mosque at Ayodhya as a relic of 
oppressive and unjust Muslim rule, and as the chief obstacle to the restoration of 
ramrajya, Hindu nationalists have made Muslims a permanent subversive element in 
all references to Rama.498 As Tapan Basu and his co-authors remark, “The new 
historical myths have achieved a vital substitution of associative feeling so 
effectively…that Muslims need not be introduced at all…Rama’s face and his life 
story are enough…to [bring] in the invented medieval history of India.”499 This 
sentiment is explicitly expressed in the ideas of Jana Krishnamurti, former BJP Vice-
President and strategist. In an interview in 1999 he stated, “Ask [Hindus]…whom do 
they prefer: Babur or Rama? [The destruction of the Babri mosque] was…a 
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misreading of the mood of Hindus by other political parties. We are not asking for 
every mosque to be removed. We desire only the birthplace of Rama back…if the 
Muslims feel this is their land, why do they not agree to leave the site?”500  
The 1988 Rama shila pujas, wherein bricks inscribed with Rama’s name were 
worshipped during a nationwide campaign organized by the VHP, illustrate the 
inventive manner in which Hindutva rituals reinforced the singular myth of Rama. The 
bricks, wrapped in saffron cloth and displayed at temples and public sites, proved 
instrumental in the BJP’s operations in Ayodhya.501 
 
Phase 01: Consolidating Consensus 
Establishing an alternative set of significations allowed Hindutva ideologues to 
instate a spirit of reformation among its cadres. The phase of revivalism ushered in 
1985 culminated in a full-fledged drive against remnants of medieval Islam.502 For the 
VHP, the Babri mosque was the edifice upon which Muslim rule once rested. Upon 
joining forces with the BJP, VHP cadres took the final leap. They decided in 1989 to 
launch an official movement dedicated to building a Rama temple in place of the 
Babri mosque.503 
As Hindu devotees from across India, each bearing a brick for the construction 
of the new temple, made their way to Ayodhya, the nation witnessed a communal 
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confrontation featuring over a 100,000 armed Hindutva volunteers.504 With 
parliamentary elections around the corner, the BJP was forced to forfeit the temple 
issue temporarily.505 Meanwhile, Congress representative Rajiv Gandhi, who had 
made every attempt to stir the communal pot in his bid for Muslim support during the 
Shah Bano controversy, sought to use the Ayodhya riots against the BJP.506 His efforts 
proved largely ineffectual, and concerns over corruption and inflation drove the 
Congress out of power.507 With 11.4 percent of the national vote and eighty-five seats 
in the Lok Sabha,508 the BJP possessed all but one ingredient (a non-elitist socio-
economic agenda) necessary to rake up its ethno-nationalist Hindu agenda.509 
The lack of a shared vision ate away at the BJP coalition. Out of power by the 
1990s, the party faced another dilemma. The Mandal Commission, created a decade 
ago by the Congress, released its report favoring a twenty-seven percent quota for 
backward classes in all government institutions.510 The BJP responded with 
disapproval, maintaining that the quota undercut the party’s attempts to unite upper 
and lower caste Hindus. Caught between the pulls of its traditional elitist base and the 
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newly emerging lower caste brigade, whose vote won the party national office a year 
earlier, the BJP desperately sought an agenda that would ensure political victory.511  
 
Phase 02: Dharma Yuddha (Righteous War) 
Several BJP members proposed the revival of the Babri mosque dispute as the  
path forward. Sensing the need to distract the party’s electoral base from the Mandal 
Report, BJP leader L.K. Advani launched a rath yatra (chariot procession) in 1990,512 
with the support of RSS and VHP volunteers513 The 10,000-kilometer journey514 
across ten states in the heartland of north India was to end at Ayodhya on October 30, 
1990, when the construction of the much awaited Rama temple was scheduled to 
commence.515 
As the date neared, tens of thousands of Hindu militants led by Advani met at 
Ayodhya. “Women brought coconuts, incense sticks, and sandalwood 
paste…youngsters met the rath armed with…swords and trishuls (tridents)…VHP and 
Bajrang Dal activists prepared the route with decorations.”516 Advani’s dharma 
yuddha (righteous war) had begun.517 Invoking the principles of secularism, then 
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Prime Minister V.P. Singh518 stressed that the Uttar Pradesh High Court’s interim 
order to secure status quo at the disputed site would be enforced, and that the mosque 
at Ayodhya would be “protected at all costs.”519 In lieu of the above, Advani and other 
BJP leaders were arrested on October 23, en-route to the mosque.520 The arrests 
sparked a series of clashes among Hindus and Muslims that left nearly three thousand 
people dead. Hindu nationalist forces withdrew from Ayodhya with the promise to 
return.521 
The incident had immediate political impact. Following Advani’s arrest, the 
BJP withdrew its parliamentary support from V.P. Singh’s National Front 
government. On losing a vote of no confidence, V.P. Singh submitted his resignation 
as Prime Minister.522 The BJP exploited the Ayodhya issue in the subsequent 
elections, thereby increasing its holdings in the Lok Sabha from eighty-five in the 
1989 parliamentary elections to a hundred and nineteen in the 1991 elections.523 
The commonly cited rationales for Advani’s decision to launch the rath yatra 
relate to the Hindu vote bank, which the BJP had been cultivating since the mid-
1980s. As caste loyalties came to the fore owing to the release of the Mandal 
Report,524 proponents of Hindutva were faced with the need to safeguard their 
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established electoral base.525 Advani continues to claim that whether or not the Babri 
mosque had been built over an existing Rama temple is irrelevant. Of importance is 
the symbolism of Ayodhya in Hindus’ imagination. In fact, several accounts have 
suggested that a temple never existed on the site.526 The Ramjanmabhoomi movement 
was therefore an attempt to substitute the issue of caste discrimination with an 
alternative political configuration in which backward castes could be “sutured into an 
integrated Hinduism.”527 This allowed the BJP to displace blame for the post-Mandal 
era anti-reservation riots (spurred by Hindu elites) onto the Muslims. It also ensured 
low caste support for the party’s agenda in Ayodhya. Advani’s yatra was a calculated 
political move. Put simply, it was the BJP’s anti-Mandal strategy.528 
 
Phase 03: Turned to Rubble 
  Lalit Vachani’s documentary, The Boy in a Branch, depicts BJP leader Arun 
Shourie hoisting the bhagwa dhwaj,529 the saffron flag, at the RSS’s 1992 Founders 
Day rally, shortly before the destruction of the Babri mosque.530 Shourie is dressed in 
secular clothing, not in the khaki shorts and saffron stoles worn by other RSS 
members at the rally. Unlike his contemporaries K.K. Shastri and Devendra Swarup, 
Shourie is not a dogmatic RSS man.531 A man with well-thought-out but nonetheless 
                                                 
525
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 171. 
526
 Puniyani, Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths, 128. 
527
 Ibid. 
528
 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 172. 
529
 Literally translated, “bhagwa dhwaj” implies “protective shield.” The saffron color embodies the 
greatness of the Vedic past, and the pure, sacrificial quality of Agni, the Vedic god of fire. See footnote 
75 for citation.  
530
 Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 62/ 70. 
531
 Ibid. 
  
112 
controversial economic views, he portrays himself as wanting the BJP to lose its 
extremism. Yet his speech accords complete support to the Ayodhya campaign. There 
is no getting around the fact that Shourie joined the BJP not for its economic policies 
alone, but because of the conviction that Muslims pose a danger to India and must be 
kept in check. Shourie’s case is a classic example of the implications of Hindutva. 
Through the promise of an economically vibrant India, Hindu nationalists seek to 
control even the moderate Hindu vote.532 
 Following the 1991 elections, the BJP’s liberal economic bent under Prime 
Minister A.B. Vajpayee was severely critiqued by several RSS leaders. In a joint 
VHP-RSS rally on October 29, 1991, Hindutva forces threatened, “If the BJP dragged 
its feet over the construction of the temple at Ayodhya, its government will fall.”533 In 
the face of mounting pressure from other right-wing organizations, the BJP had little 
choice but to comply with the larger demands of the Hindutva family. This being said, 
Hindutva ideologues recognized that the garb of economic liberalism would ensure the 
BJP’s success in office. The party’s stable position at the Center was a golden 
opportunity for the right-wing forces embroiled in the decade-long struggle at 
Ayodhya.534 
 The rally launched in October 1991 spurred thousands into action. By October 
31, 1991, a sizeable front had gathered in the grounds adjacent to the Babri mosque. 
The same day, a group of young activists climbed onto the domes of the Babri mosque 
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and hoisted saffron flags, destroying one of the building’s outer walls.535 By the end of 
July 1992, RSS cadres were in the midst of completing a concrete platform on the site. 
Their actions clearly violated a 1990 Supreme Court order which prohibited the 
creation of “a permanent structure” in the vicinity of the mosque.536  
By December 5, 1992, about 100,000 supporters joined Hindutva forces at the 
mosque. At this juncture, the BJP sent hard-liners like Advani with explicit 
instructions to engage the masses while the government sought a compromise with 
RSS cadres. Unfortunately, Advani’s speeches yielded the opposite result. Those at 
Ayodhya viewed the presence of BJP leaders as a tacit endorsement of Hindu 
communal intentions.537 On December 6, 1992, as three hundred thousand supporters 
gathered to listen to RSS speeches, some pilgrims breached the cordon, entered the 
disputed area, and began stoning the mosque.538 Using iron rods, they defaced the 
mosque’s north wall. By late afternoon, five and a half hours after the first group of 
Hindus crossed the cordon, all three domes of the mosque had been pulled to the 
ground. Two thousand Muslims were killed in the three weeks of rioting that ensued in 
the north western states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.539 
 
A Successful Siege 
There is still no agreement about the extent to which the demolition was 
planned. Advani is said to have shown signs of surprise and distress: he resigned from 
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his post as the leader of the opposition. Vajpayee, who was not present at the time, 
said the demolition was the “worst miscalculation ever made by his party.”540  
Meanwhile, the Congress government under Narasimha Rao vacillated, failing 
to take strong action against the Hindu nationalist perpetrators. The ban imposed on 
the VHP and RSS on December 8, 1992 was quickly withdrawn.541 Aware that the 
demolition was not receiving strong criticism, BJP leaders repealed their earlier 
statements, arguing that there was no salient distinction between moderates and hard-
liners in the party. The initially apologetic Vajpayee seemed only happy to support his 
camp’s misdemeanors. He stated, “The Babri mosque was a symbol of shame and has 
been erased.”542 
Although the Congress instituted an inquiry commission to investigate the 
Ayodhya riots under Supreme Court Justice M.S. Liberhan,543 the commission finally 
submitted its report to the current Congress-led coalition under Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh after seventeen years and forty-eight extensions. Despite the 
report’s release on June 30, 2009, the ruling government has failed to institute 
concrete measures against the RSS and BJP.544 
 The political potential of the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation lay in the multiple 
ways in which it engaged the dominant discursive narratives in post-colonial India. It 
sought to use alternately, and to its advantage, three contested ideas: the fallacy of the 
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Nehruvian state,545 Indian society as dominated by an inherently tolerant Hindu 
culture; and communalism as anti-national sentiments among minorities.546 By 
asserting that Ayodhya was Rama’s birthplace, the BJP cast the Babri mosque as a 
remnant of medieval Mughal rule.547 This became the central mobilization tactic 
during the 1992 campaign. Domestic constraints only aided Hindu nationalists.548 The 
breakdown of Nehruvian socialism during the early 1990s, along with allegations of 
corruption which plagued the Congress, augmented the Ramjanmabhoomi 
campaign.549 
The sharpest edge in the entire campaign lay in the constant drawing of 
boundaries between “self” and “other.” Just as it was crucial to “fetishize the 
materiality of the Babri mosque,” it was important to “essentialize the Muslim 
community.”550 Muslim destruction and brutality—as epitomized in the Partition—
became popular themes for women like Sadhvi Ritambara and Uma Bharati. The two 
BJP leaders continually stressed their status as sadhvis, or women willing to sublimate 
their femininity. The parallels between the RSS warrior-monk and the sadhvi are 
instructive, as they point to women’s co-optation into the male-centric framework of 
the Sangh Parivar.551 As noted in chapter three, the use of rhetoric imbued with 
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violent metaphors has caused women and backward communities to equate 
empowerment with acts of force. This orientation has advanced the BJP’s attempts at 
legitimizing violence against Muslims.552 The staging of Uma Bharati as a young, 
angry, “backward class woman” has played subtly on the assimilationist attributes of 
Hindutva. Bharati’s statements reflect this collusion: “We could not teach them with 
words, now let us teach them with kicks…tie up your religiosity and kindness and 
throw it in the Jamuna [River]…[A]ny non-Hindu who lives here does so at our 
mercy.”553 
 
Ayodhya: A Road Map for Future Violence  
The illegal construction of the Rama temple in Ayodhya commenced soon 
after the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992, and has gathered pace since.554 The 
demolition brought in its wake an unprecedented attack on Muslim communities in 
late 1992 and early 1993, in both north and south Indian towns and cities. In Mumbai, 
the Hindutva campaign was systematically planned. Muslim individuals, business, and 
homes were methodically targeted by the Shiv Sena, a regional Hindu nationalist 
outfit.555 Though the Mumbai violence was a product of a range of causes, such as the 
lack of land redevelopment and the rise of organized crime, it is nonetheless estimated 
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that close to 67 percent of the people who died in the 1993 Mumbai riots were 
Muslim.556 
In the aftermath of the riots, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao instructed the 
Maharashtra state government to institute a commission of inquiry under Justice B. N. 
Srikrishna.557 Though its initial brief was to investigate the causes of the Mumbai 
riots, the Shiv Sena-BJP joint government that took control of Maharashtra expanded 
the commission’s area of inquiry to include the bomb blasts that occurred in Mumbai 
in March 1993.558 The blasts were believed to have been supported by individuals in 
the city’s growing criminal circle, whose Muslim origins were of particular concern to 
the BJP. The commission refrained from expanding its focus, and identified the 
Hindutva camp, in particular the Shiv Sena, as responsible for the 1993 communal 
riots in Mumbai. 559 
According to the Srikrishna Commission Report, “While several incidents of 
violence took place during the period…large scale rioting commenced from January 6, 
1993…owing to the efforts of the Shiv Sena and its leader Bal Thackeray who 
continued to whip up communal frenzy [through] their statements and acts.”560 The 
Mumbai riots are significant because they exemplify the extent to which Hindutva 
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ideology is impacting India’s political character. The increase in regional 
organizations supportive of the BJP indicates the potency of Hindu nationalist ideas.561 
 From Mumbai, riots spread to cities like Allahabad in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh (1994-95) and Ahmadabad in the state of Gujarat (1996). Communal tensions 
in Gujarat culminated in the carnage of 2002, in which the BJP played a pivotal 
role.562 The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign represented “the coming together” of the 
BJP’s communal tactics. The destruction of the Babri mosque proved that the party’s 
mobilization strategies and discourse could actualize change. The BJP, having 
perfected the myth-mobilization paradigm, reverted to the myth of Rama in virtually 
every communal skirmish thereafter.563 
In some ways, the BJP has created a monster it can no longer contain. As 
historian Christophe Jaffrelot states, “It was easier to mobilize Hindus against the 
Babri mosque than for anything else.”564 Subsequent riots initiated by the 
undisciplined members of the Bajrang Dal and other youth organizations caused 
trouble for the BJP, which needed to play its cards deliberately but carefully.565  
 Additionally, the party’s rhetorical support for the status of Muslim women 
(post the Shah Bano controversy) and its simultaneous emphasis on the virtues of 
adopting a uniform civil code have roused the ire of conservative Indian Muslims. 
Such anti-minority imports, coupled with the institutionalization of violence in the 
decade following Ayodhya, have caused clerics to affirm international Islamic 
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radicalism.566 Hindu nationalist-led violence has caused consistent Muslim backlash. 
This was evident in the Allahabad and Ahmadabad riots in 1987 and 1993, where 
Muslims reacted fervently to Hindutva activism.567 “The size and spontaneity of 
Muslim rallies—such as the 300,000 people who gathered in Mumbai on November 
20, 1985—indicate the frustration and insecurity among Indian Muslims.”568  
The Ayodhya incident was a godsend for Pakistan. Islamabad used the event to 
convince other Islamic countries that Muslims everywhere should prevent Hindu India 
from “butchering” its Muslim citizens.569 Pakistanis used the Babri mosque 
controversy as an occasion for temple-burning and the murder of Hindus, who 
constitute less than 1.6 percent of the nation’s population.570 Unfortunately, the Indian 
Senate Committee on Religious Freedoms and Minority Affairs sided with Pakistan, 
citing the Liaqat-Nehru Pact,571 which promised safeguards to minorities in both India 
and Pakistan. Between November 1989 and November 1990, over 240 Hindu 
temples572 were destroyed in Bangladesh.573 Since sections of the Indian media openly 
promoted the Hindutva standpoint during and after the Ayodhya riots, India’s 
immediate neighbors seized the opportunity to engage in anti-Hindu reporting. In 
recent years, moderate voices in the BJP have spoken against biased media reports in 
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India.574 V.K. Malhotra, former BJP Secretary notes, “The responsibility for what has 
happened in Pakistan and Bangladesh is entirely that of the Union government and the 
[media]. They have been engaging in so much anti-Muslim propaganda that [other] 
governments have an excuse for [reverse] publicity.”575 
It is clear that the BJP’s current anti-minority stance will strengthen the 
majoritarian politics576 of Islamic separatists in contested territories like Kashmir.577 
Aside from bolstering the aims of Pakistan, continued militancy in such areas will 
heighten fundamentalist tendencies among Hindus and Muslims alike. A secure and 
confident Muslim community in India is therefore the surest means of refuting 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s legacy of the Two-Nation Theory.578 
As the caste system became increasingly dogmatic during the medieval period, 
Hindu low castes sought other faiths.579 Conversion gained popularity in latter half of 
the British era (1900-1947). In independent India, the 1980s witnessed a wave of 
adivasi (tribals) conversions to Islam and Christianity.580 These conversion drives, 
along with the strong assertion of Muslim identity in connection with the Shah Bano 
case caused proponents of Hindutva to strengthen their right-wing stance.581 The rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism has received significant space in the writings of Hindu 
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nationalists and intellectuals alike. While Islamic backlash suggests the possibility of 
heightened communal confrontations in India, those writing in the Indian context 
forget that Hindu nationalist discourse has contributed to Muslim insecurities.582 By 
postulating that Islam is hijacking Hindu devotees, votaries of Hindutva invariably 
appeal to the fundamentalist tendencies they seek to oppose.  
  In recent years, notable Muslim figures in India have used their status to 
oppose the conservative elements in India’s Islamic community. Asghar Ali Engineer, 
a prominent Islamic scholar based in Mumbai, said in 1990: “Every human life is 
much more precious than a hundred masjid’s [mosques] or temples…we should 
therefore do everything possible to resolve this issue…through the spirit of 
reconciliation.”583 The likes of Imam Maulana Waheeduddin Khan, and Professor 
Imtiaz Ahmed of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, have on several 
occasions initiated inter-communal dialogue. Unfortunately, the BJP and RSS have 
responded by hinting that they may press in due time for more mosque demolitions 
across India.584 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
582
 Ibid. 
583
 Wright Jr., Hinduism and Secularism, 14. 
584
 Ibid.  
 
  
122 
CHAPTER 5 
 
MODI AND HIS MUSLIMS: THE GUJARAT CARNAGE 
 
 
 
On January 26, 2001, as India celebrated her fifty-first Republic day, the most 
powerful earthquake in almost two hundred years shook north western Gujarat. 
According to official estimates, over 20,000 persons perished and close to 200,000 
were injured.585 The aftermath of the earthquake was a portent of the partisan nature of 
both state and society in Gujarat: As government officials rushed to assist Hindus, 
Muslims were denied access to relief and rehabilitation.586 
Ever since its inception, Gujarat’s polity has witnessed many turbulent phases. 
In the three and a half decades between 1960 and 1995, when the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) established its power in the state, Gujarat witnessed four spells of 
Presidential rule587 and the turn of seventeen ministries. Due to unstable political 
alliances and fragile state coalitions, not a single Chief Minister, except Madhavsingh 
Solanki who headed the Congress cabinet from 1980 to 1985, competed a full term of 
five years.588 The instability in government paralleled upheavals brought about by 
rapid urbanization. Political entities exploited the fierce competition between castes 
and communities seeking to assume meaningful identities in Gujarat’s evolving 
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society. Hindutva forces in the state embarked on each of these waves of discontent, 
turning them to their political advantage.589 
 
Laboratory of the Hindu Nation   
Though the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) found footing in Gujarat as 
early as 1941, votaries of Hindutva failed to establish political control in the state until 
the 1960s, when the erstwhile unity within the Congress Party’s ranks became feeble. 
As Atal Bihari Vajpayee assumed the political reins of the Jana Sangh590 in 1972, he 
pledged to move beyond reformist rhetoric, and promoted in its place an organized 
coalition of diverse Hindu groups in India.591 The Gujarati Navnirman movement of 
1974 provided Vajpayee and his followers with a golden opportunity to mobilize 
varied constituents in the state. As noted in chapter two, the movement allowed the 
Jan Sangh to join hands with Jay Prakash Narayan’s Total Revolution, a campaign 
spearheaded by a newly formed party, the Congress (O), comprising a disgruntled 
group of former Congressmen who sought to involve the poor in electoral politics.592 
In addition to backing factional tendencies within the Congress,593 Hindutva 
ideologues supported right-wing political bodies like the Swatantra Party, whose 
                                                 
589
 Ibid.  
590
 The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), or the Jan Sangh, was a precursor to the BJP. Chapter two outlines 
the history of this party.  
591
 Yagnik, Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat, 228. 
592
 See timeline for more details. See footnote 1 for citation.  
593
 The Congress Party was the BJP’s chief political rival. BJP leaders encouraged factions in the 
Congress to undermine the latter’s political legitimacy. See footnote 1 for citation.  
  
124 
staunchly elitist appeal dominated Gujarat’s political scene for much of the 1960s and 
1970s.594  
The general elections of 1980 witnessed a significant digression from the status 
quo, and changed the entire spectrum of political and social equations that hitherto 
characterized the state. Armed with a new strategy to counter its debacle in the 
previous decade, the Congress Party launched the KHAM (kshatriya, harijan, adivasi, 
Muslim)595 alliance, which sought to challenge the hegemonic position of the 
Swatantra Party.596  
Following this development, members of the educated middle class in Gujarat, 
specifically the banias and patidars,597 retaliated with a series of anti-reservation riots 
during the early 1980s. The riots aimed at reducing the political and social leverage of 
Muslims and low caste Hindus alike.598 Clashes between upper caste (savarnas) and 
lower caste (avarnas) communities in the industrial periphery of Ahmedabad 
gradually mutated into a caste war, which spread to eighteen of the then nineteen 
districts in Gujarat.599 
 Caste tensions resurfaced in 1985 during a second anti-reservation agitation. At 
this juncture, BJP leadership, drawn mainly from the upper castes, realized the 
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importance of expanding the party’s social base to achieve electoral success.600 While 
the BJP implicitly supported those allied with the Swatantra Party, it simultaneously 
employed a succession of yatras (processions) aimed at incorporating dalits into the 
party’s gambit. The Social Assimilation Platform movement of the 1970s provided 
BJP members with a precedent for low caste mobilization.601 The anti-Christian 
campaign was also brought in under this context. Hindutva’s negative definition of 
Indianness—neither Christians nor Muslims were true Indians—paved the way for 
anti-minority violence in Gujarat.602 
When communal riots broke out in the city of Ahmedabad in 1986, during an 
annual procession to the famed Jaganath Temple, the series of stabbings that ensued 
were projected as evidence of dalits’ allegiance to the Hindutva cause. Revisiting the 
concept of ramrajya (rule by Lord Rama), the BJP initiated the Rama-Janaki Dharma 
procession in 1987, the Rama shila prayer ceremonies in 1989, and the Rama Jyoti 
pilgrimages during the early 1990s.603 Advani’s rath yatra (chariot procession) of 
1990 lent fuel to the fire. It adroitly played on the Mandal reservation issue (1989-
1990),604 which favored political and educational quotas for the lower castes. BJP 
leaders repeatedly stressed that religious and caste issues should not be channeled to 
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the secular front. In reality, the party used low caste disillusionment605 with the 
Mandal Report to perpetuate anti-Muslim hysteria.606  
Each of these events resulted in a trail of communal clashes. The first in the 
series, the Rama-Janaki Dharma procession affected large areas of north western 
Gujarat.607 The second set of clashes due to the Ram shila ceremonies impacted 180 
Gujarati villages. The Ram Jyoti pilgrimages and Advani’s yatra unleashed violence 
in thirty-three districts across the northern, eastern, and western regions of the state.608 
The riots following the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 exacerbated Hindu-
Muslim tensions. Violence in the city of Surat, for example, caused the death of nearly 
200 persons over a seventy-two hour period.609      
 The BJP adeptly used the chaos emanating from these acts of violence to shift 
attention to matters of development. The strategy appeased the disgruntled Hindu 
elites in Gujarati society. Following an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in 
1987, the BJP began constructing a dam on the Narmada River; supposedly to 
augment India’s power generation capacity. The resultant displacement of tribal 
communities and low caste Hindus exposed, yet again, the elitist and urban-centric 
agenda of the BJP.610 Inter-caste violence in Gujarat during the 1980s enabled votaries 
of Hindutva to launch a nationwide economic reform movement rooted in the 
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repudiation of affirmative action.611 This in turn facilitated the BJP to project elite-
sponsored violence against lower castes as evidence of Muslim communalism. The 
link between low caste mobilization and anti-Muslim hysteria remains an integral 
aspect of BJP operations. 
The cyclicality of violence in Gujarat created social cleavages, enabling the 
BJP to connect with the grassroots. By 1995, the party had achieved a clean sweep in 
Gujarat’s local power institutions.612 It won 395 seats in the state’s six municipal co-
operations; the Congress captured only thirty-seven. The BJP’s feats at the village 
level were equally promising. The party secured close to eighty seats at the panchayat 
(village) level in 1995.613 
 
Why Gujarat?  
Aside from the fact that the BJP was extremely successful in establishing a 
firm political presence in Gujarat, the socio-economic climate in the state provided, 
for a multitude of reasons, the grounds necessary for the party to launch its nationwide 
endeavors.  
As subjects of the Mughals, Gujaratis had witnessed the destruction of Hindu 
shrines and temples by foreign forces. This subversion of Hindu religiosity left 
irreversible antagonisms in the social fabric of the state.614 That the north western 
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frontier of Gujarat borders Pakistan remains a significant factor in people’s minds. 
Appeals to the Partition615 and accounts of medieval Muslim oppression have fueled 
suspicions of Indian Muslims’ loyalty to Pakistan.616 This has strengthened the 
political currency of the BJP’s rhetoric.  
The economic apathy that gripped Gujarat after the 1980s was a crucial reason 
that Hindutva found following in the state. The closure and downsizing of the state’s 
traditional textile industry, and the gaining popularity of Western modes of life, have 
severely challenged the pre-existing religious syncretism in Gujarati society.617 
Increased migration in search of economic opportunity has led to the emergence of a 
strong Non-Resident Indian (NRI) community. This has in turn created a rootless 
middle class dependent entirely on monetary infusions and retrograde ideological 
imports from abroad.618 A parallel development is the enhanced willingness of low 
caste Hindus (dalits) and tribal communities (adivasis) to engage in communal acts. 
For these individuals, the journey to Hindutva is propelled by both the desire to escape 
poverty619 and the quest for an overarching identity beyond the confines of caste and 
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community.620 It is ironic that the BJP’s promise of inclusion has prompted a majority 
of Hindus to overlook its elitist tendencies.621 
 Historical trends associated with Gujarat’s industrial and economic sectors 
shed light on the rise of conservative forces in the state. The division of labor in 
Gujarat is based entirely on the Gandhian concept of trusteeship, under which 
submission of laborers is integral.622 Given this antecedent, the tribal and low caste 
communities of Gujarat have remained menial workers under the state’s landowning 
and entrepreneurial upper class. This trend explains the lack of an organized 
movement among low caste Gujaratis. It also underscores how socio-economic 
dynamics in the state curtailed neighboring Maharashtra’s anti-brahamin movement 
from establishing its presence in Gujarat.623 
Besides adversely impacting socially backward communities, economic apathy 
contributed to an increase in unemployment in the state. By 1995, close to 4.9 percent 
of Gujarat’s youth lacked a permanent source of income.624 Pointing to the 
repercussions of this development, Asghar Ali Engineer states, “BJP propaganda 
communalized, [i.e. indoctrinated with an anti-minority orientation] not only lower 
castes but also young Hindu elites in cities like Surat.”625 These individuals became 
ardent supporters of Hindutva, and actively endorsed the ideology through Vinayaka 
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idols, which aimed at culturally co-opting local subalterns into an elitist brahaminical 
culture.626  
The contrarieties in Gujarat’s educational system explain the sense of 
disillusionment among the state’s youth.627 Bound within the confines of a rote-based 
system, students are indoctrinated with right-wing European writings and Hindu 
ethno-cultural ideas. Textbooks in the state frequently equate fascism with 
nationalism.628 It is hardly surprising that individuals bred in this system regard 
Hitler’s feats as messianic, and look to his political model during times of struggle. 
Godhra Train Attack  
  The macabre events in Gujarat began with the Godhra train attack in February 
2002. The four-month long carnage that followed, from March to June 2002, led the 
country into the depths of violence. March 2002 witnessed the displacement of a 
100,000 women and children. Close to 250 Hindus and over 2,000 Muslims perished 
in the clashes.629          
 The events in Gujarat reflect the barbarism of the Hindutva agenda. 
Alternatively, they demonstrate the disenchantment of broad sections of Indian society 
towards such a colossal tragedy.630 Particularly reprehensible is the fact that the 
carnage occurred in a state ruled by the BJP for several years.631 The infiltration of 
                                                 
626
 Ibid.  
627
 Ibid. 
628
 Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 18.  
629
 Jawaid Quddus, “Hindutva and the Indian Diaspora,” in Religion, Power and Violence: Expression 
of Politics in Contemporary Times, ed. Ram Puniyani (New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Lmt., 2005), 
151. 
630
 Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 18.  
631
 The BJP was in power in Gujarat in 1993, 1995, and then again between 1999 and 2004. See 
footnote 36 for citation.  
  
131 
communally oriented individuals in the state apparatus allowed the Gujarat 
government to instigate and aid communal violence. The RSS and Vishva Hindu 
Parishad (VHP) emerged as the BJP’s primary aides.632 
On the morning of February 27, 2002, the Sabarmati Express train, carrying 
over four hundred Hindu pilgrims (kar sevaks), made its usual stop at the Godhra 
station in the western Indian state of Gujarat. During its four-minute stop, the train’s 
S-6 car was set ablaze, allegedly by Muslims waiting on the platform. The incident 
caused the death of fifty-seven people.633 Since the destruction of the Babri mosque in 
1992, the dispute over the alleged birthplace of the Indian deity Rama has been the 
focus of Hindu-Muslim confrontations. Those on-board the Sabarmati Express were 
returning from their yearly pilgrimage to Ayodhya, a journey aimed at garnering 
support for the construction a temple where the Babri mosque hitherto stood.634  
Forensic reports reveal that trouble erupted in Godhra when a Bajrang Dal 
activist635 humiliated a Muslim tea stall vendor. Eyewitness accounts have suggested 
that violence commenced when some pilgrims on the train abducted a Muslim girl. 
Regardless of what was the catalyst, it seems clear that a large crowd descended on the 
platform. Shortly thereafter, a group of Muslim men began pelting bricks on the Hindu 
pilgrims.636 The Hindus retaliated by using the sharp flint-like stones they found along 
the railway bed.         
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 Accounts of the events prior to the explosion offer fairly cursory information. 
Since the explosion was preceded by a confrontation with a Muslim mob, local police 
officials immediately blamed the Ghanchi Muslims living near the station.637 The 
government later claimed that members of the community had thrown flaming 
kerosene-soaked materials into the train. Refuting this assertion, forensic expert 
Mukul Sinha stated, “If I may crudely use a term from tennis, the advantage lay with 
the kar sevaks [volunteers], because they were on the railway lines and had….ready 
made weapons in the stones on the tracks.”638 
 
Gujarat on Fire  
 Communal riots erupted in full force on February 28, 2002, a day after the 
Godhra train attack. Sporadic incidents of violence rapidly spiraled into a state-
sponsored program against Muslims across Gujarat. Of the twenty-four districts in 
Gujarat, eighteen witnessed an outbreak of communal insurrection.639 In Gandhingar, 
the capital of Gujarat, several Muslim administrative and religious buildings, 
including the Muslim Waqf Board and the Minority Development Board offices, were 
burned.640 A series of trucks manned by Muslim drivers were also set ablaze on 
National Highway 8, just outside the main entrance of the Gujarat High Court. A 
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Muslim sitting judge of the High Court was forced to leave his official residence and 
take refuge in a Muslim majority district in Gandhinagar.641  
The most barbaric scenes were played out in industrial Ahmedabad, where 
forty-three persons, including former Congress Member of Parliament (MP) Ahsan 
Jafri were burnt alive. That evening, a mob of 15,000 Hindus attacked the slum area of 
Naroda, killing eighty-four people.642  The army was called in to contain the violence 
on March 1, 2002. By this time, violence had erupted in cities like Vadodra, Kheda, 
Panchmal, and Sabarkantha. The same day, fourteen people, nine of them Muslim, 
were burnt alive outside the Best Bakery in Vadodra. A week later, violence had 
spread both westwards and eastwards; to Surat and other locales around the Narmada 
River.643  
Mobs during the period generally consisted of between 2,000 and 3,000 
persons, although they sometimes swelled to 10,000. Rioters were armed with tridents, 
agricultural implements, and swords. The manner of arson suggested a well-laid out 
strategy of attack.644 The rioters identified minority homes and businesses. Women 
and children were deliberately targeted, and sites of religious significance (shrines and 
mosques) were systematically destroyed.645 Hanuman and Rama temples came up 
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overnight where Muslim monuments earlier stood. Losses from the rampage were 
estimated at 3,800 crore Rupees (800 million USD).646 
 
Truth Behind the Carnage 
 Even before people gained an understanding of the events at hand, the charred 
bodies of the Godhra victims were brought to Ahmedebad, where slogan shouting 
bands of VHP and BJP activists raised the communal temperature.647 The district 
collector, Jayanthi Ravi, insisted that the tragedy was unplanned and must not be 
viewed from a religious lens.648 Reports from the railway police, and subsequent 
confirmations from the National Forensic Science Laboratory and the 2005 
Independent Commission under Supreme Court Justice U.C. Banerjee, debunked the 
theory that the fire was started by local Muslims.649 A later forensic report also 
confirmed that the train had caught fire from inside, possible owing to a leaking 
kerosene stove that belonged to one of the pilgrims. The report went on to speculate 
that the event was a deliberate move by enraged kar sevaks (volunteers), whose ire at 
the Supreme Court’s denunciation650 of the Hindutva agenda in Ayodhya drove them 
to frame Muslims in a pre-fabricated incident.651   
The complicity of the state government in the carnage that followed was 
appalling. Despite contrary evidence, Chief Minister Narendra Modi projected the 
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incident as a pre-planned act of Muslim-sponsored terrorism.652 Following Modi’s 
instructions, the local police arrested sixty-two persons, including seven Muslim boys, 
under the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA).653 The BJP had introduced 
the Act in Parliament merely three months before the Godhra incident. Though the Act 
was repealed in 2004 owing to its inherently partisan nature, few questioned the Modi 
government’s decision to enforce POTA at the time.654 
 Modi categorically instructed the police and other key officials in the 
administration to remain indifferent to riot victims’ appeals for assistance. His 
inflammatory statements, such as his decision to label Muslim relief camps as “baby 
producing centers,” exacerbated the mob mentality already prevalent in the state.655 
With the Chief Minister’s support, members of the RSS and Bajrang Dal achieved the 
legal immunity necessary to lead anti-Muslims riots.656 The infiltration of RSS cadres 
in Gujarat’s the bureaucracy ensured that a nexus between the state and the civil 
service was secured and maintained. Then Cabinet Secretary TSR Subramanian said 
of this development, “There is no civil service left in Gujarat….over the years, it has 
changed from steel frame to non-existent.”657 
 The closure (bandh) that followed on February 29, 2002, is equally illustrative 
of the extent to which Gujarat’s polity drew from Hindutva’s anti-minority orientation. 
The bandh was fully backed by the BJP, despite a 1998 Indian Supreme Court ruling 
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regarding the unconstitutionality of religiously motivated closures.658 The appointment 
of Justice Shah—known for his anti-minority judgments which were later reversed by 
the Supreme Court—to investigate the Godhra case was another piecemeal 
development, intended to silence moderate elements in Indian society.659 
 
Aftermath: Relief and Rehabilitation  
 Through the course of the communal riots, Modi repeatedly asserted that 
action was taken to avert every mob. He maintained that violence after the Godhra 
train attack was brought under control within seventy-two hours.660 In reality, Gujarati 
Ministers like Nitin Patel and Narav Laloo Patel led riots against Muslims in locales 
like Kadih, Unja, and Mehsana in western Gujarat.661 
Relief camps instituted by the state lacked adequate financial support. While 
local and international NGOs made significant progress in securing immediate relief, 
those in power neglected rehabilitation and crisis management completely.662 Even 
pre-existing mechanisms of relief were denied to the riot victims. Fire brigades did not 
come to the rescue, hospitals turned away Muslims patients, and ambulance services 
to Muslims were systematically disrupted by the police.663 Modi rejected demands for 
any form of resettlement and refused funds for the restoration of ransacked Muslims 
shrines. The breakdown of civic amenities heightened the sense of urgency among 
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those affected.664 Faced with no other alternative, these individuals turned to relief 
camps in the hopes of receiving aid. By March 2002, nearly 100,000 persons were 
enlisted in one of the many camps in the state. The figure grossed 150,000 just two 
weeks later.665  
The Gujarat government’s callous attitude towards those appealing for relief is 
manifested in the fact that Modi finally visited a relief camp at Shah Alam—during 
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s survey trip to Gujarat—two months after the Godhra train 
incident had occurred.666 Those in civil society either genuinely supported Modi’s 
actions, or sided with the government owing to the fear of punishment.667 
Communalism Combat, a journal tracking Gujarati relief measures, said the following 
with regards to the situation six months after the riots:  
In Ahmedabad and Baroda, a salient yet effective boycott of Muslims, socially 
and economically, continues. A few icons of the Gujarati business community 
have tried to counter the hate politics encouraged by the Gujarati 
government…But schools and businesses…have now more so than ever…bid 
good-bye to Muslims. The general sentiment among mixed localities is that 
they do not want Muslims back. And the many Hindus who helped their 
neighbors…are under the threat that they will not be spared next time 
around.668 
 
Aftermath: Reports of Human Rights Groups 
 A tragedy of serious proportions had struck the country. The targeting of 
minorities and the complicity of the Gujarati state government was both obvious and 
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painful.669 Was all of this a signal of the permanent erosion of civic and democratic 
norms in India?670  
Though the Modi government tried desperately to put a lid on events, members 
of organizations such as the National Human Rights Commission, the Forum Against 
Oppression of Women, and Human Rights Watch, focused precisely on the political 
conditions under which the carnage had ensued.671 Their reports brought forth the 
gruesome nature of violence against women and children, the plight of refugees, and 
the apathy displayed by goverment and administrative ranks. 
 Yet, those in power in the union government, including then Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, made every effort to deflect blame.672 Whereas Modi 
deliberately cast the Godhra incident as an outcome of the radical Islamic movement, 
his Home Minister, Gordhon Zadafia, saw the hand of Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) throughout the whole episode.673 Politically, these orientations laid 
the foundation for a Hindu nationalist movement. For the popular mind, they 
heightened the allegedly paramount link between international terrorism, Pakistani 
intentions, and the Indian Islamic community. In its account of this trend, Human 
Rights Watch reported:  
The state of Gujarat and the central government of India initially blamed 
Pakistan for the train massacre, which it called a ‘pre-meditated terrorist 
attack’ against Hindus in Godhra. [Later], the revival of the Rama temple 
campaign, and the increased fears of terrorism since September 11 were 
exploited by local Hindu nationalist groups and the local press which printed 
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reports of a ‘deadly conspiracy’ against Hindus in the state…Muslim survivors 
of the attacks repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that they were told to ‘go 
back to Pakistan.’674 
 
By casting Indian Muslims as agents of Pakistan, the BJP incorporated a pivotal 
tenet in early ideologue V.D. Sarvarkar’s writing: a repudiation of the Muslim voice in 
India. This, along with the attempts to present the “pro-Muslim” Congress Party as 
“anti-national,” allowed the BJP to deflect attention from the immoral proceedings in 
Gujarat.675 At a speech in Goa on March 3, 2002, when Gujarat was seething under 
riots, Vajpayee claimed:  
If a conspiracy had not been hatched to burn alive innocent passengers of the 
Sabarmati Express, then the subsequent tragedy in Gujarat could have been 
averted…wherever Muslims live, they don’t like to live in coexistence with 
others…they want to spread their faith by resorting to terror and threats. The 
world has become alert to this danger.676 
 
If Vajpayee had intended to convey that India would not tolerate the spread of 
terrorism, then his decision to link the events in Gujarat with general observations 
about Indian Muslims was a serious miscalculation.677 Referring to the nation’s entire 
Muslim population under the rubric of terrorism would hardly rid the subcontinent of 
violence. Surely then, his rhetoric sought to counter the charges that were being 
leveled upon the Hindu community.678 The conspiracy theory and the jargon on 
international extremism proved instrumental in achieving this goal.  
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 Fortunately, the international response to events in Gujarat has been more 
conclusive. It seems beyond dispute that the Gujarat carnage meets the definition of 
genocide offered in the United Nations Convention on Genocide.679 Article two of the 
Convention states that:  
Genocide implies any of the following acts, committed with the intent to 
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as: 
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.680  
 
Incidents of rape and murder figured widely in the Gujarat riots. In light of the above, 
international journals such as Dissent and Boston Review tirelessly pursued contacts 
within the European and American State Departments.681 Following the media frenzy, 
a March 2004 report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
found Chief Minister Narendra Modi guilty of complicity in the Gujarat riots.682 In 
September 2004, the State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report 
reviewed the Gujarat case, giving a detailed account of the derailment of law and order 
in the state. The trajectory of violence associated with the BJP’s Hindutva agenda 
came to the fore through this report.683 Perhaps the most conclusive of these measures 
was the U.S. State Department’s decision to deny Modi a visa, when he was invited to 
address the Asian-American Hotel Owners Association in Florida in 2005.684  
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 While these efforts reined in militancy temporarily, and may have contributed 
to the BJP’s defeat in the 2004 general elections, the party’s presence in its traditional 
constituencies in northern India has not diminished. Of particular concern is the 
manner in which present-day Hindutva both reinforces and is reinforced by the anti-
Muslim bias that has crept into India’s judicial and executive branches.685 The 
aforementioned discussion of the partisanship in the Gujarati civil service applies to 
the national context as well. Legal decisions involving infamous cases, such as the 
burning of fourteen persons outside the Best Bakery in Vadodra on March 1, 2002, 
demonstrate the loopholes in Indian secularism. In addition, they call attention to the 
absence of a formal “separation of powers” in the Indian federation.686 In 2006, the 
Indian Supreme Court awarded a death sentence to Zahira Sheikh for her alleged 
involvement in the Best Bakery case. That the Court ruled against Sheikh, even though 
the National Human Rights Commission supplied the judges concerned with evidence 
of her innocence, indicates the prevailing biases in India’s judicial system.687 
 
Violence with a Difference 
The 2002 riots were not the first time Gujarat had witnessed communal 
violence. Hindu-Muslim skirmishes have characterized the state’s socio-political scene 
both prior to Partition688 and in the decades following 1947.689 
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It is worth noting, however, that the nature and scope of violence in post-
independent India has witnessed a dramatic shift. In the pre-independence period, 
communal riots were a form of reciprocal violence between Hindus and Muslims who 
were pitted against each other by colonial forces.690 Two features of rioting during the 
last two decades are perceptibly different. First, the number of victims from the 
Muslim community has consistently risen with each successive act of violence.691 
Second, Muslims have suffered a significantly higher rate of property loss during 
inter-communal clashes.692 Small-scale riots in India have escalated due to the 
communalization of social space by dedicated organizational outfits. Rhetorical 
slogans, such as “Muslims are aliens,” and “The only two abodes for Muslims are 
Pakistan and the graveyard,” are an essential feature of the mob mentality, and have 
been used extensively in past riots. The 1967, 1975, and 1984 riots in Allahabad (Uttar 
Pradesh) and Ahmedabad (Gujarat) exemplify the above.693 
The events in 2002 reflected many conventional patterns associated with 
religiously motivated violence. Yet there is consensus that the occurrences in Gujarat 
were fundamentally more alarming, as they signaled the rise of leaders steeped in 
Hindutva ideology.694 For many, the most chilling aspect of the violence (and the one 
feature which demonstrated that Hindu-inspired communalism is capable of assuming 
genocidal proportions in India) was the complicity of those charged with law 
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enforcement. Indeed, it was the steady infiltration of the BJP into the political fabric of 
Gujarat that enabled key leaders to enlist mass support for the violence that ensued.695  
Unlike before, when rioters sought to intimidate Muslims by targeting 
vulnerable sections of the Muslim community, the violence in 2002 witnessed 
unprecedented attacks on middle and upper class Muslim localities.696 Seemingly 
urbane Hindus participated in the looting. Muslims were openly attacked, even in 
areas where they constituted the majority.697 Victims of violence in Vadodra 
remarked: “Earlier, if there were riots, there was stabbing or stone-throwing in the 
streets. If Muslims stayed at home, they were safe. This time…they came to destroy 
houses, loot and burn. Our neighbors were involved. We have lost our trust.”698 A 
section of the media—newspapers like Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar—added fuel to 
the fire by sensationalizing the tragedies reported. Their efforts were supplemented by 
the advertisements posted by Sangh Parivar organizations; many of which extolled 
acts of violence in the name of self-defense.699 
Despite an outwardly defensive stance, internal estimates under the Modi 
government acknowledged the characteristic predominance of Muslim casualties in 
the Gujarat riots. Estimates indicate that initial violence resulted in the death of five 
Muslims for every Hindu. The ratio was as high as fifteen-to-one in the riots that 
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followed Godhra.700 Women were raped. Infants were burnt alive.701 The large-scale 
incineration of civilians, indicative of a sophisticated plan for extermination, had never 
been seen before; nor had the widespread use of sexual torture. For Hindu nationalists, 
the assault on Muslim women’s sexuality was a means of redeeming the dignity that 
Hindus had lost under Mughal dominion.702 These features of the Gujarat carnage 
point to the institutionalized aspects of rioting articulated in the first chapter of this 
thesis. They affirm that rhetorical and symbolic appeals to a negative view of history 
can instigate cyclical acts of violence.703 
 
A Haven for Hindutva?  
 As rioting gained momentum in Gujarat, Modi’s government conducted a 
survey to assess the electoral prospects of the BJP. The survey indicated that the 
party’s prospects were excellent. A news magazine, The Week, confirmed similar 
findings a fortnight later.704 At a time when the cry for rehabilitation was searing the 
Gujarati conscience, talk of elections seemed unfounded. Yet Modi was firm in his 
resolve. Aware that his government was under no threat, since he enjoyed a majority, 
Modi dissolved Gujarat’s state legislative assembly. His motive was clear: the Chief 
Minister sought to use electoral victory as a means of improving the BJP’s national 
prospects.705 
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 In a remarkable show of unity, the VHP, Bajrang Dal, and RSS came together 
to assist the BJP in its run for control over the state. By distributing leaflets, CD’s, and 
free meals during electoral rallies, Sangh Parivar organizations expressly endorsed the 
Gujarat government’s agenda.706 As the Modi government secured a laudable sixty-
five seats707 in the state in 2002, the precedent for using communal violence to achieve 
electoral gains was strengthened. Seventy-one percent of the total votes obtained by 
the party came from thirteen (of twenty-four) riot affected districts in Gujarat.708 
Given the BJP-led union government’s support for Narendra Modi, the 
Election Commission of India decided to review the situation. The three-member 
committee appointed by the Commission confirmed that the political environment in 
Gujarat was unfeasible for fair elections to be held. In line with expectations, the Modi 
government challenged the committee’s decision and referred the matter to the 
Supreme Court.709 Though the Court has since refused to express a view on the 
conduct of elections in a state gripped by strife,710 the events of 2002 reflect the BJP’s 
successful manipulation of the Indian judiciary.  
 In the aftermath of the Ayodhya incident, the BJP’s Rama campaign was 
loosing its steam. With the Babri mosque in ruins, and without an alternative rhetorical 
rallying point, BJP members struggled to garner local support. In light of the above, 
situating the violence in Gujarat in the “retaliation for Godhra theme” paid rich 
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dividends to the Sangh Parivar.711 It follows that the events in Gujarat cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the electoral fortunes of the BJP. As is typical of situations 
involving socio-political struggles, people in riot-stricken Gujarat sought stability. In 
fact, many in India believed that the BJP’s ideal of inclusion would provide them with 
safety and security.712 Unfortunately, the average Hindu gradually became invested in 
anti-minoritism due to Hindu nationalists’ persistent rhetorical maneuvers.713 By 
juxtaposing the issue of violence with Hindu nationalism, the BJP achieved not just 
electoral polarization, but also the communalization of civil society.714  
The communal riots in Gujarat left a lasting imprint on the Indian conscience. 
First, they called attention to the inadequate protection of life and personal liberty in 
the country.715 Second, they unraveled problems of relief and rehabilitation in the face 
of political and natural crises. Third, they exposed the need to hold perpetrators of 
political crimes accountable.716 The Modi government failed to respond to any of these 
concerns. In relation to the above, historian Ram Puniyani remarked: 
 An analysis of the Gujarat violence combined with the struggle against 
communalism not only leads to a better understanding of the phenomenon, but 
also brings out the real character of our ‘democratic’ institutions. Amidst our 
discussions regarding good governance, the crisis [of secularism], the decline 
into prejudice and partiality of our executive and judicial bodies, and the general 
decay of ‘civil society’ organizations of various forms have not been given due 
attention.717  
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Perhaps the most tragic result of the 2002 conflict is a phenomenon Allen 
Feldman calls the “militarization of everyday life.”718  One sees clear evidence of this 
not only in the form of everyday skirmishes amongst Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat, 
but also through the high incidence of suicides witnessed in the state between 2002 
and 2003.719 This indicates that violence has moved beyond the semantics of 
discourse. It has pervaded political institutions and previously syncretic social 
structures. A popular view is that communalization is the BJP’s recourse to electoral 
supremacy. However, traces of communal undertones are visible in the politics of 
several entities in the Indian context. What distinguishes votaries of Hindutva is that 
communalism for them is both a means to political power and an essential component 
of an overarching end: an ethno-nationalistic form of governance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
LEGALIZING COMMUNALISM: PREVENTION OF 
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ACT (POTA) 2002 
 
 
POTA: Political Context and Legislative Scope          
 Sensing the need for a national framework to combat terrorism in the post-
September 11 world order, India’s union cabinet issued the Prevention of Terrorism 
Ordinance (POTO) in October 2001. The government claimed that POTO was a 
response to “the upsurge of terrorist activities, and the intensification of cross-border 
terrorism and insurgency across the country.”720 A precursor to POTA, the ordinance 
targeted those who “incited, supported, abetted, harbored, concealed, or benefited 
from the proceeds of terrorism.”721 In reality, POTO granted law enforcement officials 
“sweeping powers to investigate, detain, and prosecute for a wide range of terrorism-
related offenses.”722         
 For many, POTO bore a resemblance to India’s “notorious” Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), which lapsed in 1995 after years of 
abuse.723 Despite initial criticism, POTO became an imperative segment of the ruling 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition’s posture on extremism.724 Events thereafter 
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only bolstered the party’s rhetoric on the need for national anti-terrorism legislation.725 
On December 13, 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked; allegedly by members 
belonging to two prominent Islamic terrorist groups.726 Accusing Pakistan of 
complicity, the BJP-led national government claimed that the attack was an assault on 
“the very heart of [India’s] system of governance, on the symbol [the Parliament] and 
the keystone of the largest democracy in the world.”727 The adroit attempt to link 
global terrorism with Pakistan’s (and implicitly Muslims’) ill-founded motives in 
India728 placed the country on a war footing (India deployed thousands of troops along 
the Indo-Pakistan border), and proved pivotal in pushing POTA through the 
Parliament. Less than three months after the attack, on March 28, 2002, during a joint 
session convened at the Prime Minister’s request, POTO, a temporary ordinance, was 
phased out in favor of a permanent legislative directive: the Prevention of Terrorist 
Activities Act.729         
 While the current Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition 
repealed POTA in 2004 due to its pro-Hindu bias, the Act legitimized rampant 
violations of minority rights in the two years that it was in force.730 More importantly, 
POTA’s legacy in India’s executive, judicial, and legislative organs has long-standing 
implications for future decisions regarding inter-communal clashes and acts of 
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terrorism.731 Although the Congress oversaw POTA’s demise, the party’s own anti-
minority orientation,732 and its reliance on Hindutva support for articulating a national 
economic vision, has bolstered the BJP’s nationalist aims. This chapter therefore seeks 
to describe both the import of POTA in the past and the legacy it has left for the 
future.  
POTA Evaluated        
 Opponents of POTA cite three aspects of the Act—its broad definition of 
terrorism, the sweeping powers of arrest and detention enshrined in the legislation, as 
well as the appeal and review process mandated under it—to demonstrate how 
Hindutva forces used its inbuilt discretionary authority to perpetuate communal 
ends.733 
Broad Definition of Terrorism      
 Many of POTA’s flaws stemmed from its broad text. While all laws may be 
susceptible to abuse, anti-terror legislation enables misdemeanors by placing 
permissive language in the hands of law enforcement officials.734 POTA defined 
terrorism as any act that “threaten[ed] the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of 
India… [a] strike in the people or any section of the people…or a disruption of any 
supplies or services essential to the life of the community.”735 It was taken for granted 
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that neither the government nor Indian security forces could be guilty of any of the 
aforementioned charges listed in Section II of POTA.736 Since the Act granted 
significant leverage to political actors, it was used to justify military operations and 
activism. Successive governments’ mobilization of troops in civilian populated 
regions of war-torn Kashmir, for example, was entirely exempt from the purview of 
POTA.737 Moreover, the law imposed a minimum five-year sentence on “[w]hoever 
conspire[d] or attempt[ed] to commit, advocate, abet, advise, incite, or knowingly 
facilitate the commission of a terrorist act, or any act preparatory to a terrorist act.”738 
Particularly troublesome were the words “advocate” and “incite,” for they indicated 
the erosion of fundamental rights like free speech and political expression. Section 21 
of POTA stipulated that even addressing “a meeting for the purpose of amassing 
support for a terrorist organization” was an outright offence.739 Evidently, POTA did 
more than just create new categories of crime under the rubric of terrorism. By 
defining terrorist acts in generalized terms that encompassed ordinary cases of murder, 
robbery, and theft, the Act enabled law enforcement officers to circumvent 
constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards. Due to this immunity, the police 
could subject violators to severe penalties such as electrocution and arbitrary 
detention.740 
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Sweeping Powers of Arrest and Detention     
 POTA’s vague definition of terrorism was especially problematic in light of its 
arrest and detention procedures. A fundamental criticism leveled against POTA is that 
the legislation disregarded the tenets of “due process” and “presumption of 
innocence.”741 Persons arrested under the Act could be held for thirty days before 
authorities were required to produce them in a special POTA court. POTA also 
allowed law enforcement agencies to withhold the identities of witnesses.742
 Human rights organizations have demonstrated that Indian authorities routinely 
used the thirty-day period to extract confessions from individuals of targeted 
communities. POTA was used by the government, writes Human Rights Watch, 
“against political opponents, religious minorities, dalits [or untouchables], tribal 
communities, and children.”743 India’s Human Rights Commission also condemned 
POTA. Its members declared that existing laws were “sufficient to deal with any 
eventuality, including terrorism.”744        
 As noted earlier, threats and torture became common means of extracting 
statements from individuals arrested under POTA. Detainees involved in the 2002 
Godhra case and the 2002 Mumbai blast case were raped, burned with cigarette butts, 
and subjected to electric shocks. In both instances, POTA allowed the prosecution to 
use a person’s confession—to a crime that he had not formally been charged with—as 
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evidence in the court of law.745       
 Section 49(2) of POTA enabled the police to detain a suspect for up to 180 
days without a formal charge. This far exceeded the limit stipulated under Indian 
criminal law.746 The Indian Constitution requires police to immediately inform a 
person of the grounds for his or her detention. Indian case law states that a speedy trial 
is “an integral aspect of ‘the fundamental right to life and liberty’ as enshrined in the 
Constitution.”747 POTA dramatically undermined each of these safeguards by 
endorsing arbitrary and punitive detention.     
 Stringent bail procedures further suppressed the rights of the accused. Under 
Section 48 (7) of the Act, special POTA courts could postpone bail petitions for a 
year. Moreover, if a prosecutor opposed bail, the courts could not release the accused 
without “grounds for believing that he [was] not guilty.”748 This provision reversed the 
“presumption of innocence” clause in the Indian Constitution, and granted prosecutors 
a veto over bail applications.749 In effect, POTA mandated a “presumption of guilt” 
even in cases where the accused merely possessed arms or explosives, or if his or her 
fingerprints were found at the scene of crime.750  
Appeal and Review        
 While POTA enabled either party to appeal a special court’s bail ruling before 
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a bench of two judges of a concerned state’s High Court,751 the Act stipulated no 
qualifications for the appointment of judges. Moreover, orders passed by a special 
POTA court during the interlocutory stage752 were non-reviewable.753  
 The central government initially defended POTA, arguing that it was “safe 
from abuse” because it entrusted only senior law enforcement and judicial 
functionaries with extensive investigative and adjudicative authority.754 Because 
POTA operated at the state level, however, regional governments wielded tremendous 
power over state law enforcement officials, regardless of their seniority.755  
  In an attempt to check this power, Indian legislators created a Central 
Review Committee. The measure was flawed from the outset. Though POTA’s text 
provided for a review committee, the absence of interpretive guidelines led to 
considerable confusion: “The government’s early interpretations limited the 
provision’s application to the primarily advisory review of certain surveillance 
procedures and the designation of terrorist groups.”756 Only after numerous reports of 
POTA’s anti-Muslim bias proliferated across India did the central government select 
certain cases, notably the 2002 Godhra case and the 2003 Mumbai blast case, for 
further review.757 A formal amendment in December 2003 gave the Committee the 
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power to “review prima facie cases,” and declared that its decisions were binding on 
POTA courts. Despite these changes, the Committee continued to lack both the time 
and resources required to address the cases brought to its attention.758 
POTA Applied        
 Once POTA was enacted, states wasted no time “in capitalizing on its broad 
definitions and sweeping powers of arrest and detention. Warning signs of POTA’s 
susceptibility to abuse surfaced in the summer of 2002.”759 Only four months after its 
enactment, law enforcement officers had arrested 250 people nationwide under the 
Act.760 Eight months later, seven states had used the legislation to arrest over 940 
people, 560 of whom are still held in jail. The instances discussed in the following 
section shed light on both the communal and political motives behind the use of 
POTA.761   
A Means to Communalism and Anti-Minoritism     
 Communalism and “political gamesmanship” have a long history in India. 
POTA’s opponents warned that officials would use the law to target minorities and 
political opponents.762 Their fears were soon realized.763   
Gujarat          
 The misuse of POTA along communal lines was most glaring in the state of 
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Gujarat, where the Act was invoked to arrest 123 Muslims who were supposedly 
involved in the February 2002 Godhra train attack.764 The government declined, 
however, to use POTA against the Hindus involved in the March 2002 riots that killed 
over 2,000 Muslims.765 Gujarat’s Chief Minister Narendra Modi characterized the 
violence as a “spontaneous reaction” to the train attack, despite evidence that the riots 
had been initiated by Hindu right-wing organizations like the Rashtriya 
Swamyamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP).766 The Gujarat 
police later used POTA to arrest Muslims involved in a post-riot reprisal against a 
former police official, K.N. Rao. Justifying the arrests, officials claimed that their 
investigations had “uncovered a major conspiracy. . .to strike terror in the minds of a 
particular section of  [Hindu] people.”767       
 It is worth noting that all but one of Gujarat’s 240 POTA detainees were 
Muslim. Law enforcement officials evaded even the few existing safeguards intended 
to protect detainees from abuse.768 According to Amnesty International, “The police 
neglected the writ of habeas corpus, held people for questioning for weeks without 
access to legal counsel, and threatened to arrest detainees’ family members under 
POTA if they petitioned the government.”769 The accused repeatedly complained of 
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being tortured770 and forced into giving confessions. POTA’s text, and the state’s 
justifications for prosecuting Muslims under the law, also supported charges against 
Hindu nationalist groups771 involved in the riots.772 Yet the Gujarat government chose 
to use the ambiguities in POTA to protect these groups. In so doing, it reiterated 
Hindutva’s majoritarian stance.        
 In 2005, the POTA Review Committee instituted under the central government 
opined that the accused in the Godhra case should not be tried under the provisions of 
POTA.773 Then in December 2008, the Supreme Court ordered that all proceedings in 
connection with the Godhra incident should be transferred from POTA special courts 
to the Godhra sessions court.774 Its 2008 judgment notwithstanding, the Supreme 
Court’s lack of leadership on the issue is disturbing. In a March 2009 follow-up 
judgment to the Gujarat High Court’s February 2009 decision, Supreme Court justices 
K.G. Balakrishnan and P Sathasivam maintained that they would “wait on the Gujarat 
High Court’s verdict.”775         
 The state’s High Court also decided that the Godhra carnage was not an act of 
terrorism and hence POTA was not applicable to the case. However, the Gujarat 
government refused to comply with the judgment and appealed the ruling before the 
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Supreme Court.776 Though the number of persons detained in connection with the 
Godhra case reduced from 240 to 79 by late 2009, the accused are still held under 
Section 3(10) of POTA by the Gujarat government.777  
Uttar Pradesh and the Akshardham Attack      
 Gujarat was not the only state that targeted Muslim minorities arbitrarily. 
“Jharkhand gained particular notoriety for arresting women, children, and the elderly,” 
despite the fact that states like Tamil Nadu decided against arresting juveniles under 
POTA.778 In April 2003, police in Uttar Pradesh arrested two Kashmiri Muslim 
students under POTA for sympathizing with a Muslim terrorist group. Every Kashmiri 
in the state became a suspect in the subsequent investigation.779   
 POTA was also invoked in the 2002 Akshardham temple780 terrorist attack 
case, in which thirty-three persons (Hindus and Muslims) were killed.781 The case was 
originally assigned to the national Anti-Terrorism Squad. For reasons unknown, it was 
subsequently transferred to the Gujarat Crime Branch in Ahmedabad, which seized the 
opportunity to employ POTA. In positing Akshardham with the Godhra train attack, 
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Gujarati Chief Minister Narendra Modi advanced the BJP’s anti-minority discourse. 
782
 
Mumbai: 2003 and 2006       
 POTA’s misuse after the 2003 Mumbai blasts was equally blatant.  In 2008, a 
special POTA court acquitted two of the three Muslims accused in the 2003 Mumbai 
twin blasts at the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar.783 A year later, in a review 
judgment, the court sentenced to death the three persons (including a woman) 
convicted in the case.784        
 The 2003 blast case was not the only time Mumbai witnessed the use of 
POTA. According to official sources, the July 2006 blasts in the city’s suburban 
railway trains killed 207 people, and left another 700 injured.785 Since no individual or 
group claimed responsibility for the attacks, the media, police, and Hindu nationalist 
groups seized the opportunity to accuse Islamic terrorist organizations786 of complicity 
in the bombings.787          
 The Mumbai police now claim the involvement of India’s Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT)788 and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in both attacks. Since the 
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2006 blasts occurred under the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
coalition, BJP leaders claimed that the events were a consequence of the ruling 
government’s leniency towards Indian Muslims.789 The BJP’s leadership therefore 
called for the revival of tough anti-terrorism measures such as POTA, which was 
repealed in 2004.790 POTA’s re-enactment was brought up by Hindutva ideologues 
again, in the wake of the Mumbai blasts on November 26, 2008.791   
 The danger of reinstating POTA lies in the fact that it was used extensively 
against Muslims after the 2003 bombings in Mumbai.792 While the Congress-led UPA 
coalition chose to neglect BJP demands, it actively used the controversial Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) Act (1967), which it revised and reenacted in 2004 after POTA 
was phased out.793 It is clear that POTA’s anti-minority stance has implicitly been 
adopted by the Congress. The move is telling of the extent to which the BJP’s 
ideology has permeated Indian political scene.  
A Tool to Eliminate Political Opposition      
 In addition to its application along communal lines, POTA was also used to 
rout political opposition in at least three states. Politicians unaffiliated with the 
Hindutva cause utilized “the national legislation” for personal purposes.794 
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Uttar Pradesh          
   In Uttar Pradesh, “after months of harassment in the form of criminal 
charges,” Chief Minister Mayawati used POTA to arrest her long-time political rival 
Mulayam Singh Yadav795 in December 2003.796 Though the media openly criticized 
Mayawati,797 the BJP-led national government endorsed the Chief Minister’s decision, 
in the hopes of securing her support in the 2004 parliamentary elections.798 The BJP’s 
agenda witnessed a serious setback when Mayawati lost the January 2004 Uttar 
Pradesh state elections. On assuming political control after Mayawati’s defeat, 
Mulayam Singh Yadav immediately released the former Chief Minister’s rivals. 
Unfortunately, a POTA special court denounced his order as arbitrary.799  
Jammu and Kashmir         
 In March 2002, police in Jammu and Kashmir invoked POTA to arrest a figure 
sympathetic to the secessionist movement: A former detainee under POTA’s 
forerunners, “Yasin Malik remains a prominent figure among a coalition of parties 
which have long sought autonomy from the Indian union.”800 In July 2002, a POTA 
special court granted Malik bail because of his failing health.801 The police rearrested 
Malik soon after his release under Jammu and Kashmir’s Public Safety Act, which 
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allows for preventive detentions.802 Malik was thereafter detained for five months 
before the state’s new government mandated his release. The government proclaimed 
magnanimously that the release reflected “a policy shift.”803 In reality, Malik’s 
detention and release bear testimony to the arbitrary application of POTA and related 
laws in India.804 
Tamil Nadu          
 The most significant example of POTA’s political misuse occurred in July 
2002, in the state of Tamil Nadu.805 Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha arrested several 
members—both Hindus and Muslims—of a rival Tamil nationalist party for publicly 
expressing sympathy for the banned Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam806 (LTTE).807
 
Prominent among those detained was Vaiko, the general secretary of the 
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) Party. After over four and a 
half months of questionaing, the police finally charged Vaiko, along with eight other 
MDMK officials. In its 440-page report, the Jayalalitha government claimed that the 
detainees had violated Sections 21(2) and (3) of POTA.808 Vaiko’s appeals against the 
proposed charges eventually prompted the Supreme Court to clarify that a mere 
                                                 
802
 Ibid. 
803
 Ibid.  
804
 K. Samu, “Terrorism/POTA-2005,” Human Rights Documentation, (New Delhi: Indian Social  
Institute, 2005). Available: http://www.isidelhi.org.in/hrnews/HR_THEMATIC_ISSUES/Terrorism 
/Terrorism-05.pdf. [February, 12, 2010].  
805
 Gagne, “POTA,” Boston College Third World Law Journal, 289. 
806
 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, commonly known as the LTTE or the Tamil Tigers, was a 
separatist organization formerly based in northern Sri Lanka. Founded in May 1976, it waged a violent 
secessionist campaign that sought to create an independent Tamil state in the north and east of Sri 
Lanka. See footnotes 70 and 73 for citation.  
807
 Menon, Nigam, Power and Contestation, 137. 
808
 Gagne, “POTA,” Boston College Third World Law Journal, 292. 
  
163 
expression of “verbal support” did not amount to a violation of Section 21 of the 
Act.809  Responding to Vaiko’s detention and prosecution, the BJP-led central 
government endowed POTA’s Central Review Committee “with the power to issue 
binding opinions on the validity of a state’s prima facie cases.”810 Jayalalitha 
immediately challenged the Review Committee’s jurisdiction over Vaiko’s case, 
which was proceeding in a POTA court.  Eventually, on February 7, 2004, as “Vaiko 
awaited word from the special court,” the Committee released him on bail “after 
eighteen months of needless detention.”811      
 The aforementioned cases demonstrate the varied ends towards which POTA’s 
discretionary authority was directed. So grave were the misdemeanors that occurred 
under the auspices of the Act that Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani conceded—
despite his staunch approval of the Act a year earlier—that evidence of POTA’s 
misuse was “serious enough” to warrant review.812 
A Lasting Legacy         
 In its assessment of POTA in 2004, the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative (CHRI) opined that a “revised version” of the Act should not include 
ordinary criminal cases in its definition of terrorism.813 The assessment also stipulated 
that revisions to POTA must ensure that the independence of the judiciary is not 
compromised. Specifically, CHRI argued that no judge’s tenure should extend beyond 
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the age of superannuation.814 The study also suggested that the controversy with 
regards to Section 49 (7) of POTA should be set at rest by endowing the judiciary (as 
opposed to special POTA courts) with the power to grant bail. In addition to its 
advocacy of shorter time frames for trials, the CHRI stressed the importance of 
allowing the publication of trial proceedings.815     
 In consonance with the sentiment of Human Rights organizations, the 
Congress Party vehemently opposed POTA during the 2001-02 debate over its 
enactment. Though Congress leaders said little about the Act during the 2004 spring 
election campaign,816 POTA’s repeal (on October 7, 2004) was included in the 
Common Minimum Program (CMP) that the party negotiated with its UPA coalition 
partners.817          
 The UPA government’s decision to repeal POTA failed to institute concrete 
change. The Act already contained a sunset clause which stipulated “a parliamentary 
review after three years of enactment,” and was set to expire in October 2004, merely 
one month after its much praised repeal.818 More importantly, however, the Congress 
combined the repeal of POTA with amendments to the 1967 Unlawful Activities 
Prevention Act (UAPA). These amendments have made POTA’s repeal largely 
cosmetic, given that the UAPA retains many POTA clauses.819  
 Some believe that anti-terrorism legislation essential to curb extremism in 
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India. However, when such legislation was in effect, it did not prevent terrorist 
attacks.820 The Indian Parliament was attacked in December 2001, when POTA was an 
ordinance. The May 2002 Kaluchak army base attack in Jammu and Kashmir and the 
September 2002 Akshardham Temple attack in New Delhi occurred after POTA was 
enacted as a permanent legislation.821 In fact, “POTA might actually have been 
instrumental in fueling terrorism.”822 Its misuse by Gujarati Chief Minister Modi is 
said to have “prompted hundreds of young people to join extremist outfits to counter 
the Indian state.”823 Unfortunately the lack of an international legal framework to 
combat terrorism has led the BJP to promote “Hindu nationalist” alternatives.824 This 
has ensured the perpetuation of anti-minority legislation like TADA and POTA.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
That the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) successfully enunciated a discourse on both 
Hindu nationalism and the need for strong governance proved instrumental to its 
success between 1998 and 2004.825 Yet, the party’s consecutive losses826 in the general 
elections of 2004 and 2009 signal that its leadership has failed to strike a cord with the 
growing plural sections of Indian society.827 As compared to the 270 parliamentary 
seats (37.06 percent of national votes) that the BJP captured in the 1999 general 
elections, its 159 seats (24.63 percent of national votes) after the 2009 elections 
illustrate the decline in the party’s national standing.828 
 The state elections of 2003-2004 provided telling signs of the BJP’s possible 
defeat in the upcoming national polls.829 The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) coalition lost in the February 2003 state elections, the northeastern states of 
Tripura, Meghalaya, and Nagaland.830 In the next round in December—featuring 
northern states like New Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan—reining Prime 
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Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s moderate approach rather than Hindutva’s nationalist 
plank ensured the BJP’s victory.831 Evidently, Hindu nationalists are still bound to the 
norms of a democratic political system.832 They must, therefore, cater their discourse 
to alternative electoral alliances and the impending anti-incumbency tendency; both of 
which have rendered “the state,” i.e. regional constituencies, an important unit in 
India’s electoral process.833  
 
Hindutva and Muslims  
Economic growth under the BJP’s Liberalization, Privatization, and 
Globalization (LPG) program remained confined to urban areas. The party’s efforts to 
commercialize agriculture during its reign between 1998 and 2004 were piecemeal, 
and found relatively few Muslim beneficiaries.834 Though a middle class of Muslim 
traders and professionals has emerged in the urban centers of western and northern 
India, agriculture remains the primary mode of sustenance for a vast majority in the 
Islamic community. The lack of economic opportunity, along with the fact that only 
59 percent of Indian Muslims are literate,835 has contributed to the community’s sense 
of marginalization and victimization.836 
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The virulent anti-Muslim rhetoric disseminated by Sangh Parivar 
organizations, in the wake of Hindu conversions to Islam during the late 1980s,837 
demonstrated that Hindu nationalists enjoyed a relatively free hand in India’s political 
arena.838 This predictably heightened Muslims’ insecurities. Realizing that their 
community lacked powerful public leaders, religious heads like Imam Bukhari of 
Delhi’s Jama mosque,839 and populist Islamic figures like Syed Shahabuddin, emerged 
as outspoken proponents of a culturally conservative platform.840 A quote from a 1991 
editorial in Shahabuddin’s monthly magazine, Muslim India, indicates an essentialist 
construction of religious identity similar to that proposed by Hindu nationalists:  
For a Muslim, at a personal level, his religious identity is supreme, rising 
above race, language, geography, [and] political jurisdiction. Indeed, he is not 
prepared to trade his religious identity at any price…to extend it is based in his 
scriptures, the Holy Koran and the Traditions of the Holy Prophet…this 
identity is universal, sacrosanct, and immutable; valid for all times and for all 
societies.841 
 
A glance at some of the transformations in the Indian Muslim community may 
shed light on the outburst of what is now referred to as Islamic conservative 
radicalism.842 As stated in chapter three, close to 4.5 million Indian Muslims migrated 
to Gulf nations during the 1970s.843 The economic opportunities in these countries 
enabled Muslims to bring back funds for the betterment of their brethren. Their newly 
acquired resources aside, the anti-Western rhetoric professed by radical Islamists in 
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the Middle East created a sense of urgency among Muslim intellectuals and clerics in 
India. Constructing an Islamic identity became crucial in this register.844  
Hindu nationalist rhetoric strengthened the conservatism in Indian Islam. On 
one hand, Hindutva ideologues sympathized with the apathetic status of Muslim 
women. This displeased Islamic clerics, who viewed the talk on gender inequality as 
an assault on the traditional social norms of their community.845 On the other hand, 
Sangh Parivar members spared no opportunity to direct rhetoric against Indian 
Muslims.846 Of particular significance is the manner in which Hindu nationalists used 
the discourse on global Islamic extremism847 to recast Muslims as a threat to the 
Hindus.848 The 2002 riots in Godhra exemplify the above. Exploiting violence to the 
party’s advantage, then BJP President Jana Krishnamurthi announced March 9, 2002 
as “anti-terrorism” day.849 Worse still, the media embraced this orientation. While 
controversies surrounding the construction of a Rama temple continued unabated, 
news from Ayodhya was presented as reports from Ground Zero.850   
 The enactment of POTA after the 2001 attacks on India’s Parliament played on 
both the legacy of the Partition and the notion of Islamic terrorism. The BJP 
government’s decision to expose the Pakistani origins of the conspirators was more 
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than just a statement of fact.851 The Muslim angle was deliberately introduced to 
arouse Hindu sentiments. Though POTA is no longer an active legislation, the 
ideological biases inherent to the Act have become systemic. Yet again, Gujarat is a 
sad reminder of the extent to which partisan views have penetrated the nation’s 
executive and judicial branches.852  
By appropriating the rubric against terrorism, Hindu nationalists altered 
attitudes in the Hindu and Islamic communities alike. For one, they subverted low 
caste fears concerning globalization.853 The strategy allowed the BJP to serve Hindu 
elites through the economic liberalization program of the 1990s. It simultaneously 
convinced other sections of Hindu opinion that global concerns posed a greater threat 
to the nation.854 Hindutva’s oscillation between anti-Muslim assertions and 
sympathetic discourse had already cornered the Muslim community. The emphasis on 
Islamic extremism further exacerbated conservative tendencies in Indian Islam. 
Communal backlash was the inevitable result.855 
Mushirul Hasan, a leading historian of Islam in India, elaborates on the latter 
trend, when he claims that Indian Muslims’ desire to assert their identity during the 
twentieth century encouraged them to insulate themselves from the processes of social 
change and modernization.856 While Hasan rightly notes that internal factors were 
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responsible for the community’s alienation from India’s secular and democratic 
institutions, it is equally true that Muslims are scarcely free to operate in Indian civil 
society. For over six decades, they have been targeted as undifferentiated enemies by 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its affiliates.857  
 
Hindutva and Hindus 
It is clear that the BJP’s political praxis after the 1980s enhanced the pre-
existing minority psychosis858 in India’s Islamic community. Besides its approach 
towards Islam, the party’s consistent subversion of the mass Hindu voice is perhaps 
the greatest limitation in its political vision.859 
The Sangh Parivar’s challenge to the secular state in the 1980s was founded 
upon an alternative that the Congress Party had already made dominant in the political 
field.860 According to historian Ram Puniyani, “The entire Ramjanmabhoomi agitation 
did not actually demolish secularism as a ‘legitimate problematic’ but recorded it to 
signify in ‘high’ political discourse what it already meant in political practice: the 
competitive mobilization of intersecting majorities and minorities along increasingly 
non-negotiable boundaries.”861 
The crux of the issue seems to be that although the BJP introduced a host of 
innovations into the practice of agitational politics, and set up a network of committed 
                                                 
857
 Ibid.  
858
 The fear psychosis among Indian Muslims is a product of the 1947 Partition, as well as external 
Islamic influences of the 1970s. See footnote 31 for citation. 
859
 Embree, Prospects for Peace in South Asia, 174. 
860
 Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 187. 
861
 Ibid. 
  
172 
activists all over the country, it has been unable to articulate a societal vision beyond 
the fuzzy rhetoric of social harmony (between upper and lower caste Hindus) even to 
this day. This has translated into the lack of an alternative party vision of what 
political practice should entail.862 Hindutva’s endorsement of both social conservatism 
and economic progressivism won the BJP the support of Hindu elites. The promise of 
economic opportunity also endeared those seeking upward mobility.863 The problem, 
however, is that Hindutva’s proximity to social hierarchies has rendered it difficult for 
the Sangh Parivar to articulate a socio-economic agenda that would mobilize the 
nation as a whole. Issues like land reform, education, and gender equality lie outside 
the overarching objectives of Hindutva.864 
It is precisely due to the absence of a concrete agenda that the BJP has drifted, 
time and time again, towards matters pertaining to faith.865 By undermining social 
hierarchies and providing a sense of unity during times of communal strife, religious 
issues have, until recently, sustained the party’s power. In essence, the RSS and its 
frontal organizations have no sustainable model of mass mobilization other than the 
use of Hindu-specific themes, such as the myth of Rama and the ideal of a caste-free 
Hindu society. As the next section reveals, the temptation to use these themes is 
becoming more powerful in the face of the BJP’s defeat.866 
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The Way Forward 
The current Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has 
repeatedly declared that it cannot intervene in either the 1992 Ayodhya dispute or the 
conflict over POTA’s misuse after the 2002 Gujarat carnage.867 Several reasons have 
contributed to this stance. First, the sympathies of significant elements in Gujarat and 
Uttar Pradesh868 lie not with Muslim victims, but rather with the instigators of 
communal violence. The UPA does not want to lose this section of votes at the 
polls.869 Second, the Congress relies on the BJP’s support in pressing forward with 
India’s “bourgeoisie reform agenda.”870 Third, were the Congress to dig into the BJP’s 
role in the Gujarat and Ayodhya riots, the latter would assuredly clamor for an inquiry 
into the Congress Party’s culpability in the 1984 anti-Sikh massacre.871  
It is indeed worrisome that the two principal parties in the world’s most 
populous democracy have secretly pledged to bury each other’s communal crimes. 
The UPA government’s inability to act notwithstanding, the elections of 2004 and 
2009 have underscored that India’s electorate seems vary of “coalition building” that 
rests on a pre-determined elitist base.872 Alluding to this development in his essay, The 
Muslim Factor, Asghar Ali Engineer states:  
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The BJP is playing a complex game with the full knowledge and approval of 
the RSS. BJP leaders know that [their] overture to Muslims will not elicit a big 
response from the community. Some have suggested that the speech by [Party 
President Laxman] was not so much aimed at Muslims as liberal Hindus. This 
may or may not be true. But in this era of coalition politics, the BJP wants to 
clear the decks for its coalition partners.873  
 
After having spent over two decades using the twin ideologies of economic 
liberalism and religio-ethnic nationalism to augment an elitist base, the realization that 
Indian institutions remain essentially pluralistic has predictably caused disappointment 
in the BJP. Of particular concern today is the future course that the party will adopt.874 
In an ideal scenario, Hindu nationalists would redefine “Hindutva” to better represent 
India’s secular spirit. The fear is that the BJP’s recent engagement with the RSS, to 
devise an agenda in the aftermath of its 2009 defeat, may result in an intensification of 
the pattern of cultural nationalism witnessed in the past.875 The RSS’s militant posture 
has hitherto stifled moderate voices in the BJP. The communalization of not just party 
ranks, but also the administrative machinery of an entire state is well illustrated in the 
2002 violence under Gujarati Chief Minister Narenda Modi.876 
As it stands, the BJP’s electoral following is limited to twenty-five percent of 
the popular vote.877 The issue today is not so much the “conversion” of India’s 
moderate electorate as it is the potency of anti-minoritism within the pre-established 
voter base of the BJP. The party’s decline878 has not impacted grassroots supporters in 
its traditional constituencies in the north. Though it lost seats in states like Uttar 
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Pradesh and Bihar in both 2004 and 2009,879 its presence in the states is by no means 
eliminated. Moreover, evidence of activism and force in the party’s rallies has actually 
increased.880 While Hindutva remains an essentially north Indian phenomenon, the 
aforementioned patterns of activism are equally evident in the BJP’s southern 
constituencies. Since 2003, the state of Kerala has recorded an average of two annual 
BJP-led rallies. Karnataka recorded twenty-two instances of communal conflict in 
2003, and Tamil Nadu witnessed three mobilization rallies following the BJP’s defeat 
in 2004.881 While the aforementioned trends indicate, on the surface, a decline in the 
BJP’s electoral strength (the party secured 24.6 percent of the national vote in 2009 as 
compared to 33.3 percent in 2004), they also indicate that the party’s following is far 
from diminished.882 A smaller, concentrated, and disciplined voter base may actually 
prove beneficial to the BJP’s activist agenda.  
The defeat in 2009 has provided the BJP’s cadres with an opportunity to 
evaluate the relevance of Hindu nationalism as an electoral pillar. To expand its 
national standing, it is imperative for the BJP to relinquish the extremities embodied in 
Hindutva. Should the party’s pendulum fail to swing in this direction, its economic 
reform agenda will continue to sustain its traditional elitist base. Chapter three reveals 
that it is possible for the BJP to use its current mobilization strategies—notably its use 
of the Rama myth—to endear low caste Hindus. It follows that irrespective of whether 
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the party wins new supporters, it will be able to retain those already in its fold.883 In so 
doing, the BJP’s leadership will likely strengthen its existing pattern of caste-based 
communal activism.  
Regardless of which course the BJP adopts in the long-term, it is clear that the 
party will not forfeit Hindutva in the near future. On the eve of the BJP’s defeat in 
2009, Party President Rajnath Singh maintained that there would be no compromise 
on ideology. He added that the party did not regret raising issues like religious quotas 
during campaigning, “as [such issues] are in the country’s welfare.”884 He also 
claimed that the BJP’s commitment to building a Rama temple in Ayodhya is 
reiterated in the party’s manifesto. With regards to the BJP’s larger agenda he stated, 
“Perhaps we need to present our views in a better and more contemporary context. For 
this, it is necessary that we strengthen our organizational structure, campaign and 
strategy.”885 On one hand, Singh’s comments underscore that the “contemporary 
context” demands plurality; i.e. the Indian electorate favors moderate institutions. On 
the other hand, they reveal the BJP’s unwillingness to adapt Hindutva. 
 The BJP’s insistence on maintaining pre-ordained political underpinnings 
despite the odds at hand is doubtlessly the most instructive aspect of this analysis. It 
proves that unless the party disassociates itself from the militant activism and rhetoric 
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inscribed in its core ideology, communal skirmishes and Islamic conservatism will 
continue to pervade the Indian political scene.  
The findings in this thesis underscore the manner in which the Bharatiya Janata 
Party has emerged as the political face of Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism. They 
demonstrate the inter-linkages between the BJP and its parent organizations, and 
indicate how the “cultural” aims of the latter have confined the political leeway of 
those within the party. The BJP was born in 1980, when the Hindu right began 
promoting a brand of revivalism that was embedded in the anti-minority ideas of the 
pre-Partition era. Since the party came into being at a juncture when Hindu 
conversions to Islam were at the forefront of the political scene, its members were able 
to extend the Hindutva platform. Ayodhya and Gujarat demonstrate how the BJP 
successfully used its Hindutva lineage in contemporary situations.  
In delineating the multiple facets of the BJP’s political agenda, this thesis 
confirms many overarching views in the scholarship of Chetan Bhatt, Deepa Reddy, 
Thomas Blom Hansen, Ram Puniyani, and Badri Narayan; all of whom highlight how 
the party projects itself as an inclusive organization despite its allegiance to an elitist 
voter base. The findings in this analysis reflect existing concerns over the costs that 
militant activism may impose on India’s social and political realms. While the thesis 
describes the pluralism in Indian society, it simultaneously reveals Hindutva’s ability 
to employ and adapt militant strategies on a decidedly smaller-scale. This explains 
why the BJP’s defeat has not prompted either its leadership or its grassroots supporters 
to shed the Hindutva plank. Equally significant is the persistence of an anti-minority 
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sentiment in India’s executive, judicial, and legislative branches after the BJP’s recent 
defeat. The case studies on Gujarat and the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act 
(POTA) bear testimony to this legacy. For these reasons, and many others, Hindutva 
in its current or alternative form is likely to remain a crucial variable within the BJP’s 
operations and in Indian politics.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Religious Composition of India 
Religious Composition Population Percentage 
Hindus 827,578,868 80.5 
Muslims 138,188,240 13.4 
Christians 24,080,016 2.3 
Sikhs 19,215,730 1.9 
Buddhists 7,955,207 0.8 
Jains 4,225,053 0.4 
Other persuasions 6,639,626 0.6 
Religions not stated 727,588 0.1 
Total 1,028,610,328 100 
Source: Census of India, 2001. Available: http://censusindia.gov.in/. [April 10, 2010]. 
 
Table 2: National Parties in India 
 
Party  Year 
Founded 
Seats in (Lok 
Sabha) Lower 
House of Parliament 
(out of 552) 
Seats in (Rajya Sabha) 
Upper House of 
Parliament (out of 250) 
Indian National 
Congress/ Congress 
1885 206 72 
Bharatiya Janata 
Party  
1980 116 55 
Bahujan Samajwadi 
Party  
1984 21 11 
Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) 
1964 16 15 
Nationalist 
Congress Party  
1999 9 4 
Communist Party of 
India  
1920 9 5 
 
Note: Parties are arranged by rank in descending order. 
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main 
              /index.as. [April 10, 2010]. 
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Table 3: Comparative Holdings: BJP vs. Congress 
 
 
Year BJP Congress 
 Seats  Votes (in 
percent) 
Seats  Votes (in 
percent) 
1991 120 20.1 232  36.5 
1999 270 37.06 156 28.3 
2004 181 33.3 218 35.4 
2009 159 24.63 262 37.22 
 
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main 
 /index.as. [April 10, 2010]. 
 
 
Graph 1: Decline in BJP seats in Parliament 
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Note: Figures are listed in table 3. 
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available:  http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ 
               index.as. [April 10, 2010].  
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Graph 2: Decline in BJP votes 
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Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ 
              index.as. [April 10, 2010].  
Note: Figures are listed in table 3. 
 
 
Pie-Chart 1: Religious Composition of India 
 
Key: Orange: Hinduism (80.5%), Green: Islam (13.4%), Purple: Christianity (2.3%),            
Red:  Red: Sikhism (1.9%), Blue: Others (0.19%)    source 
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://censusindia.gov.in.     
[April     [April 10, 2010].         
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Map 1: BJP and Congress Constituencies in the 2009 State Elections 
 
 
 
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ 
              index.asp. [April 9, 2010]. 
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Map 2: Regional Distribution of India’s Muslim Population 
 
 
 
Source: Election Commission of India, 2002. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ 
              index.asp. [April 9, 2010].  
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    Map 3: 1990 Chariot Procession (Rath Yatra) Locations and Death Toll 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of A Divided Nation, 330. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Several terms listed below have multiple meanings. They are defined here in 
accordance with the context in which they appear in this analysis. 
 
Ahimsa—non-violence 
Akhand Bharat—undivided India 
Akhara—wrestling ground 
Ashrama— (1) the four stages of life: student, celibate, householder, ascetic; (2) an 
institutional structure that may be used as a place of learning, or as a site for religious 
reflection 
Atman—soul  
Bhagwa dhwaj—saffron flag 
Bhakti—devotional form of Hinduism; arose in the medieval period 
Bharatmata—Mother India; feminization of Indian territory 
Bhoudik—spiritual and ideological training 
Brahamin—Hindu priest 
Brahaminism—a form of elitist Hindu worship; stressed caste hierarchies to seclude 
lower castes 
Brahman—universe; universal essence  
Dalit—untouchable  
Dharma—religion, duty, righteousness, the way of life 
Garibi hatao—remove poverty; Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s slogan  
Gaumata—Mother cow 
Goonda—muscleman 
Guru—religious teacher/ guide 
Hindu rashtra—Hindu nation 
Jati—caste group 
Jawan—soldier; term used to denote youth 
Kar sevak—RSS volunteer 
Mandir—Hindu temple 
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 Manusmriti—ancient Indian law book compiled between 200 CE and 200 AD. 
Masjid—mosque  
Namaz—Muslim prayer recited five times a day 
Panchayat—local governing and adjudicating council  
Pehelwan—professional wrestler/ strongman 
Pitrubhoomi—Sarvarkar’s term for Fatherland and Holyland 
Pracharak—full-time RSS organizer 
Puja—Hindu form of prayer  
Pundit—learned Hindu scholar 
Purdah—veil used by Hindu and Muslim women 
Ramrajya—rule by Rama 
Ramjanmabhoomi—the birthplace of Rama; a movement to replace the Babri mosque 
in Ayodhya with a Ram temple. 
Ratha—chariot used in a religious procession   
Rashtrasevika—female equivalent of a swayamsevak; member of the Rashtra 
Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS) female wing, the Rashtirya Swayamsevika Sangh 
(RSS*) 
Samskar—virtues, moral teachings  
Sangathan—organization of Hindus  
Sangh Parivar—the RSS family of organizations 
Sarsanghchalak—president of an organization 
Sarvodaya—welfare for all 
Sati—immolation of widows upon the death of their husbands; arose in medieval 
times 
Satyagraha—passive resistance 
Shakha—an RSS organizational unit where young men meet and conduct daily 
prayers, exercise, and discussions 
Shakti—creative power, latent or potential force  
Shuddhi—purification or reconversion to Hinduism  
Swadeshi— economic self-sustenance; indigenous production  
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Swayamsevak—RSS volunteer 
Swaraj—self-rule, independence 
Trishul—trident; emblem of Lord Shiva 
Ulama—Muslim religious council 
Varna—Vedic four-fold social ranking system consisting of brahamins or priests; 
kshatriyas or warriors; vaisyas or traders; and shudras or untouchables 
Varnashramadharma—a system which combines caste rankings (varna), social stages 
in life (ashrama), and duties appropriate to both caste and stage 
Yatra—pilgrimage, religious procession  
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